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Alexander Sarch [11]Alexander F. Sarch [4]
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Profile: Alexander Sarch (University of Surrey)
  1. Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It.Alexander Sarch - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184.
    Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form (...)
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  2.  95
    Multi-Component Theories of Well-Being and Their Structure.Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):439-471.
    The ‘adjustment strategy’ currently seems to be the most common approach to incorporating objective elements into one's theory of well-being. These theories face a certain problem, however, which can be avoided by a different approach – namely, that employed by ‘partially objective multi-component theories.’ Several such theories have recently been proposed, but the question of how to understand their mathematical structure has not been adequately addressed. I argue that the most mathematically simple of these multi-component theories fails, so I proceed (...)
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  3.  2
    A Modest Attempt to Rehabilitate the Fact-Based View. [REVIEW]Alexander F. Sarch - 2017 - Jurisprudence 8 (1):177-183.
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  4.  5
    A Modest Attempt to Rehabilitate the Fact-Based View. [REVIEW]Alexander F. Sarch - 2017 - Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought 8 (1):177-183.
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  5. Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy.Alexander Sarch - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):451 - 474.
    George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. (...)
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  6.  3
    Who Cares What You Think? Criminal Culpability and the Irrelevance of Unmanifested Mental States.Alexander Sarch - forthcoming - Law and Philosophy:1-44.
    The criminal law declines to punish merely for bad attitudes that are not properly manifested in action. One might try to explain this on practical grounds, but these attempts do not justify the law’s commitment to never punishing unmanifested mental states in worlds relevantly similar to ours. Instead, a principled explanation is needed. A more promising explanation thus is that one cannot be criminally culpable merely for unmanifested bad attitudes. However, the leading theory of criminal culpability has trouble making good (...)
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  7.  66
    Desire Satisfactionism and Time.Alexander Sarch - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):221-245.
    In this article, I aim to clarify how Actual Desire Satisfactionism should accommodate the ways in which desire and time are connected. In particular, I argue that Weak Concurrentism represents the most promising way for the Desire Satisfactionist to capture the temporal nature of desire. I consider the Desire Satisfactionist's other main options, but argue that none succeeds. This leaves Weak Concurrentism looking attractive. However, Weak Concurrentism might also be thought to have some implausible consequences of its own. Nonetheless, I (...)
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  8.  29
    Blameworthiness and Time.Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.
    Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...)
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  9.  51
    What's Wrong with Megalopsychia?Alexander Sarch - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (2):231-253.
    This paper looks at two accounts of Aristotle's views on the virtue of megalopsychia. The first, defended by Christopher Cordner, commits Aristotle to two claims about the virtuous person that might seem unpalatable to modern readers. The second account, defended by Roger Crips, does not commit Aristotle to these claims. Some might count this as an advantage of Crisp's account. However, I argue that Cordner's account, not Crisp's, is actually the better interpretation of Aristotle. Nonetheless, this does not ultimately spell (...)
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  10.  9
    Double Effect and the Criminal Law.Alexander Sarch - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):453-479.
    American criminal law is committed to some version of the doctrine of double effect. In this paper, I defend a new variant of the agent-centered rationale for a version of DDE that is of particular relevance to the criminal law. In particular, I argue for a non-absolute version of DDE that concerns the relative culpability of intending a bad or wrongful state of affairs as opposed to bringing it about merely knowingly. My aim is to identify a particular feature of (...)
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  11.  7
    Hausman and McPherson on Welfare Economics and Preference Satisfaction Theories of Welfare: A Critical Note.Alexander F. Sarch - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):141-159.
  12.  19
    On the Objectivity of Welfare.Alexander F. Sarch - unknown
    This dissertation is structured in such a way as to gradually home in on the true theory of welfare. I start with the whole field of possible theories of welfare and then proceed by narrowing down the options in a series of steps. The first step, undertaken in chapter 2, is to argue that the true theory of welfare must be what I call a partly response independent theory. First I reject the entirely response independent theories because there are widely-shared (...)
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  13.  14
    Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts.Alexander Sarch - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):569-587.
    In his recent book Attempts, Gideon Yaffe suggests that attempts should be criminalized because of a principle he dubs the “Transfer Principle.” This principle holds that if a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized. Although Yaffe provides a powerful defense of the Transfer Principle, in this paper I argue that Yaffe’s argument for it ultimately does not succeed. In particular, I formulate two objections to Yaffe’s (...)
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  14.  7
    In Praise of Desire, Nomy Arpaly and Tim Schroeder. Oxford University Press, 2014, Ix + 316 Pages. [REVIEW]Alexander Sarch - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):320-327.
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  15. Ignorance Lost: A Reply to Yaffe on the Culpability of Willful Ignorance.Alexander Sarch - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-18.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Gideon Yaffe provides an expected utility model of culpability in order to explain why willfully ignorant misconduct sometimes is just as culpable as knowing misconduct. Although promising, I argue here that challenges remain for Yaffe’s view. First, I argue that Yaffe’s proof of the equal culpability of willful ignorance and knowledge is not watertight in certain realistic cases. Next, I argue that Yaffe’s view of culpability is motive-sensitive in a way that sits uncomfortably (...)
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