In this book, his major work, Alfred Schutz attempts to provide a sound philosophical basis for the sociological theories of Max Weber. Using a Husserlian phenomenology, Schutz provides a complete and original analysis of human action and its "intended meaning.".
The Structures of the Life-World is the final focus of twenty-seven years of Alfred Schutz's labor, encompassing the fruits of his work between 1932 and his death in 1959. This book represents Schutz's seminal attempt to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the nature of social reality. Here he integrates his theory of relevance with his analysis of social structures. Thomas Luckmann, a former student of Schutz's, completed the manuscript for publication after Schutz's untimely death.
V. 1. The problem of social reality -- v. 2. Studies in social theory -- v. 3. Studies in phenomenological philosophy -- v. 4. [without special title] -- v. 5. Phenomenology and the social sciences -- v. 6. Literary reality and relationships.
Following the thematic divisions of the first three volumes of Alfred Schutz's Collected Papers into The Problem of Social Reality, Studies in Social Theory and Phenomenological Philosophy, this fourth volume contains drafts of unfinished writings, drafts of published writings, translations of essays previously published in German, and some largely unpublished correspondence. The drafts of published writings contain important material omitted from the published versions, and the unfinished writings offer important insights into Schutz's otherwise unpublished ideas about economic and political theory (...) as well as the theory of law and the state. In addition, a large group contains Schutz's reflections on problems in phenomenological philosophy, including music, which both supplement and add new dimensions to his published thought. All together, the writings in this volume cover Schutz's last 15 years in Europe as well as manuscripts written after his arrival in the USA in 1939. Audience: Students and scholars of phenomenology, social theory and the human sciences in general. (shrink)
Phenomenological foundations - The cognitive setting of the life-world - Acting in the life-world - The world of social relationships - Realms of experience - The province of sociology.
I will begin by considering how the social world appears to the scientific observer and ask the question of whether the world of scientific research, with all its categories of meaning interpretation and with all its conceptual schemes of action, is identical with the world in which the observed actor acts. Anticipating the result, I may state immediately that with the shift from one level to the other, all the conceptual schemes and all the terms of interpretation must be modified.Proceeding (...) in this direction, I encounter several problems overlapping with the problem of rational action and the “rational act unit” in Professor ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ sense. First: The conceptual scheme of rational action presupposes a more or less definite knowledge of, or orientation within, the world in which this action is performed. In this sense the term, “rationality”, is not specific to the conceptual scheme of action; it embraces the conceptual scheme of the world in general and is only one element in it. Therefore, we also must examine the problem of orientation in this world. Second: We ought to keep in mind that all interpretation of the social world has to start from the actor’s subjective point of view. Therefore, we cannot accept the term, “unit act”, as such, without trying to reduce it to its subjective meaning. Here I have to discuss in general terms why I insist on the subjective point of view. This is more than the whim of a few social scientists; social science cannot be built up except by taking cognizance of the subjective meaning the actor connects with his acting. Finally, I have to discuss the fact that there are social sciences operating on high theoretical levels that, like economics, apparently prefer to deal with statistical curves and mathematical formulae rather than with actions of human beings in the social world, yet they use the term, “rational action”, as an indispensable element of their systems. I will have to show what modification this term undergoes in these types of social sciences..). (shrink)
Translation and Introduction by Fred Kersten Alfred Schutz’s lecture, “The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Husserl,” was read and discussed at the Husserl-Colloquium in Royaumont on April 28, 1957. The German text of the lecture appeared in Philosophische Rundschau: Eine Vierteljahrsschrift für philosophische Kritik, edited by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Helmut Kuhn, Vol. V, 1957, pp. 81ff. A translation of the lecture by Frederick Kersten in collaboration with Professors Aron Gurwitsch and Professor Thomas Luckmann was published in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Volume (...) III, edited by Ilse Schutz and an Introduction by Aron Gurwitsch. (shrink)
This volume contains a translation of four early manuscripts by Alfred Schutz, unpublished at the time, written between 1924 and 1928. The publication of these four essays adds much to our knowledge and appreciation of the wide range of Schutz’s phenomenological and sociological interests. Originally published in 1987. The essays consist of: a challenging presentation of a phenomenology of cognition and a treatment of Bergson’s conceptions of images, duration, space time and memory; a discussion of the meanings connected with the (...) grammatical forms of language in general; a consideration of the relation between meaning-contents and literary forms in poetry, literary prose narration and dramatic presentation; and an examination of resemblances and differences in the inner forms and characteristics of the major theatrical art forms. (shrink)
This volume contains a translation of four early manuscripts by Alfred Schutz, unpublished at the time, written between 1924 and 1928. The publication of these four essays adds much to our knowledge and appreciation of the wide range of Schutz’s phenomenological and sociological interests. Originally published in 1987. The essays consist of: a challenging presentation of a phenomenology of cognition and a treatment of Bergson’s conceptions of images, duration, space time and memory; a discussion of the meanings connected with the (...) grammatical forms of language in general; a consideration of the relation between meaning-contents and literary forms in poetry, literary prose narration and dramatic presentation; and an examination of resemblances and differences in the inner forms and characteristics of the major theatrical art forms. (shrink)
The Structures of the Life-World is the final focus of twenty-seven years of Alfred Schutz's labor, encompassing the fruits of his work between 1932 and his death in 1959. This book represents Schutz's seminal attempt to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the nature of social reality. Here he integrates his theory of relevance with his analysis of social structures. Thomas Luckmann, a former student of Schutz's, completed the manuscript for publication after Schutz's untimely death.
Values and the scope of scientific inquiry, by M. Farber.--The phenomenology of epistemic claims: and its bearing on the essence of philosophy, by R. M. Zaner.--Problems of the Life-World, by A. Gurwitsch.--The Life-World and the particular sub-worlds, by W. Marx.--On the boundaries of the social world, by T. Luckmann.--Alfred Schutz on social reality and social science, by M. Natanson.--Homo oeconomicus and his class mates, by F. Machlup.--Toward a science of political economics, by A. Lowe.--Some notes on reality-orientation in contemporary societies, (...) by A. Brodersen.--The eclipse of reality, by E. Voegelin.--Alienation in Marx's Political economy and philosophy, by P. Merlan.--The problem of multiple realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil, by P. L. Berger.--Phenomenology, history, myth, by F. Kersten.--The role of music in Leonardo's Paragone, by E. Winternitz.--Alfred Schutz bibliography (p. [297]-306). (shrink)
Il problema della «nozione di responsabilità» che Alfred Schütz affronta in Some Equivocations of the Notion of Responsability emerge sullo sfondo di una dimensione fenomenologica dell’azione morale. L’autore propone di distinguere internamente a questa nozione il punto di vista soggettivo e quello oggettivo, mettendo in luce come principi, norme, leggi e doveri morali assumano significato differente se riferiti alla coscienza individuale, in cui vengono autodeterminati ed elaborati, o se invece imposti dall’esterno. Giudicare ‘da se stessi’ la propria azione risulta così (...) su un piano etico di maggiore rilevanza rispetto a quello in cui la responsabilità viene etero-determinata come ‘responsabilità di qualcuno verso qualcosa’, quello in cui è soltanto il gruppo o l’autorità, dall’esterno, a rendere un altro responsabile.The problem of the «notion of responsibility» which Alfred Schütz treats in Some Equivocations of the Notion of Responsability comes out on the background of a phenomenological size of the moral action. The author suggests distinguishing inside to this notion the subjective point of view and that one objective, sheding light upon as principles, rules, laws and moral duties grasp different meaning if ascribed to the individual conscience, in which are self-determined and elaborated, or if instead imposed from the outside. So ‘self-judgment’ on the action turns out on an ethical greater importance plan than that one in which the responsibility is hetero-determined as ‘responsibility of someone towards something’, that in which is only the group or the authority, from the outside, to hold another person responsible. (shrink)
The student of Max Scheler's work encounters several difficulties. First, the range of his preoccupation is unique in our time. During his most creative years, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and the phenomenology of emotional life were at the center of his interest. Later he became more and more involved in the ontological problems of society and reality and laid the foundation of a new sociology of knowledge. Second, Scheler's thought evolved in the course of his short life--he died in (...) 1928, barely fifty-four--through various phases which were hardly compatible with one another. He started as a student of Rudolph Eucken, the philosopher of life, who imbued his disciple with an admiration for St. Augustine and Pascal; he became deeply influenced by Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson, and above all, Husserl. Converted to Catholicism, Scheler became a convinced Christian--both a personalist and a theist. But very soon his attitude toward religion underwent a complete change; in a last pantheistic phase, he dedicated himself to the philosophical and sociological exploration of the human condition. He then conceived the development of world history as a progression from illogical and blind vital urges to the fulfillment of the destiny of humanity in the realms of values and spiritual existence, and interpreted the whole process as the manifestation of divine force, the becoming of God in the world. A third difficulty for the student of Scheler's thought is the lack of organization of his books, originating in his disdain of any attempt to visualize life in an artificially unified perspective of the kind which the construction of a philosophic system might offer. He was, as Ortega y Gasset said, in the true sense of Plato an "enthusiastic" philosopher. Overwhelmed by the wealth of his discoveries, he lived in a continuous haste of mind. He had to proclaim so many lucid insights that he staggered, bewildered by cognition and inebriated by truth. This explains the frequent inconsistencies of his thought and the lack of structure of his writings. (shrink)
Scheler's main purpose is to show that an ethics of concrete values by no means has to lead to the consequences reached by Kant. He develops an ethical theory based on the insight that concrete values and their hierarchical order form a realm of material, a prioristic data which is disclosed to us by emotional intuition. He calls his system "ethical absolutism and objectivism" and adds that, in another sense, it might be interpreted as a new attempt at personalism, since (...) one of its outstanding theses is the subordination of all values to the personal. (shrink)
The present paper gives an introduction to Schutz’s hereafter first published [“Fragment on the Phenomenology of Rhythm”]. After the editorial remarks the connections to the first part are developed along the lines of a nonconceptual substructure of meaning, the problem of passive synthesis,the phenomenological concept of the ideal object, the problem of the unit, and finally the connection of body, mind, and space. The paper closes with a commented summarization of Schutz’s fragment.
The present paper gives an introduction to Schutz’s hereafter first published [“Fragment on the Phenomenology of Rhythm”]. After the editorial remarks the connections to the first part are developed along the lines of a nonconceptual substructure of meaning, the problem of passive synthesis,the phenomenological concept of the ideal object, the problem of the unit, and finally the connection of body, mind, and space. The paper closes with a commented summarization of Schutz’s fragment.