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Alison Fernandes [6]Alison S. Fernandes [2]Alison Sutton Fernandes [2]
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Alison Sutton Fernandes
Trinity College, Dublin
  1. Exploring People’s Beliefs About the Experience of Time.Jack Shardlow, Ruth Lee, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, Patrick Burns & Alison S. Fernandes - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10709-10731.
    Philosophical debates about the metaphysics of time typically revolve around two contrasting views of time. On the A-theory, time is something that itself undergoes change, as captured by the idea of the passage of time; on the B-theory, all there is to time is events standing in before/after or simultaneity relations to each other, and these temporal relations are unchanging. Philosophers typically regard the A-theory as being supported by our experience of time, and they take it that the B-theory clashes (...)
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  2. Time Travel and Counterfactual Asymmetry.Alison Fernandes - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):1983-2001.
    We standardly evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in temporally asymmetric terms—by keeping the past fixed and holding the future open. Only future events depend counterfactually on what happens now. Past events do not. Conversely, past events are relevant to what abilities one has now in a way that future events are not. Lewis, Sider and others continue to evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in temporally asymmetric terms, even in cases of backwards time travel. I’ll argue that we need more temporally neutral methods. (...)
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  3.  24
    Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past–Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods.Ruth Lee, Christoph Hoerl, Patrick Burns, Alison Sutton Fernandes, Patrick A. O'Connor & Teresa McCormack - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (9):e12887.
    It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future (...)
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  4. Freedom, self-prediction, and the possibility of time travel.Alison Fernandes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):89-108.
    Do time travellers retain their normal freedom and abilities when they travel back in time? Lewis, Horwich and Sider argue that they do. Time-travelling Tim can kill his young grandfather, his younger self, or whomever else he pleases—and so, it seems can reasonably deliberate about whether to do these things. He might not succeed. But he is still just as free as a non-time traveller. I’ll disagree. The freedom of time travellers is limited by a rational constraint. Tim can’t reasonably (...)
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  5.  63
    Does the Temporal Asymmetry of Value Support a Tensed Metaphysics?Alison Fernandes - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):3999-4016.
    There are temporal asymmetries in our attitudes towards the past and future. For example, we judge that a given amount of work is worth twice as much if it is described as taking place in the future, compared to the past :796–801, 2008). Does this temporal value asymmetry support a tensed metaphysics? By getting clear on the asymmetry’s features, I’ll argue that it doesn’t. To support a tensed metaphysics, the value asymmetry would need to not vary with temporal distance, apply (...)
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  6. Varieties of Epistemic Freedom.Alison Fernandes - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):1-16.
    When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two (...)
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  7.  28
    Time, Flies, and Why We Can't Control the Past.Alison Fernandes - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer, Eric Winsberg & Brad Weslake (eds.), Time’s Arrows and the Probability Structure of the World. Cambridge, Mass.:
    David Albert explains why we can typically influence the future but not the past by appealing to an initial low-entropy state of the universe. And he argues that in the rare cases where we can influence the past, we cannot use this influence to knowingly gain future rewards: so it does not constitute control. I introduce an important new case in which Albert's account implies we can not only influence the past but control it: a case where our actions in (...)
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  8.  11
    Back to the Present: How Not to Use Counterfactuals to Explain Causal Asymmetry.Alison Fernandes - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (2):43.
    A plausible thought is that we should evaluate counterfactuals in the actual world by holding the present ‘fixed’; the state of the counterfactual world at the time of the antecedent, outside the area of the antecedent, is required to match that of the actual world. When used to evaluate counterfactuals in the actual world, this requirement may produce reasonable results. However, the requirement is deeply problematic when used in the context of explaining causal asymmetry. The requirement plays a crucial role (...)
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    Toward an Account of Intuitive Time.Ruth Lee, Jack Shardlow, Christoph Hoerl, Patrick A. O'Connor, Alison S. Fernandes & Teresa McCormack - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (7).
    Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 7, July 2022.
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    Temporal Asymmetries in Philosophy and Psychology.Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Alison Sutton Fernandes (eds.) - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Humans’ attitudes towards an event often vary depending on whether the event has already happened or has yet to take place. The dread felt at the thought of a forthcoming examination turns into relief once it is over. People also value past events less than future ones – offering less pay for work already carried out than for the same work to be carried out in the future, as recent research in psychology shows. This volume brings together philosophers and psychologists (...)
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