12 found
Order:
See also
Profile: Alon Chasid (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan)
  1.  36
    Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.
    This paper discusses a counterexample to the thesis that visual experience is cognitively impenetrable. My central claim is that sometimes visual experience is influenced by the perceiver’s beliefs, rendering her experience’s representational content indeterminate. After discussing other examples of cognitive penetrability, I focus on a certain kind of visual experience— that is, an experience that occurs under radically nonstandard conditions—and show that it may have indeterminate content, particularly with respect to low-level properties such as colors and shapes. I then explain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  33
    Pictorial Experience: Not so Special After All.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.
    The central thesis (CT) that this paper upholds is that a picture depicts an object by generating in those who view the picture a visual experience of that object. I begin by presenting a brief sketch of intentionalism, the theory of perception in terms of which I propose to account for pictorial experience. I then discuss Richard Wollheim’s twofoldness thesis and explain why it should be rejected. Next, I show that the socalled unique phenomenology of pictorial experience is simply an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  31
    Content-Free Pictorial Realism.Alon Chasid - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):375-405.
    What is it for a picture to be more realistic, or more depictive, than another? Without committing to any thesis as to what depiction consists in, I show that degrees of depictiveness are grounded in a certain relation between two basic kinds of differences between pictures: configurational differences and content differences. A picture is thus more depictive just in case it is seen as having fewer nondepictive features, whereas a nondepictive feature is individuated through the susceptibility of the picture's configuration (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Why the Pictorial Relation is Not Reference.Alon Chasid - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):226-247.
    Nelson Goodman argued that the pictorial relation is reducible to reference. After explaining why previous attempts to refute this thesis of reduction have failed, I argue that in order to show that the thesis is indeed wrong we must find an aspect of pictures that is incompatible with it. I proceed to argue that there is indeed such an element to pictures. Ordinarily, a picture depicts its subject as having aesthetic properties. I show that the depiction of these properties requires (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  11
    Imaginative Content, Design-Assumptions and Immersion.Alon Chasid - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):259-272.
    In this paper, I will analyze certain aspects of imaginative content, namely the content of the representational mental state called “imagining.” I will show that fully accounting for imaginative content requires acknowledging that, in addition to imagining, an imaginative project—the overall mental activity we engage in when we imagine—includes another infrastructural component in terms of which content should be explained. I will then show that the phenomenon of imaginative immersion can partly be explained in terms of the proposed infrastructure of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  11
    Imaginatively‐Colored Perception: Walton on Pictorial Experience.Alon Chasid - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):27-47.
    This paper develops Kendall Walton's account of pictorial experience. Walton argues that the key feature of that experience is that it is imaginatively-penetrated experience. I argue that this idea, as put forward by Walton, has various shortcomings. After discussing these limitations, I suggest, on the basis of a more general phenomenon of cognitive penetration, a refinement of Walton's account. I then show how the revised account explains various features of pictorial experience. Specifically, I show that, given the manner in which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  21
    Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (4):405-416.
    This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called ‘representationalism’) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I then argue (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  8
    On Images: Their Structure and Content. [REVIEW]Alon Chasid - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (3):326-328.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. A Case Against Representationalism.Alon Chasid - 2013 - Iyyun 62 (1):29-42.
    The case of blurry vision has been cited by many as a counterexample to representationalism in the theory of perception. Specifically, it is claimed that the phenomenon of blurry vision is incompatible with the supervenience thesis which is at the root of representationalism. Michael Tye, a leading representationalist, has responded to such objections by giving an account of blurry vision in a way that, allegedly, renders it compatible with representationalism. In this paper I argue that Tye’s account of blurry vision, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Imaginatively-Colored Perception.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
  11. On Images: Their Structure and Content: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Alon Chasid - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (3):326-328.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Review of "On Images: Their Structure and Content," by John Kulvicki. [REVIEW]Alon Chasid - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (3).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography