9 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Alex Friedman [4]Alexander Friedman [3]Alexander W. Friedman [2]
  1.  42
    Beyond Accountability for Reasonableness.Alex Friedman - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (2):101–112.
  2.  31
    Which Benefits of Research Participation Count as 'Direct'?Alexander Friedman, Emily Robbins & David Wendler - 2012 - Bioethics 26 (2):60-67.
    It is widely held that individuals who are unable to provide informed consent should be enrolled in clinical research only when the risks are low, or the research offers them the prospect of direct benefit. There is now a rich literature on when the risks of clinical research are low enough to enroll individuals who cannot consent. Much less attention has focused on which benefits of research participation count as ‘direct’, and the few existing accounts disagree over how this crucial (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3.  33
    Does the Elephant Belong in the Room?Alexander Friedman - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (10):51 – 52.
  4.  52
    Intransitive Ethics.Alex Friedman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):277-297.
    This article addresses the question of whether the relation of moral preference is transitive. I argue, following Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels, that any ethical theory complex enough to be even minimally plausible allows us to generate intransitive sets of preferences. Even act utilitarianism cannot avoid this predicament unless we accept its least plausible version. We must reevaluate the assumption that an ethical theory must be transitive in order to be rational. This problem amounts to a foundational crisis in ethics. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  48
    Intransitivity and Priority Setting.Alex Friedman & Marion Danis - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:173-189.
    It is a basic and intuitive assumption that the relation of moral preference must be transitive—if A is overall morally preferable to B; and B is overall morally preferably to C; then, if our views are coherent, it better be the case that A is overall morally preferable to C. However, recent work by Temkin and Rachels has undermined that assumption by showing that common-sense ethical distributive principles that we are unlikely to give up generate intransitive sets of moral preferences. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  44
    Rationing and Social Value Judgments.Alexander W. Friedman - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics 11 (7):28 - 29.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 7, Page 28-29, July 2011.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  11
    Intransitivity and Priority Setting.Alex Friedman & Marion Danis - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:173-189.
    It is a basic and intuitive assumption that the relation of moral preference must be transitive—if A is overall morally preferable to B; and B is overall morally preferably to C; then, if our views are coherent, it better be the case that A is overall morally preferable to C. However, recent work by Temkin and Rachels has undermined that assumption by showing that common-sense ethical distributive principles that we are unlikely to give up generate intransitive sets of moral preferences. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  25
    Complete Lives, Incomplete Theories.Alexander Friedman - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics 10 (4):58 – 60.
  9. Minimizing Harm: Three Problems in Moral Theory.Alexander W. Friedman - 2002 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Distance and morality. I argue that in "Faminine Ethics: the Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer's Ethical Theory" Frances Kamm fails to produce a pair of cases in which a moral difference is present that is not attributable to factors other than distance. I also point out that Kamm's attempts at explaining why distance could possibly matter in morality fall far short. I conclude that there is no reason for us to believe that distance matters in morality and offer (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark