Current general restrictions on performance-enhancing drugs pose a collective action problem that cannot be solved and bring a variety of adverse consequences for sport. General prohibitions of PEDs are grounded in claims that they violate the integrity of sport. But there are decisive arguments against integrity of sport-based prohibitions of PEDs for elite sport. We defend a harm prevention approach to PED prohibition as an alternative. This position cannot support a general ban on PEDs, since it provides no basis for (...) prohibiting non-harmful PED use. We argue that a harm prevention approach to restricting PEDs is ethically justified, has better prospects of compliance, is consistent with respecting the integrity of sport, and holds at least a modest prospect of resolving the collective action problem around PED restriction. (shrink)

Mental health acts allow for interference with the liberty of the individual. As such, they serve as test cases for theories of liberty, and thus the question of what Mill would think about them arises. My aim is to answer this question. I argue that Mill would embrace mental health acts to protect mentally disturbed individuals from themselves and others from them, and that they should have broad admission criteria, allow capable patients to refuse treatment, and have treatment decisions made (...) by patients or their families on the basis of substituted judgements rather than representatives of the state acting on best interest judgements. This interpretation will show that many writers who claim Mill's support cannot properly do so. It is also a combination of views that cannot be readily found in mental health acts themselves, but which, as Mill's reasons for it show, is a serious candidate for legislative adoption. (shrink)

The current main source of transplantable organs is from heart-beating donors. These are patients who have suffered a catastrophic brain injury, been ventilated, declared dead by neurological criteria, and had their vital functions maintained mechanically until the point of transplantation. But the demand for organs far outstrips the supply, and these patients are not the only potential donors. The idea behind non-heart-beating transplantation is to expand the donor pool by including in it patients who are in hopeless conditions but who (...) are not dying because of brain injury and hence will not suffer the neurological death necessary to become heart-beating donors. As long as we continue to hold the so-called dead donor rule, according to which dying donors cannot have their organs taken before they are dead, this requires that death be able to be declared by alternative criteria, specifically by cardiopulmonary criteria. The challenge is to find such criteria that will identify a state that the public will readily recognize as death and that will facilitate non-heart-beating transplantation. a. (shrink)

There are 12 different Mental Health Acts in Canada, all of which provide for the involuntary confinement of the mentally disordered to protect both them from themselves and others from them. The Acts differ in many ways, but three issues stand out above all: involuntary admission criteria, the right to refuse treatment, and who has the authority to authorize treatment. I first describe how the MHAs differ on these issues. I then take up the methodological question of how to select (...) or construct a MHA from the many, all of which have something to be said for them. Finally, I apply this test to the three main issues in dispute and identify which solutions would be in an ideal MHA. My aim in this last is not to settle the issues but to engage with them and so deepen our understanding of what is at stake. (shrink)

Baseball rules prohibit pitchers from intentionally throwing at batters. When a pitcher does so, however, it is common practice for a pitcher on the opposing team to retaliate by throwing at the first player of the offending team to bat the next inning, and for umpires to ignore the rule forbidding that. I argue that player retaliation in the form of one for one is a better response to the initial violation than any other that is available, one for one (...) can be justified as payback and for anticipated good consequences, and everyone who becomes a professional baseball player has consented to the practice. From these claims, I conclude that one for one is in the best interest of baseball, it is best if umpires follow common practice and wink at the rule forbidding it, and players cannot complain if they are told to throw at batters in certain circumstances, or are thrown at in just those circumstances. (shrink)

Mr. Paul Mills suffered from cancer of the esophagus. Three major surgeries were unsuccessful in correcting the problem, and other treatment methods likewise failed. His condition deteriorated to the point where there was no longer any hope of recovery. Dr. Morrison, who was Mr. Mills's intensive care physician at the Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre in Halifax, and Mr. Mills's family agreed that active life support should be discontinued. Dr. Morrison then removed Mr. Mills's ventilator. To everyone's surprise, and (...) dismay, Mr. Mills did not die. He continued to breathe spontaneously and started to show signs of distress. Dr. Morrison increased the dosage of morphine, to no effect. She increased it again to the point where death could reasonably be expected to occur; signs of distress continued. Dr. Morrison at this point administered a dose of potassium chloride and Mr. Mills died. (shrink)

Canada is one of the few countries in the world—China is another—that has decriminalized abortion. In Canada, there are no legislative or judicial restrictions whatsoever on abortion: When, where, and under what circumstances abortions can be performed are all unregulated. In sharp contrast, abortion is generally illegal in South American and predominantly Catholic countries, as well as in African and Muslim countries. And the countries that do allow legal abortions, including most in Europe along with America, Australia, and Russia, typically (...) permit it only up to a certain time or make it subject to circumstances such as risk to the woman. In what follows we will first explain how Canada came to decriminalize abortion and then go on to assess that position from an ethical point of view. (shrink)

Advance directives enable individuals to project their healthcare preferences into a period of anticipated incapacity. With advance directives, individuals can designate whom they would like to have make healthcare decisions for them, or give their healthcare provider advice on what to do, or both. Canada has an unusually wide variety of legislative approaches to advance directives. In what follows we describe and evaluate these, with the aim of pointing the way toward the ideally best legislation and policies on such directives.

In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the criminal law prohibiting physician assisted death in Canada. In 2016, Parliament passed legislation to allow what it called ‘medical assistance in dying.’ The authors first describe the arguments the Court used to strike down the law, and then argue that MAID as legalized in Bill C-14 is based on principles that are incompatible with a free and democratic society, prohibits assistance in dying that should be permitted, and makes access to (...) medically-assisted death unnecessarily difficult. They then propose a version of MAID legislation that gives proponents and opponents of MAID everything they can legitimately want, contend that it is the only way to legalize MAID that is compatible with a free and democratic society, and conclude that it is the way to legalize MAID in Canada and other similarly free and democratic societies. (shrink)

We have a philosopher friend who was quite ill and required surgery, but she was not ill enough to be admitted to hospital under the “life, limb, and organ preservation” guidelines that control surgical admissions. Her surgeon told her to go to emergency and gave her a list of symptoms to tell the physicians there. Those, he said, would get her a bed, and he would then come and perform the necessary surgery. And that is how our friend got her (...) surgery. (shrink)

In any healthcare system in which demand exceeds supply—which means any typical public healthcare system—patients cannot always get the care they want or need when they want or need it. It is also unrealistic to suppose that it will ever be otherwise. There have been such advances in medicine and growth in the population that even if we forgot about all other goods such as education, roads, social services, and so forth and put the entire budget into healthcare, there would (...) still be a gap between supply and demand. Moreover, even if we could by that expedient make them match and had eyes only for health, we still should not. For it is now understood that healthcare is the least important determinant of health, lining up well behind poverty and social status. But if suboptimal care is to be our destiny, we must plan how it is to be delivered. (shrink)

I argue that whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not theoretically capable of being (...) solved, and legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true. (shrink)

I argue that (1) whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, (2) the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, (3) there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not theoretically (...) capable of being solved, and (4) legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true. (shrink)

It is a rare patient who always does everything healthcare providers advise. Sometimes no harm comes from this; sometimes good does. But occasionally, great harm comes from not listening, as when it results in patients returning time and again for costly and invasive treatments of, say, infections, valve replacements, pressure ulcers, and so forth. No class of patients arouses more anger and resentment in healthcare providers, who often put out a call to invoke some version of the three strikes rule (...) and refuse care. And if the patients are also unemployed substance abusers who live in a local park, impolite or dangerous to staff, disruptive to other patients, and have intimidating visitors, the call to say “No” is louder. Can care ever be refused? If so, when? These are the questions we take up in this article. The answers we provide were developed as part of a Paraplegics and Quadriplegics with Pressure Ulcers Project carried out at Vancouver Hospital and Health Sciences Centre. Following an established usage, we refer to patients who exhibit a cluster of the above characteristics, the dominant one of which is a reluctance to heed medical advice, as “noncompliant patients.” This term is offensive to some, but the politically correct lexicon does not provide any alternative which is as short and clear or substantially different. We use the term as a convenient way of referring to a familiar class of patients and without any imputation of blame. (shrink)

The recent history of the Canadian healthcare system has been increasingly one of shortages. There are delays for services that impose risk and hardship, disparities between the accessibility of healthcare for rural versus urban populations, and a lack of adequate coverage for or access to prescription drugs, diagnostic services, and homecare. Add to these problems shortages of healthcare providers—in particular, physicians and nurses—and state-of-the-art equipment, and we can understand the universal agreement that the Canadian healthcare system must change. The only (...) question is how. Some argue for modifications within the basic framework of a one-tier single-payer system; others for more radical reform that will allow for infusions of money by expedients such as user fees, extra billing, or a full-blooded second tier where one can buy any healthcare one wants. a. (shrink)

Residents in long-term care facilities and rehab hospitals sometimes ask healthcare professionals to help them do things that HCPs judge to be on balance harmful. A person with respiratory problems may ask for a cigarette, a diabetic for alcohol, a dysphagiac for food or fluids by mouth, a person at risk for falling for her walker, and so on. These requests raise two kinds of problems. The first pits residents against HCPs. Should HCPs ever help residents do what they consider (...) harmful? The second pits HCPs against HCPs. If HCPs disagree among themselves—some thinking that the resident should receive the assistance, others thinking not—what should be done? (shrink)

Two of the most poignant decisions in pediatrics concern disagreements between physicians and families over imperiled newborns. When can the family demand more life-sustaining treatment than physicians want to provide? When can it properly ask for less? The author looks at these questions from the point of view of decision theory, and first argues that insofar as the family acts in the child’s best interest, its choices cannot be constrained, and that the maximax and minimax strategies are equally in the (...) child’s best interest. He then proposes a guideline according to which the family can demand LST if it is physiologically possible to preserve a life the child can be expected to welcome, and refuse such treatment if it causes suffering that is “more than can be borne” even if an uncompromised life is expected to emerge. (shrink)