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Alexandru Volacu
SNSPA Bucharest
  1.  8
    Preferences, Reasoning Errors, and Resource Egalitarianism.Alexandru Volacu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1851-1870.
    In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals are prone to making systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably by egalitarians. Subsequently, I claim that the most plausible interpretation of resource egalitarianism takes preferences, not choices, as the site of responsibility. This distinction is salient, since preference-sensitive resource egalitarianism is faced with an important objection when applied to situations (...)
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  2.  15
    Assessing Non-Intrinsic Limitarianism.Alexandru Volacu & Adelin Costin Dumitru - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):249-264.
    In this paper we aim to examine a novel view on distributive justice, i.e. limitarianism, which claims that it is morally impermissible to be rich. Our main goal is to assess the two arguments provided by Ingrid Robeyns in favour of limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs and the two distinct limitarian views which these arguments give rise to. We claim that strong limitarianism, which is supported by the democratic argument, should be rejected as (...)
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  3.  19
    Pluralist Welfare Egalitarianism and the Expensive Tastes Objection.Alexandru Volacu & Oana-Alexandra Dervis - 2016 - Contemporary Political Theory 15 (3):285-303.
  4.  2
    Electoral Quid Pro Quo: A Defence of Barter Markets in Votes.Alexandru Volacu - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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  5.  10
    Heterogeneous Rationality and Reasonable Disagreement in the Original Position.Alexandru Volacu - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:131-148.
    In this paper I challenge the claim that each party in the original position will have a first-ranked preference for an identical set of principles of justice. I maintain, by contrast, that the original position allows parties to choose on the basis of different conceptions of rationality, which in turn may lead to a reasonable disagreement concerning the principles of justice selected. I then argue that this reasonable disagreement should not lead us to abandon contractualism, but rather to reconstruct it (...)
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  6.  7
    Prioritarianism and Other-Regarding Decision-Making Under Risk.Alexandru Volacu - 2017 - Ethical Perspectives 24 (2):199-224.
    In the present contribution I attempt to refute a recent challenge raised by Michael Otsuka against prioritarianism, according to which the priority view is objectionable since it rejects the moral permissibility of choosing in accordance with rational self-interest – understood as maximization of expected utility – in one-person cases involving other-regarding decision-making under risk. I claim that Otsuka’s argument is bound to make an illegitimate move, which is either to assume implausibly that individuals are generally risk-neutral or to assume implausibly (...)
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  7.  9
    Heterogeneous Rationality and Reasonable Disagreement in the Original Position in Advance.Alexandru Volacu - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  8.  2
    Maximization, Slotean Satisficing, and Theories of Sufficientarian Justice.Alexandru Volacu - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):73-90.
    In this paper I seek to assess the responses provided by several theories of sufficientarian justice in cases where individuals hold different conceptions of rationality. Towards this purpose, I build two test cases and study the normative prescriptions which various sufficiency views offer in each of them. I maintain that resource sufficientarianism does not provide a normatively plausible response to the first case, since its distributive prescriptions would violate the principle of personal good and that subjective-threshold welfare sufficientarianism as well (...)
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  9. An Incrementalist Approach to Political Philosophy. The Case of Heterogeneous Rationality Assumptions in Theories of Distributive Justice.Alexandru Volacu - 2016 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):217.
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