Adam Smith's ethics have long been thought to be much closer to the Stoic school than to any other school of the ancient world. Recent scholarship however has focused on the fact that Smith also appears to be quite close to Aristotle. I shall attend to Smith's deployment of a version of the doctrine of the mean, shall show that it is quite close to Aristotle's, shall demonstrate that in its detailed application it is seriously at odds with Stoic teaching (...) on the passions, and particularly with their teachings on anger, and shall conclude that on a central issue of ethics Smith is a good deal closer to Aristotelian than to Stoic thinking. (shrink)
Medieval logicians advanced far beyond the logic of Aristotle, and this book shows how far that advance took them in two central areas. Broadie focuses upon the work of some of the great figures of the fourteenth century, including Walter Burley, William Ockham, John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and Paul of Venice, and deals with their theories of truth conditions and validity conditions. He reveals how much of what seems characteristically twentieth-century logic was familiar long ago. Broadie has extensively revised (...) his text for this second edition, while preserving the character of the first. There are now fuller accounts of supposition, of intentional contexts, and of medieval syllogistic, and the conclusion has been substantially expanded. (shrink)
Some of the greatest writers on moral philosophy have claimed that their theories about morality do not run counter to the moral views of ordinary men, but on the contrary are an elucidation of such views, or provide them with a sound philosophical underpinning. Aristotle, for example, made it quite clear that he could not take seriously a moral view that was at odds with the heritage of moral wisdom deeply imbedded in his society. His doctrine of the mean was (...) based on a philosophical consideration of such wisdom. And Immanuel Kant thought that his moral philosophy articulated the moral views of ordinary men. (shrink)
Philosophy was at the core of the eighteenth century movement known as the Scottish Enlightenment. The movement included major figures, such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson, and also many others who produced notable works, such as Gershom Carmichael, George Turnbull, George Campbell, James Beattie, Alexander Gerard, Henry Home (Lord Kames) and Dugald Stewart. I discuss some of the leading ideas of these thinkers, though paying less attention than I otherwise would to Hume, Smith (...) and Reid, who have separate Encyclopedia entries. Amongst the topics covered in this entry are aesthetics (particularly Hutcheson's), Moral philosophy (particularly Hutcheson's and Smith's), Turnbull's providential naturalism, Kames's doctrines on divine goodness and human freedom, Campbell's criticism of the Humean account of miracles, the philosophy of rhetoric, Ferguson's criticism of the idea of a state of nature, and finally the concept of conjectural history, a concept especially associated with Dugald Stewart. (shrink)
The early 16th century was a time of intense intellectual activity during which ideas central to the disputes between traditionalists and reformers were being refined. This is the first full-length study of the quest for the answer to the question then being asked: "What is knowlege?" Broadie focuses on the distinction between sensory and intellectual cognition, and on the concept of "notion" which was central to the epistemological debates of the period, paying special attention to the doctrines of John Mair, (...) David Cranston, Gilbert Crab, George Lokert and Gervaise Waim, all philosophers at the University of Paris between 1500 and 1530 who represented the intellectual tradition confronting the reformers. (shrink)
Each human being is a co-creator of the world and when a human being dies the world he co-created is thereby annihilated. The main authors discussed are Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and David Hume.
The strong and the weak deontic operators, O and p, Have been employed as operators on names of acts (e.G. By g h von wright) and on imperatives (e.G. By m fisher), But most commonly as proposition forming operators on propositions (e.G. By a n prior). But a strong case can be made out for the introduction of two kinds of adverbial deontic operator operating respectively on a proposition and on a predicate. These two operators can be used to symbolize (...) the kantian notions of acting in accordance with the moral law and acting out of respect for the moral law. In this paper the syntactic properties of these adverbial operators are examined in detail and a start is made on the symbolization of a system, A system of kantian deontic logic, Containing them. (shrink)
Are faith and knowledge mutually incompatible in the sense that it is not possible for someone both to know something to be the case and also, and at the same time, to accept as a matter of faith that it is the case? Robert Baron, one of the group of early seventeenth-century Episcopalians known as the ‘Aberdeen doctors’, examines this question and provides an answer full of philosophical interest. This article discusses his answer, focusing in particular on his account of (...) the nature of and the relation between the assent of knowledge, assent of faith, and assent of will. (shrink)
What is the correct way to interpret terms when they are used to signify divine attributes? In The Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides addresses this perennial problem. I shall discuss his solution, and on the basis of that discussion I shall attempt to shed light on the question of the relationship between Maimonides' solution and that of St Thomas Aquinas, Maimonides' most illustrious critic. I wish to argue that on this most important of issues the difference between these two universal (...) figures is a good deal less than might readily be supposed. But first it should be said that Maimonides did not make things easy for those of later generations who have sought his help. Part of our difficulty with the Guide is rooted in the pastoral concern which Maimonides had for the strength of faith of those in his care. He recognized that certain of his doctrines lent themselves to misinterpretations which could lead to loss of faith. And we should scarcely expect the greatest leader of twelfth-century Jewry to ignore such a risk. His solution was to write the Guide on two levels, for two classes of people, the philosophically sophisticated and the multitude. Evidently a book which is both esoteric and exoteric leaves room for dispute about the author's intentions. And disputes have duly taken place. But there is a consensus on one critically important matter, namely, the purpose of the Guide . It was written in order to provide a philosophical interpretation of the Bible for conscientiously observant Jews who have at the same time been successful in their philosophical studies. Those studies might set the faith of such Jews at risk, and Maimonides’ intention is to protect their faith. In accepting this as his intention I am taking him at his word. (shrink)
During the last few months of his life James Dundas, first Lord Arniston (c. 1620–79), wrote a monograph on moral philosophy. It appears never to have been mentioned in any work whether academic or otherwise. It includes a discussion promoting three doctrines against Hobbes. First, that something is simply good and something is simply bad, and that the first rule of morals is not self-love, but the glory of God. Secondly, the state of nature is not a state of war. (...) Thirdly, contra Hobbes, the chief point in natural law is not that each person has a right to use all ways and means to preserve himself. This paper probes Dundas's arguments for his three doctrines. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to establish that although Thomas Reid uses his version of value realism as a weapon with which to beat David Hume's value nominalism, at a deeper level of analysis the realism of the one and the nominalism of the other are fully compatible.
In Philosophy 51, October 1976, 471–472, Professor Tom Regan takes ud to task for our attack on Kant's theory concerning the moral status of animals. The ground of Regan's criticism is that ‘… it is clear that Kant does not suppose, as… Broadie and Pybus erroneously assume that he does, that the concept of maltreating an animal, on the one hand, and, on the other, the concept of using an animal as a means, are the same or logically equivalent concepts’ (...) . Regan argues that Kant does not say that we should avoid treating animals as a means. Rather, he claims, Kant's view is that we have an indirect duty not to maltreat animals, since in maltreating them we treat, or run the risk of treating, as a mere means rationality in ourselves or in others. (shrink)