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Alvin I. Goldman [137]Alvin Ira Goldman [1]
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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
  1. Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
    So argues a leading epistemologist in this work of fundamental importance to philosophical thinking.
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  2. Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is a bold, (...)
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  3. A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.
  4. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
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  5.  84
    Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):424-429.
  6. Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading.Vittorio Gallese & Alvin I. Goldman - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (12):493-501.
    A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey’s premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One (...)
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  7. A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
  8. Interpretation Psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
  9. Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
    Mainstream epistemology is a highly theoretical and abstract enterprise. Traditional epistemologists rarely present their deliberations as critical to the practical problems of life, unless one supposes—as Hume, for example, did not—that skeptical worries should trouble us in our everyday affairs. But some issues in epistemology are both theoretically interesting and practically quite pressing. That holds of the problem to be discussed here: how laypersons should evaluate the testimony of experts and decide which of two or more rival experts is most (...)
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  10. In Defense of the Simulation Theory.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.
  11.  48
    A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
  12. The Psychology of Folk Psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  13. Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status.Alvin I. Goldman - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26.
    Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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  14. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
    It is a widely accepted doctrine in epistemology that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. But although epistemologists regularly pay homage to this doctrine, evidence for it is shaky. Is it based on evidence that ordinary people on the street make evaluative comparisons of knowledge and true belief, and consistently rate the former ahead of the latter? Do they reveal such a preference by some sort of persistent choice behavior? Neither of these scenarios is observed. Rather, epistemologists come (...)
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  15. Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.
  16.  37
    Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81.
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  17. Internalism Exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
  18.  89
    Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays.Alvin I. Goldman - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    This is the most up-to-date collection of essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, refining and clarifying that theory and critiquing its rivals. The volume features important essays on the internalism/externalism debate, epistemic value, the intuitional methodology of philosophy, and social epistemology.
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  19.  73
    Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in (...)
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  20. Strong and Weak Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.
  21.  81
    Empathy, Mind, and Morals.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):17 - 41.
  22. Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
  23. Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition.Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion (...)
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  24.  50
    Internalism Exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
  25. Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...)
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  26.  48
    Interpretation Psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-185.
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  27. Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence.Alvin I. Goldman & Joel Pust - 1998 - In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.
    How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being (...)
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  28. Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  29. Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:271-285.
  30. Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):131-143.
    According to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.
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  31. Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):509-523.
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  32. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Westview Press.
    One of the most fruitful interdisciplinary boundaries in contemporary scholarship is that between philosophy and cognitive science. Now that solid empirical results about the activities of the human mind are available, it is no longer necessary for philosophers to practice armchair psychology.In this short, accessible, and entertaining book, Alvin Goldman presents a masterly survey of recent work in cognitive science that has particular relevance to philosophy. Besides providing a valuable review of the most suggestive work in cognitive and social psychology, (...)
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  33. A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):71-88.
    Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily formats,” i.e., representational codes primarily utilized in forming interoceptive (...)
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  34. Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or (...)
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  35. The Individuation of Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):761-774.
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  36. Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2004 - Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
    Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition . This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. In making this choice, (...)
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  37. Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):113-131.
  38. Foundations of Social Epistemics.Alvin I. Goldman - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):109 - 144.
    A conception of social epistemology is articulated with links to studies of science and opinion in such disciplines as history, sociology, and political science. The conception is evaluative, though, rather than purely descriptive. Three types of evaluative approaches are examined but rejected: relativism, consensualism, and expertism. A fourth, truth-linked, approach to intellectual evaluation is then advocated: social procedures should be appraised by their propensity to foster true belief. Standards of evaluation in social epistemics would be much the same as those (...)
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  39.  89
    Ethics and Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Ethics 103 (2):337-360.
  40. Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation.Alvin I. Goldman - unknown
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from (...)
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  41. Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach*: ALVIN I. GOLDMAN.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):201-217.
    Why should a citizen vote? There are two ways to interpret this question: in a prudential sense, and in a moral sense. Under the first interpretation, the question asks why—or under what circumstances—it is in a citizen's self-interest to vote. Under the second interpretation, it asks what moral reasons citizens have for voting. I shall mainly try to answer the moral version of the question, but my answer may also, in some circumstances, bear on the prudential question. Before proceeding to (...)
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  42.  81
    An Economic Model of Scientific Activity and Truth Acquisition.Alvin I. Goldman & Moshe Shaked - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (1):31 - 55.
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  43. Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology.Alvin I. Goldman - forthcoming - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
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  44.  21
    Metaphysics and Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction Alvin I. Goldman and Brian P. McLaughlin Section I: What Might Be the Role of Cognitive Science in Metaphysics? Chapter 1: Time Lost, Time Regained Craig Callender Chapter 2: Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking Jonathan Schaffer Section II: Ethics and Cognitive Science Chapter 3: Moral Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, and the Cognitive Sciences Peter Railton Chapter 4: Debunking and Vindicating in Moral Psychology Shaun Nichols Section III: God and Cognitive Science Chapter 5: On Perceiving God: Prospects for a (...)
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  45. Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
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  46.  8
    " T Fl The Psychology of Folk Psychology".Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 347.
  47. A Guide to Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
  48. Science, Publicity, and Consciousness.Alvin I. Goldman - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):525-45.
    A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific practice and the publicity requirement. Which should give way? This paper argues against the publicity requirement and against a fallback (...)
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  49.  18
    Argumentation and Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):27-49.
  50. Argumentation and Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):27-49.