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Alexander Jackson [7]Alexander T. Jackson [2]Alexander Paul Vincent Jackson [1]
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Alexander Jackson
Boise State University
  1.  98
    Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief.Alexander Jackson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):564-593.
    One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated (...)
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  2.  82
    Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.
    This paper distinguishes two ways to ?put knowledge first?. One way affirms a knowledge norm. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that one must only assert that which one knows. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that one must only treat as a reason for action that which one knows. Another way to put knowledge first affirms a determination thesis. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that what one knows determines what one is justified in believing. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that what (...)
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  3.  72
    How You Know You Are Not a Brain in a Vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.
    A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat ; but she doesn’t panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not inferentially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that ‘Moorean’ response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological literature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that’s plausibly responsible for a sensible (...)
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  4.  28
    How to Solve Hume's Problem of Induction.Alexander Jackson - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.
    This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...)
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  5.  2
    How to Formulate Arguments From Easy Knowledge.Alexander Jackson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):341-356.
    Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen's presentation, namely his focus on knowing that one's faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White's (...)
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  6.  54
    From Relative Truth to Finean Non-Factualism.Alexander Jackson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):971-989.
    This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non-factualism is the better relativist theory. As I explain, non-facualism about (...)
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  7.  34
    The Inflexibility of Relative Truth.Alexander Jackson - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):409-418.
    The ideology of relative truth is inflexible in two ways. Firstly, what's true-for-J is closed under entailment. This is a problem for using truth-relativism to solve the preface puzzle about knowledge. Secondly, it is plausible that vagueness gives rise to some questions having multiple ‘acceptable’ answers, and other questions having no ‘acceptable’ answer. Even if truth-relativism can express the former idea, it can't express the latter. I propose an ideology that is not so rigid. It is preferable to relative truth.
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  8.  5
    Appropriate Training Should Turn Ethical Reasoning Into Ethical Practice.Alexander T. Jackson, Mathias J. Simmons, Bradley J. Brummel & Aaron C. Entringer - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics Education 13:373-392.
    The prevalence of ethics training in organizations rose from 50% in 2003 to 76% in 2011. This paper reviews the current state of ethics training in organizations and proposes a new conceptual model for designing effective ethics training programs based on Rest’s model of ethical decision-making. We argue that it is not the content of ethics training that fails to produce ethical behavior; it is the method by which ethics training is delivered. Most organizations utilize training methods designed to disseminate (...)
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  9. The Reciprocal Relationships Between Escalation, Anger, and Confidence in Investment Decisions Over Time.Alexander T. Jackson, Satoris S. Howes, Edgar E. Kausel, Michael E. Young & Megan E. Loftis - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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