Continuing work begun in [10], we utilize a notion of forcing for which the generic objects are structures and which allows us to determine whether these “generic” structures compute certain sets and enumerations. The forcing conditions are bounded complexity types which are consistent with a given theory and are elements of a given Scott set. These generic structures will “represent” this given Scott set, in the sense that the structure has a certain weak saturation property with respect to bounded complexity (...) types in the Scott set. For example, if ? is a nonstandard model of PA, then ? represents the Scott set ? = n∈ω | ?⊧“the nth prime divides a” | a∈?.The notion of forcing yields two main results. The first characterizes the sets of natural numbers computable in all models of a given theory representing a given Scott set. We show that the characteristic function of such a set must be enumeration reducible to a complete existential type which is consistent with the given theory and is an element of the given Scott set.The second provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a structure ? such that ? represents a countable jump ideal and ? does not compute an enumeration of a given family of sets ?. This second result is of particular interest when the family of sets which cannot be enumerated is ? = Rep[Th(?)]. Under this additional assumption, the second result generalizes a result on TA [6] and on certain other completions of PA [10]. For example, we show that there also exist models of completions of ZF from which one cannot enumerate the family of sets represented by the theory. (shrink)

We examine the relationship between two different notions of a structure being Scott set saturated and identify sufficient conditions which guarantee that a structure is uniquely Scott set saturated. We also consider theories representing Scott sets; in particular, we identify a sufficient condition on a theory T so that for any given countable Scott set there exists a completion of T that is saturated with respect to the given Scott set. These results extend Scott's characterization of countable Scott sets via (...) models and completions of Peano arithmetic. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the greatest and most fascinating philosophers of all time. His Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, composed in a series of remarkable numbered propositions, was the only book he published in his lifetime. He tackles nothing less than the question of whether there is such a thing as a logically perfect language and, armed with it, what we can say about the nature of the world itself. Pushing the limits of language, logic and philosophy, the Tractatus is a brilliant, (...) cryptic and hypnotic tour de force, exerting a major impact on twentieth-century philosophy and stirring the imagination today. With a new foreword by Ray Monk. (shrink)

The proposal by Clarke and Beck offers a new explanation for the association between the approximate number system and math. Previous explanations have largely relied on developmental arguments, an underspecified notion of the ANS as an “error detection mechanism,” or affective factors. The proposal that the ANS represents rational numbers suggests that it may directly support a broader range of math skills.

The current paper proposes the Dysexecutive Luck hypothesis; that beliefs in being unlucky are associated with deficits in executive functioning. Four studies suggest initial support for the Dysexecutive Luck hypothesis via four aspects of executive functioning. Study 1 established that self-reports of dysexecutive symptoms predicted unique variance in beliefs in being unlucky after controlling for a number of other variables previously reported to be related to beliefs around luck. Studies 2 to 4 demonstrated support for the Dysexecutive Luck hypothesis via (...) assessment of executive functioning via: two fundamental executive functions , emotional processes related to executive functioning as described by the Somatic Marker hypothesis, and higher executive functions as accessed via divergent thinking. The findings suggest that individuals’ beliefs in being unlucky are accompanied by a range of deficits in executive functioning. (shrink)

In Russell's Problems of Philosophy, acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.

Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent (...) the world. This book explores an important assumption about representation, namely, that when we represent things in the world, we represent them as having properties, and in this way our representations have "propositional" structure. The contributors examine what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; illuminate why one might find the thesis attractive ; and consider ways in which one might depart from propositionalism. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of how the mind and world are connected. (shrink)

The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and (...) equality that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and (...) equality that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

In face-to-face interaction, speakers make multimodal contributions that exploit both the linguistic resources of spoken language and the visual and spatial affordances of gesture. In this paper, we argue that, in formulating and understanding such multimodal contributions, interlocutors apply the same principles of coherence that characterize the interpretation of natural language discourse. In particular, we use a close analysis of a series of naturally-occurring embodied discourses to argue for two key generalizations. First, communicators and their audiences draw on coherence relations (...) to establish interpretive connections between successive gestures and between gestures and speech. Second, coherence relations facilitate meaning-making by resolving the underspecified meaning of each communicative act through constrained inference over entities, propositions, and spatial frames made salient in the prior discourse. Our approach to gesture interpretation improves on previous work in better accounting for its flexibility, in capturing its constraints, and in laying the groundwork for formal and computational models. At the same time, it shows that gesture provides an important source of evidence to sharpen the theory of coherence relations and contextual resolution. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the representation of negated sentences in Minimal Recursion Semantics (Copestake, Flickinger, Pollard, & Sag, 2005). We begin with its treatment in the English Resource Grammar (Flickinger, 2000, 2011), a broad-coverage implemented HPSG (Pollard & Sag, 1994), and argue that it is largely a suitable representation for English, despite possible objections. We then explore whether it is suitable for typologically different languages: namely, those that express sentential negation via inflection on the verb, particularly Turkish and Inuktitut. (...) We find that the interaction between negation and intersective modifiers requires a change to the way in which (at least) one of them contributes to semantic composition, and we argue for adapting the analysis of intersective modifiers. (shrink)

This is a tough-minded book, written in a clear, even-toned, flat and uncompromising style. There are no concessions to time and place: all is a matter of true premises and valid argument. Sainsbury presents Russell's arguments in a manner always cogent, usually lucid and occasionally with remarkable insight. More perhaps than in other volumes in this series, the arguments are not only of the philosopher at hand, but pre-eminently for professional philosophers. The arguments are for the most part those (...) adduced by Russell in support of his doctrines of logical atomism and hence for various claims about language, knowledge, and the world. Sainsbury has deliberately chosen to limit his discussion to these topics, thus omitting reference to Russell's moral and political philosophy and to some topics in philosophical psychology. The choice was a useful one, enabling Sainsbury to trace themes beginning in chapters on "Meaning," "Names," "Descriptions," and "The Perfect Language," to those on "Knowledge," "Ontology," and "Mathematics.". (shrink)