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Alex Bundy
University of California at Santa Barbara
  1. On “Epistemic Permissiveness”.Anthony Brueckner & Alex Bundy - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):165-177.
    In "Epistemic Permissiveness", Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one's total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ~P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White's arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.
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    On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Aikin, Harbour, Neufeld, and Talisse.Alex Bundy - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):619-624.
    The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension. In “In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness” I presented arguments that their arguments do not succeed, and in “On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy” they argue that my arguments are not successful. I here clarify (...)
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    In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness.Alex Bundy - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):287-292.
    The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.
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