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Alex Kiefer
Monash University
  1.  87
    Content and Misrepresentation in Hierarchical Generative Models.Alex Kiefer & Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2387-2415.
    In this paper, we consider how certain longstanding philosophical questions about mental representation may be answered on the assumption that cognitive and perceptual systems implement hierarchical generative models, such as those discussed within the prediction error minimization framework. We build on existing treatments of representation via structural resemblance, such as those in Gładziejewski :559–582, 2016) and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, to argue for a representationalist interpretation of the PEM framework. We further motivate the proposed approach to content by arguing that it (...)
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  2.  31
    Literal Perceptual Inference.Alex Kiefer - 2017 - In Thomas Metzinger & Wanja Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and predictive processing. Frankfurt, Germany:
    In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. -/- In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the (...)
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  3. Representation in the Prediction Error Minimization Framework.Alex Kiefer & Jakob Hohwy - 2019 - In Sarah K. Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology: 2nd Edition. London, UK: pp. 384-409.
    This chapter focuses on what’s novel in the perspective that the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework affords on the cognitive-scientific project of explaining intelligence by appeal to internal representations. It shows how truth-conditional and resemblance-based approaches to representation in generative models may be integrated. The PEM framework in cognitive science is an approach to cognition and perception centered on a simple idea: organisms represent the world by constantly predicting their own internal states. PEM theories often stress the hierarchical structure of (...)
     
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  4.  39
    The Intentional Model in Interpretation.Alex Kiefer - 2005 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (3):271–281.