44 found
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  1. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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  2. Probabilistic Reasoning.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 43--68.
     
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  3.  35
    On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply to Jonathan Cohen.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1979 - Cognition 7 (December):409-11.
  4.  6
    Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  5.  20
    Variants of Uncertainty.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):143-157.
  6. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. I: Additive and Polynomial Representations.David Krantz, Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1971 - New York Academic Press.
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  7.  49
    On the Psychology of Prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
    Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students. The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by (...)
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  8.  8
    Utility Theory and Additivity Analysis of Risky Choices.Amos Tversky - 1967 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 75 (1):27.
  9.  6
    On the Study of Statistical Intuitions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
  10.  7
    Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  11. Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability.Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):547-567.
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  12.  6
    Features of Similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.
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  13.  19
    Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice.Amos Tversky - 1972 - Psychological Review 79 (4):281-299.
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  14.  5
    L. J. Cohen, Again: On the Evaluation of Inductive Intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.
  15.  2
    Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice.Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath & Paul Slovic - 1988 - Psychological Review 95 (3):371-384.
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  16.  40
    A Critique of Expected Utility Theory: Descriptive and Normative Considerations.Amos Tversky - 1975 - Erkenntnis 9 (2):163 - 173.
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  17.  7
    Languages and Designs for Probability Judgment.Glenn Shafer & Amos Tversky - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (3):309-339.
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  18.  12
    Intransitivity of Preferences.Amos Tversky - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (1):31-48.
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  19. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. II: Geometrical, Threshold, and Probabilistic Representations.Patrick Suppes, David Krantz, Duncan Luce & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1989 - New York Academic Press.
     
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  20. On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
  21.  29
    Studies of Similarity.Amos Tversky & Itamar Gati - 1978 - In Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd (eds.), Cognition and Categorization. Lawrence Elbaum Associates. pp. 1--1978.
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  22.  1
    Weighing Risk and Uncertainty.Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (2):269-283.
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  23.  2
    Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory.Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):406-415.
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  24. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1979 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society:263--291.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - JSTOR.
     
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  25. The Notion of Cognitive Bias.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 2000 - In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications. pp. 8--349.
  26. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. III: Representation, Axiomatization, and Invariance.Duncan Luce, David Krantz, Patrick Suppes & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1990 - New York Academic Press.
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  27.  17
    Information Versus Reward in Binary Choices.Amos Tversky & Ward Edwards - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (5):680.
  28. Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Cognitive Psychology 5 (2):207-232.
     
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  29.  10
    Can Irrationality Be Intelligently Discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
  30.  2
    Conjoint-Measurement Analysis of Composition Rules in Psychology.David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1971 - Psychological Review 78 (2):151-169.
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  31.  3
    Assessing Uncertainty.Amos Tversky - 1974 - Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 36 (2):148-159.
    Intuitive judgments of probability are based on a limited number of heuristics that are usually effective but sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Research shows, for example, that people judge the probability of a hypothesis by the degree to which it represents the evidence, with little or no regard for its prior probability. Other heuristics lead to an overestimation of the probabilities of highly available or salient events, and to overconfidence in the assessment of subjective probability distributions. These biases (...)
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  32.  1
    Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological Spaces.Amos Tversky & J. Wesley Hutchinson - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (1):3-22.
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  33.  1
    Similarity, Separability, and the Triangle Inequality.Amos Tversky & Itamar Gati - 1982 - Psychological Review 89 (2):123-154.
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  34.  1
    Preference Trees.Amos Tversky & Shmuel Sattath - 1979 - Psychological Review 86 (6):542-573.
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  35.  2
    "On the Intricacies Involved in the Study of Similarity Judgments: Comment on Ritov, Gati, and Tversky": Reply.Ilana Ritov, Itamar Gati & Amos Tversky - 1990 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 119 (1):44-44.
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  36.  1
    Foundations of Multidimensional Scaling.Richard Beals, David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1968 - Psychological Review 75 (2):127-142.
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  37.  1
    Representations of Perceptions of Risks.Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky - 1984 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113 (1):55-70.
  38.  2
    A Reply to Evans.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 12 (3):325-326.
  39. Numbers L-2.Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson, Amos Tversky, P. Legrenzi, V. Girotto, Pn Johnson-Laird, Edward E. Smith, Daniel Osherson & Nancy Pennington - 1993 - Cognition 49 (297):297.
     
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  40. An Exchange on Functional and Conjoint Measurement: Reply.David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1971 - Psychological Review 78 (5):457-458.
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  41. An Exchange on Functional and Conjoint Measurement: Reply.David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1971 - Psychological Review 78 (5):458-458.
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  42. Differential Weighting of Common and Distinctive Components.Ilana Ritov, Itamar Gati & Amos Tversky - 1990 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 119 (1):30-41.
  43. On the Relation Between Common and Distinctive Feature Models.Shmuel Sattath & Amos Tversky - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (1):16-22.
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  44. "Preference Trees": Correction to Tversky and Sattath.Amos Tversky & Shmuel Sattath - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (2):159-159.
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