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Alexander Watson
Wesleyan University
  1. The Self's Awareness of Itself: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self.Alex Watson - 2006 - Sammlung de Nobili.
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    Contrasting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist Explanations of Attention.Alex Watson - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.
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    Light as an Analogy for Cognition in Buddhist Idealism (Vijñānavāda).Alex Watson - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):401-421.
    In Sect. 1 an argument for Yogācāra Buddhist Idealism, here understood as the view that everything in the universe is of the nature of consciousness / cognition, is laid out. The prior history of the argument is also recounted. In Sect. 2 the role played in this argument by light as an analogy for cognition is analyzed. Four separate aspects of the light analogy are discerned. In Sect. 3, I argue that although light is in some ways a helpful analogy (...)
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    Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Elaboration of Self-Awareness ( Svasaṃvedana ), and How It Differs From Dharmakīrti's Exposition of the Concept.Alex Watson - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):297-321.
    The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition ( ahampratyaya ). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). (...)
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    The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments.Alex Watson - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (1):173-193.
    The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṇical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance (...)
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