See also
Allen Coates
East Tennessee State University
  1. Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in (...)
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  2. The Enkratic Requirement.Allen Coates - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
    : Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on (...)
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  3. Explaining the Value of Truth.Allen Coates - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):105-115.
    Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.
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  4. Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation.Allen Coates - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315.
    Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.
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    Moral Rationalism and Psychopathy: Affective Responses to Reason.Allen Coates - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):855-877.
    Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of moral rationalism.
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  6. Value, Commensurability, and Practical Reason.Allen Coates - 2004 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
    Two goods are incommensurable just in case neither is better than the other, nor are they equal. Incommensurable goods pose two problems: determining which goods are incommensurable, and deciding how to make choices over those that are. In this dissertation, I develop a theory of value and show how it solves these two problems. An item is good, I argue, insofar as there are reasons to choose it. Accordingly, the comparative value of two goods depends upon the reasons for choosing (...)
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