ABSTRACT In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche sets out to answer the question of the value of morality by looking at the conditions under which it developed. However, there is a puzzle about why historical investigation should be required for assessing our moral practices, especially if the defining features of those practices have changed over time. The puzzle is that if morality is “historical,” then the features that will be revealed by historical investigation are ones that—ex hypothesi—are unlikely to (...) characterize it now. And if these features do not characterize morality now, then why should a critique of morality need to take them into account? I argue that the solution to the puzzle is that history reveals that morality is a particular kind of entity, which I call a “historical individual.” I then provide an account of why it should matter for our evaluation of morality that it is an entity of this kind. (shrink)

I argue that manipulationist theories of causation fail as accounts of causal structure, and thereby as theories of “actual causation” and causal explanation. I focus on two kinds of problem cases, which I call “Perceived Abnormality Cases” and “Ontological Dependence Cases.” The cases illustrate that basic facts about social systems—that individuals are sensitive to perceived abnormal conditions and that certain actions metaphysically depend on institutional rules—pose a challenge for manipulationist theories and for counterfactual theories more generally. I then show how (...) law-based accounts of causal structure can answer such challenges. The moral of the story is that the basic manipulationist idea that our interest in causal structure is driven by our interest in manipulating our environment faces decisive problems in a central domain of application, the social sciences. (shrink)

It is a truism that our current common sense morality is the product of a complicated historical development. Whether and in what way classic questions of moral philosophy need to be informed by this history is, however, a matter of controversy.Some recent work in meta-ethics has taken the broad contours of morality’s history as important for answering questions about the existence of moral facts and the justifications of our beliefs about such facts. For instance, moral diversity and the history of (...) moral disagreement have been cited as reasons to believe there are no objective moral facts. The absence of moral facts is—according to such arguments—the best explanation of the intractability of such disagreement.1 .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, I consider how Nietzsche's history of morality in On the Genealogy of Morality is relevant to his critique of morality. I argue that, on Nietzsche's view, morality's history is a guide to whether and where we should expect to find coherence in our current moral practice. It helps us “structure our interpretation” of morality. History is relevant to critique because it reveals that morality is unlikely to have the kind of coherence required by many of its (...) defenders. After defending this account of how Nietzsche's historical claims are relevant to his critique, I use the account to explain why Nietzsche's genealogy mixes fact and fiction. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

There has been much recent work in philosophy of science on idealization – the way inaccurate representations can be used to understand a target system. My dissertation concerns a particular sort of idealization that is familiar but often overlooked: rational reconstruction. Rational reconstructions are “cleaned-up” – more coherent and accurate – versions of an individual’s or a group’s attitudes. They are the kind of idealized model that facilitates a crucial aim of the interpretive sciences, the understanding of another’s point of (...) view. I provide an account of rational reconstruction and argue that such an account can help us make sense of many intellectual projects in the humanities and the interpretive social sciences. I then argue that this account can also be used to resolve a problem in democratic theory: how deliberative institutions can facilitate understanding and discursive engagement with “inchoate” points of view. A theory of rational reconstruction thus elucidates an important way that the humanities and interpretive social sciences can be politically significant. (shrink)