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Profile: Alexander Miller (New York University)
Profile: Alexander B. Miller (Catholic University of America)
  1. Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning.Alexander Miller - 2010 - In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  2.  83
    Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction.Alexander Miller - 2013 - Polity.
    This new edition of Alexander Miller’s highly readable introduction to contemporary metaethics provides a critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth- and twenty-first-century contemporary metaethics. Miller traces the development of contemporary debates in metaethics from their beginnings in the work of G. E. Moore up to the most recent arguments between naturalism and non-naturalism, cognitivism and non-cognitivism. From Moore’s attack on ethical naturalism, A. J. Ayer’s emotivism and Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism to anti-realist and best opinion accounts of (...)
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  3.  36
    Rule-Following, Meaning and Primitive Normativity.Alexander Miller - forthcoming - Mind:fzx033.
    This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg’s attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ‘finitude’ objection to (...)
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  4. Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the rule-following (...)
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  5. The Significance of Semantic Realism.Alexander Miller - 2003 - Synthese 136 (2):191-217.
    This paper is concerned with the relationship between the metaphysical doctrine of realism about the external world and semantic realism, as characterised by Michael Dummett. I argue that Dummett's conception of the relationship is flawed, and that Crispin Wright's account of the relationship, although designed to avoid the problems which beset Dummett's, nevertheless fails for similar reasons. I then aim to show that despite the fact that Dummett and Wright both fail to give a plausible account of the relationship between (...)
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  6.  39
    Blind Rule-Following and the ‘Antinomy of Pure Reason’.Alexander Miller - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):396-416.
  7.  15
    Moral Supervenience: A Defence of Blackburn's Argument.Alexander Miller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (4):581-601.
    In the 1970s and 1980s, Simon Blackburn published a number of much-discussed works in which he argued that the supervenience of the moral on the natural generates a serious problem for moral realism, a problem which his own brand of moral projectivism can avoid. As we will see below, Blackburn construed moral supervenience in terms of what is known as weak supervenience. Partly in response to Blackburn, a number of philosophers have argued that weak supervenience is too weak to capture (...)
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  8. Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth.John Divers & Alexander Miller - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):12 - 19.
  9.  60
    Believing In Twin Earth: New Evidence for the Normativity of Belief.Seyed Ali Kalantari & Alexander Miller - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1327-1339.
    According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative ; Shah ; Shah and Velleman (); Gibbard (); Wedgwood ). In a series of widely discussed papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic (...)
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  10.  27
    Meaning Scepticism.Alexander Miller - 2006 - In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. pp. 19--91.
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  11.  69
    Realism.Alexander Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12.  34
    Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.Alexander Miller - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
    In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to (...)
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  13.  39
    Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Alexander Miller - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
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  14.  83
    Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Alexander Miller - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
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  15.  39
    Arithmaetical Platonism: Reliability and Judgement-Dependence.John Divers & Alexander Miller - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):277-310.
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  16.  54
    Thoughts, Oughts and the Conceptual Primacy of Belief.Alexander Miller - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):234–238.
  17.  35
    Tacit Knowledge.Alexander Miller - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):630-635.
  18.  51
    Platitudes and Attitudes: A Minimalist Conception of Belief.John Divers & Alexander Miller - 1995 - Analysis 55 (1):37 - 44.
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  19.  42
    Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened.Alexander Miller - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):1-10.
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  20.  49
    Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson.Alexander Miller - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):337-341.
    In chapter 8 of Miller 2003, I argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP[Nelson 2006, Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.
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  21. Rule-Following and Externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
    John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
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  22.  49
    Russell, Multiple Relations, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Alexander Miller - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):85-101.
  23.  33
    Objective Content.Miller Alexander - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):73–90.
    [Alan Weir] This paper addresses the problem of how to account for objective content-for the distinction between how we actually apply terms and the conditions in which we ought to apply them-from within a naturalistic framework. Though behaviourist or dispositionalist approaches are generally held to be unsuccessful in naturalising objective content or 'normativity', I attempt to restore the credibility of such approaches by sketching a behaviouristic programme for explicating objective content. /// [Alexander Miller] Paul Boghossian (1989, 1990) has argued, on (...)
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  24.  72
    Minimalism and the Unbearable Lightness of Being.John Divers & Alexander Miller - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (2):127-139.
  25. The Argument From Queerness and the Normativity of Meaning.Alexander Miller - unknown
    In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or “ Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non- factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to (...)
     
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  26.  26
    Objectivity Disfigured: Mark Johnston's Missing-Explanation Argument.Alexander Miller - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):857-868.
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  27.  65
    What is the Manifestation Argument?Alexander Miller - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):352–383.
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  28. Wright’s Argument Against Error-Theories.Alexander Miller - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):98–103.
  29.  70
    Mind Doesn't Matter Yet.Brian Leiter & Alexander Miller - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):220-28.
  30.  49
    Wittgenstein, Quine and Dummett on Conventionalism About Logic.Alexander Miller - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):292-301.
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  31.  23
    Realism and Antirealism.Alexander Miller - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 983.
    This article questions whether, once the conception of metaphysics as grounded in the philosophy of language has been jettisoned, Dummett's arguments against semantic realism can retain any relevance to the realist/antirealist debate. By focussing on realism about the external world as an example, it reaches the conclusion that even without Dummett's conception of philosophy as grounded in the theory of meaning, his arguments against semantic realism do retain a limited but nevertheless genuine significance for the metaphysical debate. It emerges, though, (...)
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  32.  3
    II—Alexander Miller: Does 'Belief-Holism' Show That Reductive Dispositionalism About Content Could Not Be True?Alexander Miller - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):73-90.
    Paul Boghossian has argued, on grounds concerning the holistic nature of belief fixation, that there are principled reasons for thinking that 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism about content cannot hope to satisfy a condition of extensional accuracy. I discern three separable strands of argument in Boghossian's work—the circularity objection, the open-endedness objection, and the certification objection—and argue that each of these objections fails. My conclusion is that for all that Boghossian has shown, 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism have (...)
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  33.  2
    Objective Content.Alexander Miller - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):73-90.
    Paul Boghossian has argued, on grounds concerning the holistic nature of belief fixation, that there are principled reasons for thinking that 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism about content cannot hope to satisfy a condition of extensional accuracy. I discern three separable strands of argument in Boghossian's work—the circularity objection, the open-endedness objection, and the certification objection—and argue that each of these objections fails. My conclusion is that for all that Boghossian has shown, 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism have (...)
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  34. Semantic Realism and the Argument From Motivational Internalism.Alexander Miller - unknown
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state (...)
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  35.  98
    Disjunctions, Programming, and the Australian View of Colour.Alexander Miller - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):209-212.
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  36.  74
    Emotivism and the Verification Principle.Alexander Miller - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):103–124.
    In chapter VI of Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer argues that ethical statements are not literally significant. Unlike metaphysical statements, however, ethical statements are not nonsensical: even though they are not literally significant, Ayer thinks that they possess some other sort of significance. This raises the question: by what principle or criterion can we distinguish, among the class of statements that are not literally significant, between those which are genuinely meaningless and those which possess some other, non-literal form of (...)
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  37.  21
    More Responses to the Missing-Explanation Argument.Alexander Miller - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):331-349.
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  38. Rule-Following, Response-Dependence, and McDowell's Debate with Anti-Realism.Alexander Miller - 1998 - In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
     
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  39.  25
    Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy.Alexander Miller - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):874-879.
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  40.  45
    An Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention.Alexander Miller - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):169 - 173.
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  41.  13
    Critical Notice.Alexander Miller - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):125 – 140.
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  42.  32
    Closet Dualism and Mental Causation.Brian Leiter & Alexander Miller - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):161-181.
  43.  82
    Lenin's Anticipation of Bernard Williams's Integrity Objection to Utilitarianism.Alexander Miller - 1997 - Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4):503-510.
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  44.  33
    Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?Alexander Miller & Ali Saboohi - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178.
    It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology fails to uncover a “new” hard problem for physicalism and there (...)
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  45.  26
    On Wright's Argument Against Deflationism.Alexander Miller - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):527-531.
  46.  47
    Another Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention.Alexander Miller - 1989 - Analysis 67 (3):257–263.
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  47.  9
    Review: Differences with Wright. [REVIEW]Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):595 - 603.
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  48.  30
    Response-Dependence Without Reduction?Duncan McFarland & Alexander Miller - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):407 – 425.
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  49.  61
    Critical Notice.Review author[S.]: John Divers & Alexander Miller - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):519-533.
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  50.  48
    Bare Functional Desire.Alexander Miller - unknown
    But this changes nothing. The decisive claim is that in assessing the counterfactuals implicit in (A) we do not have to take sceptical worlds into the reckoning, whereas we must do that in assessing (B) because (B) explicitly speaks of them. Accept, provisionally, what is here said about (B) and focus on the claim about (A). Nobody should make it unless they are already in a position to assert that the actual world is not a sceptical world. And with that (...)
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