291 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Alfred R. Mele [222]Alfred Mele [73]Alfred Remen Mele [1]
See also
Alfred Mele
Florida State University
  1. Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   86 citations  
  2. Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   129 citations  
  3. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - Oup Usa.
    Autonomous Agents addresses the related topics of self-control and individual autonomy. "Self-control" is defined as the opposite of akrasia-weakness of will. The study of self-control seeks to understand the concept of its own terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, emotions, and personal values. It goes on to consider how a proper understanding of self-control and its manifestations can shed light on personal autonomy and autonomous behaviour. Perspicuous, objective, and incisive throughout, Alfred Mele makes a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   130 citations  
  4.  66
    Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   124 citations  
  5.  83
    Motivation and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   69 citations  
  6. Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  7.  53
    Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? -/- Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   51 citations  
  8. Irrationality: An Essay on `Akrasia', Self-Deception, and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   75 citations  
  9.  61
    Intentional Action : Two-and-a-Half Folk Concepts?Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 171.
  10. Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.
    This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   37 citations  
  11. Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.
    Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed "the principle of alternate possibilities" (the thesis that people are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise), Harry Frankfurt offered an ingenious thought-experiment that has played a major role in subsequent work on moral responsibility and free will. Several philosophers, including David Widerker and Robert Kane, argued recently that this thought-experiment and others like it are fundamentally flawed. This paper develops a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   61 citations  
  12.  86
    Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   53 citations  
  13. Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions.Tyler F. Stillman, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):381 - 394.
    What does free will mean to laypersons? The present investigation sought to address this question by identifying how laypersons distinguish between free and unfree actions. We elicited autobiographical narratives in which participants described either free or unfree actions, and the narratives were subsequently subjected to impartial analysis. Results indicate that free actions were associated with reaching goals, high levels of conscious thought and deliberation, positive outcomes, and moral behavior (among other things). These findings suggest that lay conceptions of free will (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  14. Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
    We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   54 citations  
  15. Agents' Abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.
  16.  79
    Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out.Alfred R. Mele & Fiery Cushman - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):184–201.
    How are our actions sorted into those that are intentional and those that are not? The philosophical and psychological literature on this topic is livelier now than ever, and we seek to make a contribution to it here. Our guiding question in this article is easy to state and hard to answer: How do various factors— specifically, features of vignettes—that contribute to majority folk judgments that an action is or is not intentional interact in producing the judgment? In pursuing this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  17. Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.
    Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs subject to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  18. Moral Responsibility and History Revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  19.  39
    Persisting Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):735–757.
    Al is nearly finished sweeping his kitchen floor when he notices, on a counter, a corkscrew that should be put in a drawer. He intends to put the corkscrew away as soon as he is finished with the floor; but by the time he returns the broom and dustpan to the closet, he has forgotten what he intended to do. Al knows (or has a true belief) that there is something he intended to do now in the kitchen. He gazes (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  20.  56
    Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
    Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  21. Humean Compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.
    Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  22. Self-Deception and Delusions.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  23.  68
    Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions.Alfred Mele - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 27--43.
  24. A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):75-80.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  25. Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
    This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and what they intend in various stories and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments about what (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  26. Weakness of Will and Akrasia.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
    Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (1999, p. 262). One (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  27.  64
    Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):727-753.
    This paper criticizes the conjunction of two theses: 1) cognitivism about first-person moral ought-beliefs, the thesis (roughly) that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued contents; 2) robust internalism about these beliefs, the thesis that, necessarily, agents' beliefs that they ought, morally, to A constitute motivation to A. It is argued that the conjunction of these two theses places our moral agency at serious risk. The argument, which centrally involves attention to clinical depression, is extended to a less demanding, recent brand (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  28. Agency and Mental Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):231-249.
  29. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.
  30.  81
    Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred Mele & Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):265 - 287.
  31.  78
    Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):167-184.
    This article’s guiding question is about bullet biting: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility? Featured stories are vignettes in which agents’ systems of values are radically reversed by means of brainwashing and the story behind the zygote argument. The malady known as “intuition deficit disorder” is also discussed.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32.  55
    Mental Action: A Case Study.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
    This chapter argues that a proper understanding of the difference between trying to do something and trying to bring it about that one does it sheds light on the nature of mental action. For example, even if one cannot, strictly speaking, try to think of seven animal names that begin with ‘g’, one can try to bring it about that one thinks of seven such names, and one can succeed. In some versions of this scenario, one's successful attempt involves no (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  33. Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
    This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the "Intelligibility" and "Existence" questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls "The Significance Question" about free will: "Why do we, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  34.  99
    Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.
    To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  35. Libertarianism, Luck, and Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
    This article critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that luck poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarians.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  36.  31
    Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do. Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  37.  7
    On Snubbing Proximal Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    In the simplest case, a proximal intention is an intention one has now to do something now. Recently, some philosophers have argued that proximal intentions do much less work than they are sometimes regarded as doing. This article rebuts these arguments, explains why the concept of proximal intentions is important for some scientific work on intentional action, and sketches an empirical approach to identifying proximal intentions. Ordinary usage of “intend” and the place of intention in folk psychology and scientific psychology (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  25
    Moral Responsibility: Radical Reversals and Original Designs.Alfred R. Mele - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):69-82.
    This article identifies and assesses a way of thinking that might help to explain why some compatibilists are attracted to what is variously called an internalist, structuralist, or anti-historicist view of moral responsibility—a view about the bearing of agents’ histories on their moral responsibility. Scenarios of two different kinds are considered. Several scenarios feature heavy-duty manipulation that radically changes an agent’s mature moral personality from admirable to despicable or vice versa. These “radical reversal” scenarios are contrasted with a scenario featuring (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):735-737.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  40. The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
  41. The Philosophy of Action.Alfred R. Mele (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    The latest offering in the highly successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Action features contributions from twelve leading figures in the field, including: Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Donald Davidson, Wayne Davis, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Jennifer Hornsby, Jaegwon Kim, Hugh McCann, Paul Moser, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. Alfred Mele provides an introductory essay on the topics chosen and the questions they deal with. Topics addressed include intention, reasons for action, and the nature and explanation of internal (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  42. Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.
    Two questions guide this article. First, according to Fischer and Ravizza (jointly and otherwise), what epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are not also requirements for freely performing A? Second, how much progress have they made on this front? The article's main moral is for philosophers who believe that there are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing that are not requirements for freely A-ing because they assume that Fischer (on his own or otherwise) (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  43.  30
    Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2014 - In W. Sinnot-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44.  81
    Direct Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.
    This article’s aim is to shed light on direct control, especially as it pertains to free will. I sketch two ways of conceiving of such control. Both sketches extend to decision making. Issues addressed include the problem of present luck and the relationship between direct control and complete control.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Situationism and Agency.Alfred R. Mele & Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):62-83.
    Research in psychology indicates that situations powerfully impact human behavior. Often, it seems, features of situations drive our behavior even when we remain unaware of these features or their influence. One response to this research is pessimism about human agency: human agents have little conscious control over their own behavior, and little insight into why they do what they do. In this paper we review classic and more recent studies indicating “the power of the situation,” and argue for a more (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  46.  98
    Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):422-440.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  47.  80
    Deciding to Act.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):81–108.
    As this passage from a recent book on the psychology of decision-making indicates, deciding seems to be part of our daily lives. But what is it to decide to do something? It may be true, as some philosophers have claimed, that to decide to A is to perform a mental action of a certain kind – specifically, an action of forming an intention to A. (Henceforth, the verb ‘form’ in this context is to be understood as an action verb.) Even (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  48.  60
    On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.
    This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent objection” to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. This objection is an important plank in Pereboom’s argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49.  15
    Ordinary People Think Free Will is a Lack of Constraint, Not the Presence of a Soul.Andrew J. Vonasch, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 60:133-151.
  50. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work?Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.) - 2010 - University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 291