Was ist es, was Ludwig Wittgensteins Philosophische Untersuchungen zu etwas Besonderem macht? Sind die Philosophischen Untersuchungen als Argumentation für bestimmte philosophische Thesen zu lesen, oder soll man sie therapeutisch verstehen? Wann wurden die Untersuchungen überhaupt begonnen? Wann ist die Wende zu Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie passiert und was hat als solche zu gelten? Warum nennt Wittgenstein seine Philosophischen Untersuchungen ein “Album”? Welche Funktion hat der Stil der Untersuchungen?Auf diese und damit verbundene Fragen versucht das vorliegende Buch eine Antwort zu geben. Ein Teil (...) der Antwort wird sein, dass Wittgenstein mit den Philosophischen Untersuchungen tatsächlich ein Buch schaffen wollte, das philosophische Probleme lösen hilft, ohne dabei dem Dogmatismus Vorschub zu leisten. Für dieses Vorhaben brauchte das Buch eine besondere Form. Die Philosophischen Untersuchungen beginnen also da, wo diese Form beginnt: im November 1936 in Skjolden.Alois Pichler, geboren 1966, ist Leiter des Wittgenstein-Archivs der Universität Bergen, Norwegen. (shrink)
This paper presents two hitherto unknown dream reports by Ludwig Wittgenstein, written down by him in October 1942. The two reports are introduced by the title “Ein Traum” and found in his Nachlass item Ms-126, pages 21–26. They are edited here in parallel diplomatic and linear, gently normalized transcription. Facsimiles of the pages containing the reports can be viewed on Wittgenstein Source where they were published in the spring of 2016.
In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...) processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA. (shrink)
A conceptual ontology was used to semantically enrich the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen’s taxonomy for Wittgenstein Source to facilitate improved searching in the areas of the philosophies of mathematics and psychology. The classes and sub-classes of the multilingual taxonomy were employed to further refine the ways in which themes in these areas of philosophy could be organised. The taxonomy was intended to facilitate the identification of thematic similarities between remarks in instances where this similarity might not be (...) apparent with free text search and in cases where the classified subject of the remarks differed. The approach taken to constructing the taxonomy allows for both its alteration and potential expansion. (shrink)
What have Plato's, Hume's and Wittgenstein's dialogues in common? And what can we learn from this question for our understanding of Wittgenstein? â€“ This paper is a transcript of a lecture given in Bergen on May 4th, 2001.
Does the way authors treat their own works tell us something about how these works are to be understood? Not necessarily. But then a standard argument against the “New Wittgenstein” comes under question. The argument is: the undogmatic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus cannot be correct, since Wittgenstein himself later treats it as a work that holds certain positions. My response is: the argument is only correct if the answer to four specific questions is “yes.” The main purpose of the paper (...) is to bring issues of philosophical authorship more into focus within Wittgensteinian interpretation. (shrink)
This volume collects nine essays that investigate the work of Gottlob Frege. The contributors address Frege’s work in relation to literature and fiction (Dichtung), the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), and science (Wissenschaft). Overall, the essays consider internal connections between different aspects of Frege’s work while acknowledging the importance of its philosophical context. -/- .
This volume collects nine essays that investigate the work of Gottlob Frege. The contributors address Frege’s work in relation to literature and fiction (Dichtung), the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), and science (Wissenschaft). Overall, the essays consider internal connections between different aspects of Frege’s work while acknowledging the importance of its philosophical context. -/- There are also further common strands between the papers, such as the relation between Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to philosophical investigations, the relation between Frege and Kant, and the place (...) of Frege’s work in the philosophical landscape more generally. The volume is therefore of direct relevance to several current debates in philosophy in general, in addition to Frege and Wittgenstein research in particular. -/- Even though Frege’s great significance for contemporary philosophy is not disputed, the question of how we are to understand the character and aims of his project is debated. The debate has a starting point in Frege’s specific conception of logic. The volume elucidates this conception as well as the relation between natural language and the Begriffsschrift. It will help philosophers, researchers, and students better understand the nuances of this great thinker. By extension, it will also help readers seeking to understand Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical difficulties and his struggle to find an apt form of presentation for his philosophical investigations. (shrink)