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Alberto Voltolini
Università degli Studi di Torino
  1.  37
    How Ficta Follow Fiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Springer.
    This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...)
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  2.  53
    Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...)
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  3. Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Synthese 153 (1):23-47.
    In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...)
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  4. Probably the Charterhouse of Parma Does Not Exist, Possibly Not Even That Parma.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - Humana Mente 6 (25):235-261.
    In this paper, I will claim that fictional works apparently about utterly immigrant objects, i.e., real individuals imported in fiction from reality, are instead about fictional individuals that intentionally resemble those real individuals in a significant manner: fictional surrogates of such individuals. Since I also share the realists’ conviction that the remaining fictional works concern native characters, i.e., full-fledged fictional individuals that originate in fiction itself, I will here defend a hyperrealist position according to which fictional works only concern fictional (...)
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  5.  33
    A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What is depiction? This is a venerable question that has received many different answers throughout the whole history of philosophy, especially in contemporary times. A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction elaborates a new account on this matter by providing a theory of depiction that tries to combine the merits of the previous theories while dropping their defects. It is argued that a picture is a representation in a pictorial or figurative mode, and its 'figurativity' is given by a special perception, perceiving-in, (...)
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  6. There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
    According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a (...)
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  7.  26
    Fiction.Alberto Voltolini & Fred Kroon - 2011 - Rivista di Estetica.
  8.  51
    Against Against Fictional Realism.Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):47-63.
    In a recent paper, Anthony Everett has mounted a very serious attack against realism with respect to fictional entities. According to Everett, ficta raise deep logico-ontological worries, for they violate some basic logical laws and are problematically indeterminate with respect to both their existence and identity. Since an antirealist account for sentences apparently committing us to ficta is available, no such committment is really needed. In this paper I will try to show, first, that the antirealist account Everett proposes for (...)
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  9.  26
    Twofoldness and Three-Layeredness in Pictorial Representation.Alberto Voltolini - 2018 - Estetika 55 (1):89-111.
    In this essay, I defend a Wollheimian account of a twofold picture perception. While I agree with Wollheim’s objectors that a picture involves three layers that qualify a picture in its complexity -- its vehicle, what is seen in it, and its subject --, I argue that the third layer does not involve perception, even indirectly: what is seen in a picture constrains its subject to be a subject of a certain kind, yet it does not force the latter to (...)
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  10. Towards a Syncretistic Theory of Depiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - In C. Calabi (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Palgrave.
    In this paper I argue for a syncretistic theory of depiction, which combines the merits of the main paradigms which have hitherto faced themselves on this issue, namely the perceptualist and semioticist approaches. The syncretistic theory indeed takes from the former its stress on experiential factors and from the latter its stress on conventional factors. But the theory is even more syncretistic than this, for the way it accounts for the experiential factor vindicates several claims defended by different perceptualist theories. (...)
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  11. All the Existences That There Are.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):361-383.
    In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the (...)
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  12. The Mark of the Mental.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4:124-136.
    In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered (...)
     
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  13. Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...)
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  14.  11
    Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...)
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  15.  10
    Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...)
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  16. What's in a (Mental) Picture.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - In A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer. pp. 389-406.
    In this paper, I will present several interpretations of Brentano’s notion of the intentional inexistence of a mental state’s intentional object, i.e., what that state is about. I will moreover hold that, while all the interpretations from Section 1 to Section 4 are wrong, the penultimate interpretation that I focus in Section 5, the one according to which intentional inexistence amounts to the individuation of a mental state by means of its intentional object, is correct provided that it is nested (...)
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  17.  97
    The Seven Consequences of Creationism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (1):27-48.
    Creationism with respect to fictional entities, i.e., the position according to which ficta are creations of human practices, has recently become the most popular realist account of fictional entities. For it allows one to hold that there are fictional entities while simultaneously giving such entities a respectable metaphysical status, that of abstract artifacts. In this paper, I will draw what are the ontological and semantical consequences of this position, or at least of all its forms that are genuinely creationist. For (...)
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  18.  94
    Consequences of Schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
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  19.  2
    Cognitive Penetrability and Late Vision.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (3):363-371.
    : In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos provides a new defense of the thesis that, unlike early vision, late vision is cognitively penetrable, in accordance with a new definition of cognitive penetrability that is centered on the ideas of direct influence of cognition upon perception and of the epistemic role of perception. This new definition allows him to maintain that late vision is a genuinely perceptive stage of the perceptual process. In this paper, I try (...)
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  20.  18
    How to Allow for Intentionalia in the Jungle.Alberto Voltolini - 2007 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 27 (1):86-105.
    In this paper I will Wrst contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entitiesz—zlike those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian campz—zare ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, speciWcally addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a deWnite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently speciWc kind, i.e. intentionalia, broadly conceived as things (...)
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  21.  31
    Is Wittgenstein a Contextualist?Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):3.
    There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist (...)
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  22. To Think is to Have Something in One’s Thought.Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...)
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  23. Against Phenomenal Externalism.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (145):25-48.
    We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal external- ism is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see (...)
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  24. Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia&Quest;.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...)
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  25. The Content of a Seeing-As Experience.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - Aisthesis: Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):215-237.
    In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational seeing-as (its configurational fold) and by an (...)
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  26.  27
    Perceiving Groupings, Experiencing Meanings.Giulia Martina & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Rivista di Estetica 66:22-46.
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  27.  60
    How Pretence Can Really Be Metarepresentational.Cristina Meini & Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (1):31-58.
    Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality, an activity that adults share with children. After providing a brief reconstruction of the most important cognitive theories on pretence, we will argue that pretence has to do with metarepresentations, albeit in a rather weakened sense. In our view, pretending entails being aware that a certain representation does not fit in the very same representational model as another representation. This is a minimal metarepresentationalism, for normally metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or (...)
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  28.  2
    Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...)
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  29. Heidegger's Logico-Semantic Strikeback.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22:19-38.
    In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately (i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger’s famous sentence that should paradigmatically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., “the nothing nothings”, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sentence has to be evaluated—not as (...)
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  30.  25
    Contingent Sameness and Necessary Identity.Alberto Voltolini - 2014 - In Adriano Palma (ed.), Castañeda and His Guises: Essays on the Work of Hector-Neri Castañeda. De Gruyter. pp. 187-206.
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  31.  26
    To Think Is to Literally Have Something in One’s Thought.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object (...)
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  32. Indexinames.Alberto Voltolini - 1995 - In J. Hill & P. Kot'attko (eds.), Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning. Filosofia. pp. 258-285.
    Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...)
     
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  33.  64
    Objects as Intentional and as Real.Alberto Voltolini - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 41 (1):1-32.
    A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the object deserves (...)
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  34. Fiction and Indexinames.Alberto Voltolini - 2014 - Journal of Literary Theory 8 (2):293–322.
    In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...)
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  35.  76
    How Demonstrative Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):402-418.
    In a very recent paper (2010), Dominic McIver Lopes has claimed that pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. If as I think Lopes is right, this has important consequences for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics divide. For one can exploit Lopes' claim in order to provide one more argument in favour of the well-known contextualist thesis that wide context has not only both a pre- and a post-semantic role, but also a semantic role – to put it in (...)
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  36. How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2011 - In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--93.
    In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use of fiction-involving sentences. Thus, (...)
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  37.  96
    How Fictional Works Are Related to Fictional Entities.Alberto Voltolini - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (2):225–238.
    The paper attempts at yielding a language-independent argument in favour of fictional entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of such entities. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works. It will also be evaluated to what extent this argument is close to other arguments recently provided to the same purpose.
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  38.  54
    Ficta Versus Possibilia.Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 48 (1):75-104.
    Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have (...)
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  39. Reference Intentionality is an Internal Relation.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - In S. Miguens, J. A. Pinto & C. E. Mauro (eds.), Analyses. Facultade de Letras da Universidade do Porto. pp. 66-78.
    In this paper, I will focus on the basic form of intentionality, reference intentionality (from now on, RI), the property an intentional state has of being ‘directed upon’ a certain object, its intentional object. I will try to prove that (as Husserl, Wittgenstein and others originally envisaged) RI is not only a state - intentional object relation, but it also is an internal, i.e., a necessary, relation between that state and that object, at least in the sense that the state (...)
     
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  40.  9
    Ficta Versus Possibilia.Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 48 (1):75-104.
    Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have (...)
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  41. On the Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism.Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 24.
    In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, (...)
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  42.  74
    Can There Be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference?Alberto Voltolini - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):75-98.
    There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make (...)
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  43.  6
    Towards Non‐Being. The Logic And Metaphysics of Intentionality – By G. Priest.Alberto Voltolini - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):557-561.
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  44. The Nameability of Possible Objects.Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - From a Logical Point of View 3:14-33.
    Within the general framework of the theory of direct reference, there is no agreement as to whether unactualised possible objects (from now on, possibilia) can be referred to by means of directly referential singular terms (from now on, DR terms). While some have maintained that such a direct reference can be established e.g. via some fixing-reference description (Kaplan, Salmon, and perhaps Kripke himself), others have denied any such possibility. In what follows, I will scrutinise such denials by attempting at the (...)
     
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  45.  55
    Why the Computational Account of Rule‐Following Cannot Rule Out the Grammatical Account.Alberto Voltolini - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):82-104.
    In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics (...)
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  46.  5
    Riferimento e intenzionalita'. With a Preface by M. Dummett.Alberto Voltolini - 1992 - ETS.
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  47.  7
    How Fictional Works Are Related to Fictional Entities.Alberto Voltolini - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (2):225-238.
    The paper attempts at yielding a language‐independent argument in favour of fictional entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of such entities. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically‐based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works. It will also be evaluated to what extent this argument is close to other arguments recently provided to the same purpose.
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  48. Contingent and Necessary Identities.Alberto Voltolini - 1997 - Acta Analytica 12:73-98.
    A new theory of identity statements is put forward which appeals to a basic distinction between two notions of identity, i.e. strict and loose identity. The former is the traditional necessary relation of an object with the object itself, whereas the latter is a contingent relation of reduction of some (at least two) possible unactual objects to a possible actual object. By appealing to strict identity, one can maintain that some tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which is (...)
     
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  49. Why It is Hard to Naturalize Attitude Aboutness.Alberto Voltolini - 2002 - In W. Hinzen & H. Rott (eds.), Belief and Meaning. Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 157-179.
    Over the last twenty years, many attempts have been made to discard the intentionality possessed by prima facie contentful mental states (intentional acts; atttudes, in Russell’s terms), where this is understood as the special, mental-orsemantic, quality of being ‘directed’ upon something. This has also involved dispensing with special ‘aboutness’-properties like being about O, which stand to intentionality as species to genus. These naturalistic strategies have been oriented in two ontologically different ways, conservative or revolutionary. The first has been pursued either (...)
     
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  50. Critical Notice Of: François Recanati, Direct Reference (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). [REVIEW]Alberto Voltolini - 1997 - European Review of Philosophy 2:175-184.
    Everything you wanted to know about direct reference and always dared to ask is contained in Recanati's new book, which is not only a comprehensive survey on the received doctrine but also an original attempt to find a new way out of the many puzzles which surround the "new theory of reference" (in H. Wettstein's words) since its origins. Principles and conceptions are indeed acutely specified and Recanati's own theses are argued for in a very subtle and rigorous way. One (...)
     
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