Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of collective reasons (...) can. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a fundamental but under-appreciated distinction between two ways of understanding the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being. According to proactive desire satisfactionism, a person is benefited by the acquisition of new satisfied desires. According to reactive desire satisfactionism, a person can be benefited only by the satisfaction of their existing desires. I first offer an overview of this distinction. I then canvass several ways of developing a general formulation of desire satisfactionism that would capture the reactive view, (...) and argue that all come with significant costs. (shrink)

Effective altruism (EA) is a movement devoted to the idea of doing good in the most effective way possible. EA has been the target of a number of critiques. In this article, I focus on one prominent critique: that EA fails to acknowledge the importance of institutional change. One version of this critique claims that EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics. Defenders of EA have objected that this charge either fails to identify a problem with EA's core (...) idea that each of us should do the most good we can, or makes unreasonable claims about what we should do. However, I argue that we can understand the critique in a way that is well motivated, and that can avoid these objections. (shrink)

When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub‐personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, (...) might the temporal parts of persons, beings like “me‐in‐my‐twenties,” be thought of as normative agents? This idea, I argue, has deep attractions, and deep, but surmountable, challenges. And if we do accept this idea, I argue, this can indirectly help to support the case for thinking that groups can have reasons for action. (shrink)

Pattern-based reasons are reasons for action deriving not from the features of our own actions, but from the features of the larger patterns of action in which we might be participating. These reasons might relate to the patterns of action that will actually be carried out, or they might relate to merely hypothetical patterns. In past work, I have argued that accepting merely hypothetical pattern-based reasons, together with a plausible account of how to weigh these reasons, can lead to disastrous (...) consequences. However, in this article, I argue that this problem is not limited to hypothetical pattern-based reasons: it turns out that there are analogous issues for reasons deriving from actual patterns. I then suggest that we can avoid this problem by adopting a different account of the weight of pattern-based reasons. (shrink)

Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special (...) agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict. (shrink)

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found (...) in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox. (shrink)

An explanation of the inter-gender difference in longevity consistent with the 'disposable soma' theory of ageing is proposed. It is based on the concept of r-K selection as applied to the inter-gender situation. The concept predicts that the gender with a higher potential reproductive rate (males) should invest relatively less in somatic maintenance, which in its turn should result in a lower longevity according to the 'disposable soma' theory of ageing. In females, which are interpreted as K-selected organisms, the reproductive (...) strategy strongly depends on steady, secure constitution designed for oocyte/embryo bearing and is therefore closely related to somatic maintenance, whereas in (r-selected) males it has a greater behavioural component - risky, variable, with a greater potential reproductive success at the expense of somatic maintenance. The higher metabolic and growth rates, a higher premature mortality and a longer period of sexual competence of males also find explanation as a complex of r-selected traits. (shrink)

Yoo (Economic Letters 37:145–149, 1991) argues that the law of iterated expectations must be violated if the probability measure of a Choquet decision maker is non-additive. In this article, we prove the positive result that the law of iterated expectations is satisfied for Choquet decision makers whenever they update their non-additive beliefs in accordance with the Sarin and Wakker (Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16:223–250, 1998) update rule. The formal key to this result is the act-dependence of the Sarin–Wakker update (...) rule, which does not hold for the update rules considered by Yoo (1991). (shrink)

Social philosophy as a discipline has a number of standard research topics at its disposal, such as the search for the best form of government, the elucidation of the laws of the development of society, the problem of free will and will to power, etc., while the study of the phenomenon of fear is knocked out of this series and is not prerogative of social philosophy. However, upon closer examination, the problem of fear is extremely urgent for social philosophy, and (...) some of its aspects can be correctly interpreted only when using optics and the methodology of this field of scientific knowledge. In this article, we are talking about the peculiarities of the phenomenon of fear, which has an impact on a specific individual in particular and on society as a whole. The author strives to isolate those features that distinguish fear from the total number of problems of modern societies and to present fear as a phenomenon that can not be analyzed only with the help of the means of the natural sciences. Having these features determined, we will understand the need to examine the phenomenon of fear in studying the state of modern societies as well as social philosophy will possess the necessary tools for this analysis. (shrink)

"As Eastern Europe struggles to emerge from its communist past, the public moral witness of its Orthodox Churches has assumed a special importance for those seeking a truly just world order. Yet few Americans know what these vast and ancient Christian bodies stand for, especially on crucial issues of freedom, human rights, and war and peace. In this compelling look at the Orthodox Churches in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and the United States, Alexander F. C. Webster mines the primary sources (...) to reveal a story of both betrayal of the Church and fidelity to its moral tradition. He reflects on what is needed for these churches to become forceful and consistent voices of moral witness in society."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

English summary: In this work, Alexander Schnell expounds the role played by the formation and conferral of sense in our understanding of reality and matters of fact. Starting from the phenomenological standpoint of consciousness analysis, he tries to show how the power of imagination in particular serves as a formative function for reality. Picking up on important phenomenological concepts--such as sense, the grounding of knowledge, the unconscious, reality, truth, time, space, the human, subjectivity, transcendence--the author deals with these anew. (...) The volume thereby also contributes to the reinvigorated realism-idealism debate of recent years in which phenomenology - more than a hundred years after its inception - has yet again been awarded a key role. German description: Alexander Schnell macht in diesem Band die Rolle der Sinnbildung und Sinnstiftung in unserem Verstandnis von Realitat und faktischem Geschehnis deutlich. Vom phanomenologischen Standpunkt der Bewusstseinsanalyse ausgehend, zeigt er auf, dass hierbei der Einbildungskraft eine wirklichkeitsbildende Funktion zukommt. Hierzu nimmt er einige bedeutsame Begriffe der Phanomenologie - Sinn, Erkenntnisbegrundung, Unbewusstes, Realitat, Wahrheit, Zeit, Raum, Mensch, Subjektivitat, Transzendenz - wieder auf und behandelt sie neu. Zugleich tragt dieser Band zur Realismus-Idealismus-Debatte bei, die in den letzten Jahren dank des Neuen Realismus neu entfacht und in welcher der Phanomenologie uber ein Jahrhundert nach ihrer Grundung wieder eine bedeutsame Rolle zugestanden wurde. (shrink)

How do words mean? What is the nature of meaning? How can we grasp a word's meaning? The frame-semantic approach developed in this book offers some well-founded answers to such long-standing, but still controversial issues. Following Charles Fillmore's definition of frames as both organizers of experience and tools for understanding, the monograph attempts to examine one of the most important concepts of Cognitive Linguistics in more detail. The point of departure is Fillmore's conception of "frames of understanding" - an approach (...) to (cognitive) semantics that Fillmore developed from 1975 to 1985. The envisaged Understanding Semantics ("U-Semantics") is a semantic theory sui generis whose significance for linguistic research cannot be overestimated. In addition to its crucial role in the development of the theoretical foundations of U-semantics, corpus-based frame semantics can be applied fruitfully in the investigation of knowledge-building processes in text and discourse. (shrink)

How to read Plato's Dialogues? -- Freedom-general and universal -- Dialectic of library -- Participation and appropriation -- Onto-politics and political ontology -- Equality and difference -- The good-rationality, totality, dialectic -- Justice, politics and philosophy -- Foundations of responsibility -- The politics of virtue -- Dialectic of liberty revisited-democracy and Politeia -- Liberty in the Polis.

BackgroundWhat can the analysis of the evolution of a code of ethics tell us about the dental profession and the association that develops it? The establishment of codes of ethics are foundational events in the social history of a profession. Within these documents it is possible to find statements of values and culture that serve a variety of purposes. Codes of ethics in dentistry have not frequently presented as the subjects of analyses despite containing rich information about the priorities and (...) anxieties within the profession’s membership at the time that the code was written.Main textThis essay uses critical discourse analysis to explore the 2012 and 2018 versions of the Code of Ethics produced by the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Dental Association. This method of discourse analysis examines contradictions between the discourses within the codes and how these relate to broader social realties that surround the dental profession in New South Wales. By analysing the 2012 and 2018 codes together, it is possible to understand how the dental profession views its commitments to society as established through the social contract. Through this assessment, it will be demonstrated that both codes suffer due to their failure to consider the public as a key stakeholder in the creation and curation of the Code of Ethics and how this this relates intimately with the social contract between the profession and the public.ConclusionWithout the public being the central consideration, both codes amount to declarations of professional privilege and dominance. Although the more recent 2018 Code of Ethics demonstrates insight into the changes in public trust placed in the professions, this analysis shows that that the current code of ethics is still reluctant to recognise and engage with the public as an equal stakeholder in the planning and provision of oral health care and the development of the profession’s values and cultural trajectory. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'the line‐drawing fallacy'. Many logic or critical thinking textbooks treat the line‐drawing fallacy as a footnote to or subcategory of another fallacy. They view it as a variation of vagueness, false dilemma, slippery slope, or the perfectionist fallacy. Depending on how one interprets a key premise or central term of the argument, detecting a line‐drawing fallacy can take several forms. The chapter discusses these forms. To correct or to (...) prevent the absurd conclusions, logicians try to identify and/or explain the nature of the line‐drawing fallacy. Several line‐drawing‐related fallacies immediately arise, from false dilemma to straw man. Yet this exercise is too obvious to help a student discern the underlying difficulty in recognizing the line‐drawing fallacy or avoiding the paradox it raises. (shrink)

This book elucidates T. F. Torrance’s reconstruction of natural theology as it appears within its intellectual context and broader Christological method. Irving argues that Torrance’s work on natural theology is an important affirmation of the priority of grace in theological method and knowledge alongside the integrity of human agency.

There is widespread disagreement about Tocqueville's conception of human nature, some going so far as to say that Tocqueville possessed no unified conception of human nature at all. In this paper, I aim to provide the essential principles of Tocqueville's conception of human nature through an examination of the way in which he describes the power of human circumstances, such as physical environment, social state, and religion, to shape human character by extracting the principles underlying these transformations. There is no (...) “natural man” or man “in the state of nature” but instead a set of psychic operations that reveal a picture of human nature in which human freedom, or the ability to initiate action in pursuit of important objects, lies at the heart of human life. (shrink)

This study explored LaRose and Eastin's model of media attendance, within a European context. It extended the uses and gratifications paradigm within the framework of social cognitive theory by instituting new operational measures of gratifications sought, reconstructed as outcome expectations. Although the model of media attendance offers some promising steps forward in measuring media selectivity and usage, and to some extent is applicable to another context of media use, the relative importance of outcome expectancies in explaining media usage and selectivity (...) is not fully supported. (shrink)

The book takes the reader on a vivid, imaginative journey towards unraveling the mysteries of our existence, roles in society, and personal loyalties. The book melds science with philosophy and theology and highlights the people who dedicated their lives in pursuit of the seven riddles of the universe.

Zusammenfassung Der Aufsatz ist die Fortsetzung von „Beobachtungen zu den Thukydidesscholien I“ und „Beobachtungen zu den Thukydidesscholien II“. Im ersten Abschnitt wird gezeigt, dass durch genauere Dokumentation der Marginalien im Vatic. gr. 126, als es auch in neuen kritischen Ausgaben geschehen ist, mit unterschiedlicher Sicherheit abweichende Lesarten in Ω erschlossen werden können. In 3. 2 wird nachgewiesen, dass die Hand jenes Theodoros, der im Codex Paris. suppl. gr. 255 eine vieldiskutierte Marginalnotiz eingetragen hat, auch – was bisher nicht beachtet worden (...) ist – im Monac. graec. 430 einen ähnlichen Marginaleintrag vorgenommen hat, woraus sich weitreichende Konsequenzen für eine Reihe von Handschriftenkomponenten ergeben. Die Identität jenes Theodoros lässt sich nicht ermitteln, die von Hemmerdinger vorgenommene Identitifikation mit Theodoros Metochites wird widerlegt. Abschnitt 3. 3 untersucht die Wolfenbütteler Handschrift Gud. gr. 35 hinsichtlich ihrer Stellung im Stemma der Familie ψ und zeigt, dass Gu nicht zusammen mit μ2 und μ1 eine Abschrift von μ ist, sondern dass Gu selbst die Vorlage von μ2 und μ1 war, also mit μ identisch ist. Dadurch wird eine Vermutung D. Harlfingers bestätigt, dass der Codex Gu, der jetzt nur noch die Markellinosvita und die Anonymusvita des Thukydides enthält, der Rest einer kompletten Thukydideshandschrift ist. Da Gu der Schrift des Maximos Planudes bzw. der seiner Schreiber ähnelt, darf vermutet werden, dass im Gelehrtenkreis um Planudes eine Thukydidesausgabe geschaffen worden ist. (shrink)

In the historic tradition of calendar stories and calendar illustrations, this work presents a collection of thirty-nine stories and thirty-nine snow-swept photographs for the darkest month of the year. It includes stories drawn from modern history and the contemporary moment, from mythology, and even from meteorology.

Plausibly, one important part of a good life is doing work that makes a contribution, or a positive difference to the world. In this paper, however, I explore contribution pessimism, the view that people will not always have adequate opportunities for making contributions. I distinguish between three interestingly different and at least initially plausible reasons why this view might be true: in slogan form, things might become too easy, they might become too good, or we might be too late. Now, (...) one response to these problems might be to deliberately attempt to undo them. However, I claim that this solution is intuitively misguided, and argue that explaining this supports a holistic approach to the value of contributions. Finally, I argue that if contribution pessimism is correct, it could provide an explanation of some widely held intuitions about issues in population ethics, with implications about the practical issue of how much priority we should give to addressing risks of human extinction. (shrink)