The subject of this paper is the debate between externalism and internalism about mental content presented by Tim Crane in Chapter 4 of his book Elements of Mind. Crane’s sympathies in this debate are with internalism. The paper attempts to show that Crane’s argumentation is not refuting the Twin Earth argument and externalism, and that in its basis it does not differ much from externalism itself Crane’s version of the argument for externalism features two key premises: (1) The content of (...) a thought determines what the thought is about/what it refers to (the Content Determines Reference Principle); and (2) Twins are referring to different things when they use the word “water”. From these, in a few simple steps, Crane’s externalist infers: Therefore, their thoughts are not “in their heads”. Crane suggests denying the Content Determines Reference Principle in the light of indexical thoughts. In the first stage, Crane reduces “content” to “some aspect of content”, although he needs all aspects of content to secure identity of thoughts. However, his view then comes close to something acceptable to externalists. In the second stage, Crane makes content relative to context, but then reference still determines content. (shrink)

The paper deals with one of the key notions in Epicurean epistemology, preconception. Together with perceptions, preconceptions are the second criterion of truth. The aim of the paper is to explore their epistemological status on the basis of their origin and formation. I argue that the process of formation of preconception is purely empirical, since they are produced through repeated perceptions of individual instances of a particular type of thing. Given the way they are formed, I claim that preconceptions are (...) the means by which we recognize types of object and as such are fundamental to Epicurus’ account of how we gain knowledge of things. Exactly this gives them a distinctive criterial role, since preconceptions––unlike perceptions––enable us to engage in the process of interpretation of perceptual content. (shrink)

Epicurean epistemology is usually summarised in a controversial thesis according to which all perceptions are true. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus ’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but is supported with some serious arguments. In the paper, I examine the thesis according to which “all perceptions are true”, but my main focus is to analyse the content of Epicurean perception through the following questions: (...) what kind of content do Epicurean perceptions have; what are the proper objects of perception; can we ascribe to such content truth and falsity? In the first part, I say something general about the thesis and point out some basic characteristics of perceptions due to which they serve as a criterion of truth. Next I try to show that the proper objects of perceptions are eidola and not external objects because only in that case can Epicurus maintain the truth of all perceptions, including illusions, hallucinations, dreams and other misperceptions. In the third part, I argue that such Epicurean perceptual content can be explained by the modern notion of non-conceptual content, which helps us to understand the special feature of Epicurean perceptions and also the important difference between perception and belief in Epicurean epistemology. In the final part, I discuss the notion of alethes which I suggest implies that perception is “factive”. (shrink)

Prema Epikurovoj epistemologiji svi su opažaji istiniti. Ta teza podrazumijeva da naša osjetila nikada ne griješe, te da nam opažaji uvijek daju točne izvještaje o vanjskom svijetu. Iako se na prvi pogled čini vrlo neuvjerljivom, podrobnija analiza Epikurovih tekstova pokazuje da je ona potkrijepljena zanimljivim argumentima. Pokazuje se da je jasna motivacija Epikura za obranu te teze leži u prihvaćanju radikalnog empirizma i težnji da izbjegne skeptičke opasnosti u koje je zapao Demokrit. Nadalje, opravdanje te teze leži u Epikurovu objašnjenju (...) samog opažajnog procesa, tj. u fizikalnom objašnjenju mehanizma opažanja, koje se uklapa u atomističku sliku svijeta. Opažajni proces pokazuje da su opažaji sirovi podaci koji ne mogu biti lažni, budući da su samo puke reakcije osjetilnog organa na vanjske podražaje, te kao takvi ne mogu biti neistiniti.According to Epicurean epistemology all perceptions are true. The thesis implies that our senses do not ever err and that perceptions give us always correct report of the external world. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus ’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but supported with some serious arguments. Epicurus ’ main concern was to show that we can attain knowledge about the external world. In order to secure the possibility of knowledge Epicurus proposed to rely on perceptions as incorrigible foundation of our knowledge and argue that all perceptions are true. The defense of the thesis and explanation how can it be the case that all perceptions are true is provided by the theory of what happens in the process of perceiving a physical object. In this paper I try to show that his epistemological remarks on infallibility of the senses become more convincing and plausible if properly placed within Epicurus ’ general physical theory. His theory explains perceptions as a raw material which cannot be false since it is a mere response of a sense organ on the impact from the outside, namely from g*T8. Because g*T8 are true and secure reports of external objects, truthfulness of all perceptions is guaranteed. The truth of all perceptions simply follows from the mechanical explanation of the way they are produced, so the truthfulness of perceptions must be accepted on the basis of their origin. (shrink)

Very often moral disagreements can be resolved by appealing to factual considerations because in these cases the parties to the dispute agree as to which factual considerations are relevant. They agree, that is, with respect to their basic moral standards. Hence, when their disagreement about the non-moral facts is resolved, so is their moral disagreement. But sometimes moral disagreement persists in spite of agreement on factual considerations. When this happens, and when neither party is guilty of illogical thinking, we have (...) a case of moral deadlock. (shrink)

We explore the distinctive characteristics of Mexico's society, politics and history that impacted the establishment of genetics in Mexico, as a new disciplinary field that began in the early 20th century and was consolidated and institutionalized in the second half. We identify about three stages in the institutionalization of genetics in Mexico. The first stage can be characterized by Edmundo Taboada, who was the leader of a research program initiated during the Cárdenas government (1934-1940), which was primarily directed towards improving (...) the condition of small Mexican farmers. Taboada is the first Mexican post-graduate investigator in phytotechnology and phytopathology, trained at Cornell University and the University of Minnesota, in 1932 and 1933, respectively. He was the first investigator to teach plant genetics at the National School of Agriculture and wrote the first textbook of general genetics, Genetics Notes, in 1938. Taboada's most important single genetics contribution was the production of "stabilized" corn varieties. The extensive exile of Spanish intellectuals to Mexico, after the end of Spain's Civil War (1936-1939), had a major influence in Mexican science and characterizes the second stage. The three main personalities contributing to Mexican genetics are Federico Bonet de Marco and Bibiano Fernández Osorio Tafall, at the National School of Biological Sciences, and José Luis de la Loma y Oteyza, at the Chapingo Agriculture School. The main contribution of the Spanish exiles to the introduction of genetics in Mexico concerned teaching. They introduced in several universities genetics as a distinctive discipline within the biology curriculum and wrote genetics text books and manuals. The third stage is identified with Alfonso León de Garay, who founded the Genetics and Radiobiology Program in 1960 within the National Commission of Nuclear Energy, which had been founded in 1956. The Genetics and Radiobiology Program rapidly became a disciplinary program, for it embraced research, teaching, and training of academics and technicians. The Mexican Genetics Society, created by de Garay in 1966, and the development of strains and cultures for genetics research were important activities. One of de Garay's key requirements was the compulsory training of the Program's scientists for at least one or two years in the best universities of the United States and Europe. De Garay's role in the development of Mexican genetics was fundamental. His broad vision encompassed the practice of genetics in all its manifestations. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo reviso la interpretación de Eduardo Nicol de la teoría de la propiedad de Francisco Suárez. Para ello, presento la posición de Suárez acerca de la propiedad y la propiedad privada atendiendo dos cuestiones fundamentales. La primera es si la propiedad y la propiedad privada son derechos; la segunda es si ambos pertenecen a la naturaleza humana o no. Al final, argumento que la lectura de Nicol es insostenible, pues difícilmente puede admitirse que Suárez defendió algún tipo (...) de comunismo.: In this paper I revisit Eduardo Nicol’s interpretation of Suarez’s theory of property. To this purpose, I present Suárez’s account of property and private property focusing on two main aspects. The first is whether property and private property are rights; the second is whether they belong to the human nature or not. Finally, I argue that Nicol’s reading of Suárez is untenable for it can hardly be accepted that Suárez defended some kind of communism. (shrink)

Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do so with different sets of concepts. There's much at stake in whether one of these two sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we'd have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious (...) dualism. Folk psychology structures our daily lives and has proven fruitful in the study of mind and ethics, while decision theory is pervasive in various disciplines, including the quantitative social sciences, especially economics, and philosophy. My interest is in accounting for folk psychology with decision theory -- in particular, for believe and wanting, which decision theory omits. Many have attempted this task for belief. (The Lockean Thesis says that there is such an account.) I take up the parallel task for wanting, which has received far less attention. I propose necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in terms of decision theory, for when you're truly said to want; I give an analogue of the Lockean Thesis for wanting. My account is an alternative to orthodox accounts that link wanting to preference (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)), which I argue are false. I argue further that want ascriptions are context-sensitive. My account explains this context-sensitivity, makes sense of conflicting desires, and accommodates phenomena that motivate traditional theses on which 'want' has multiple senses (e.g. all-things-considered vs. pro tanto). (shrink)

This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled “Gödel’s natural deduction,” which presented and made comments about the natural deduction system in Gödel’s unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave at the University of Notre Dame in 1939. In that earlier paper, which was itself a companion to a paper that examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to Gödel and general proof theory, one can find a brief summary of Gödel’s notes for the (...) Notre Dame course. In order to put the earlier paper in proper perspective, a more complete summary of these interesting notes, with comments concerning them, is given here. (shrink)

Transhumanism, the movement that promotes radical enhancement by non-traditional means based in scientific and technological advances, has contributed to contemporary interest in Nietzsche?s philosophy. In this paper, we are going to claim that transhumanists? references to Nietzsche?s philosophy are unfounded. Moreover, we will make a few remarks about Nietzsche?s ethical doctrine in order to show that his conception of enhancement, contrary to transhumanist conceptions, relies on traditional means, such as upbringing and education. Although Nietzsche?s positive ethical doctrines cannot be used (...) to justify transhumanist goals, his critique of morality can be used as a critique of the transhumanist conceptions of human enhancement. nema. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 56, Issue 3-4, pp 241 - 271 William of Ockham and John Buridan provide different accounts of the distinction between formal and material consequences. Some consequences – in particular, enthymemes – that Ockham would classify as formal would be classified as material by Buridan. This paper explains this taxonomical discrepancy. It identifies the root of the discrepancy not in a difference between Ockham’s and Buridan’s notions of propositional hylomorphism but rather in Ockham’s endorsement of relational characterizations of (...) consequences. (shrink)

I want to see the concert, but I don’t want to take the long drive. Both of these desire ascriptions are true, even though I believe I’ll see the concert if and only if I take the drive.Yet they, and strongly conflicting desire ascriptions more generally, are predicted incompatible by the standard semantics, given two standard constraints. There are two proposed solutions. I argue that both face problems because they misunderstand how what we believe influences what we desire. I then (...) sketch my own solution: a coarse-worlds semantics that captures the extent to which belief influences desire. My semantics models what I call some-things-considered desire. Considering what the concert would be like, but ignoring the drive, I want to see the concert; considering what the drive would be like, but ignoring the concert, I don’t want to take the drive. (shrink)

This paper deals with Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures, as well as his appeal for revival of neo-Aristotelian approaches that imply ordered structure, based on the criticism of Quine’s method that, in his view, implies flat metaphysical structure. However, although we believe that Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures is an interesting and, basically, acceptable view, we will try to show that Schaffer’s arguments are not convincing enough to persuade us to abandon Quine’s method and adopt the Aristotelian metaphysical model. Moreover, (...) when mistakes that Schaffer makes are corrected and Quine’s method is given due attention, we will see that this can enable us a more tenable interpretation of the concepts that Schaffer speaks of (metaphysical structures), but also – as in his case – to draw certain conclusions that go beyond objectives of classification as such. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth Principle’. We argue that this principle is false: an agent may want p without having a desire that is satisfied when p obtains in any old way. For example, Millie wants to drink milk but does not have a desire that is satisfied when she drinks spoiled milk. Millie has a (...) desire whose satisfaction conditions are what we call ways-specific. Fara (2003, 2013) and Lycan (2012, ms) have also argued for this conclusion, but their claims about desire satisfaction rest solely on contested intuitions about when agents get what they want. We set these intuitions to one side, instead arguing that desire satisfaction is ways-specific by appealing to the dispositional role of desire. Because agents are disposed to satisfy their desires, dispositions provide important evidence about desire satisfaction. Our argument further provides new insight on the dispositional role of desire satisfaction. (shrink)

I present an analysis according to which the current state of the definition of substitution leads to a contradiction in the system of Transparent Intensional Logic. I entail the contradiction using only the basic definitions of TIL and standard results. I then analyse the roots of the contradiction and motivate the path I take in resolving the contradiction. I provide a new amended definition of collision-less substitution which blocks the contradiction in a non-ad hoc way. I elaborate on the consequences (...) of the amended definition, namely the invalidity of the Church-Rosser theorem. I present a counterexample to the validity of the theorem in TIL with an amended definition of substitution. (shrink)

What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to a highly influential and fruitful approach, championed by Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999), the answer is intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the ~p worlds. This approach faces a well-known and as-yet unsolved problem, however: it makes the entirely wrong predictions with what we call '(counter)factual want ascriptions', wherein the agent either believes p (...) or believes ~p—e.g., ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We bring out this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other. (shrink)

This book explores a much-neglected area of moral philosophy--the typology of immorality. Ronald D. Milo questions the adequacy of Aristotle's suggestion that there are two basic types of immorality--wickedness and moral weakness--and argues that we must distinguish between at least six different types of immoral behavior. Originally published in 1984. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of (...) these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The convergence of computing, sensing, and communication technology will soon permit large-scale deployment of self-driving vehicles. This will in turn permit a radical transformation of traffic control technology. This paper makes a case for the importance of addressing questions of social justice in this transformation, and sketches a preliminary framework for doing so. We explain how new forms of traffic control technology have potential implications for several dimensions of social justice, including safety, sustainability, privacy, efficiency, and equal access. Our central (...) focus is on efficiency and equal access as desiderata for traffic control design. We explain the limitations of conventional traffic control in meeting these desiderata, and sketch a preliminary vision for a next-generation traffic control tailored to address better the demands of social justice. One component of this vision is cooperative, hierarchically distributed self-organization among vehicles. Another component of this vision is a priority system enabling selection of priority levels by the user for each vehicle trip in the network, based on the supporting structure of non-monetary credits. (shrink)

Here I reply to a recent exchange between Edgar Danielyan and Brian Garrett regarding Alvin Plantinga’s assessment of Gaunilo’s ‘ideal island’ objection to Anselm’s ontological argument. I argue that an ideal island is conceivable if it’s defined as any island exhibiting an ideal ratio of great-making island properties.

Citizenship is no longer an exclusive relationship. Many people today are citizens of multiple countries, whether by birth, naturalization, or even through monetary means, with schemes fast-tracking citizenship applications from foreigners making large investments in the state. Moral problems surround each of those ways of acquiring a second citizenship, while retaining one's original citizenship. Multiple citizenship can also have morally problematic consequences for the coherence of collective decisions, for the constitution of the demos, and for global inequality. The phenomenon of (...) multiple citizenship and its ramifications remains understudied, despite its magnitude and political importance. In this innovative book, Ana Tanasoca explores these issues and shows how they could be avoided by unbundling the rights that currently come with citizenship and allocating them separately. It will appeal to scholars and students of normative political theory, citizenship, global justice, and migration in political science, law, and sociology. (shrink)

Contribution to a symposium on Kostas Gavroglu and Ana Simões, Neither Physics nor Chemistry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Recently, the pandemic context in which the world finds itself has inspired studies that sought to evaluate to mental health and the way people are relating to the purpose of understanding and promoting improvements psychological health. The epidemiological and public health literature shows that social connection protects and promotes mental health, being an important clinical tool for reducing anxiety, depression, and stress. Thinking in the broad sense of connection, that is, feeling and perceiving oneself connected with the environment, applied to (...) the context of sport, it is suggested that social connection could be related to the interactions in the practice of sport. Although playing sports can promote mental health, there are few findings on the topic in the context of a pandemic and with physical sports and electronic sports players. In this sense, the present study aims to assess the extent to which social connection and mental health indicators are correlated in a sample of sports and e-sports players. The participants were 401 Brazilian physical sports and e-sports players, mostly male and single, who filled in the Social Connectedness Scale, the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale, and demographic questions. The results indicated that social connection was negatively correlated and also predict the anxiety, depression, and stress. When comparing sports and e-sports players, a statistically significant difference was identified in the levels of social connection [t = −3.41; sportsmean = 4.53 ; e-sportsmean = 4.14 ] and depression [t = 2.90; sportsmean = 1.10 ; e-sportsmean = 0.85 ]. These findings can serve as a theoretical basis for the development of intervention programs and promoting discussions that focus on the analysis of aspects promoting psychological health in sports context. (shrink)

By and large, contemporary news stories are stories about a particular nation, told to an audience that is seen and addressed in national terms. However, the understanding of the exact ways in which national imagination becomes engrained in the narrative conventions of news reporting is still rather limited, in particular when it comes to audiovisual genres. This article aims to fill a part of this blank by examining the links between national imagination and the narrative conventions of television news. Building (...) on existing debates about different modes of news reporting, the article distinguishes two distinct sets of narrative conventions at work in television news: one typically found in routine reporting, the other characteristic of crisis and celebratory reporting. It is argued that each of these two sets of conventions is tied to a different form of nationalism, and normally arises in a different political climate. Links between national imagination and narrative conventions vary accordingly. To demonstrate this, the article provides a comparative analysis of narrative structures in selected samples of television news bulletins broadcast in the early 1990s in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The concluding section reflects on the external validity of the chosen case study and surveys supportive evidence from four other relevant cases, drawn from the UK and Israel. (shrink)

This book explores a much-neglected area of moral philosophy--the typology of immorality.

Body ecology by cosmosis refers to the experience of immersion, or the incorporation of the elements of nature through a body practice, leisure or sport. In this article, we propose comprehensive u...

Nick Bostrom’s “simulation argument” purports to show that if it is possible to create and run a vast number of computer simulations indistinguishable from the reality we are living in, then it is highly probable that we are already living in a computer simulation. However, the simulation argument requires a modification to escape the undermining implications of the scepticism it implies, as argued by Birch. The present paper shows that, even if the modified simulation argument is valid, still it is (...) unsound since it relies on the indistinguishability assumption that even in principle cannot be tested. To account for the unsoundness of the simulation argument, the present paper draws on John Woods' theory of fiction, to expose structural similarities between general fiction and the simulation argument. Though the simulation argument is unsound, it seems persuasive, because the argument immerses the reader in a fictive world with the help of tacit assumptions, leveraging just enough common sense to remain compelling while covering over an untestable premise. Simultaneously with the critique of Bostrom’s argument, Chalmers' argument for the matrix hypothesis is assessed on similar criteria. In either case, both arguments rely on an accumulation of assumptions, both implicit and explicit, hiding the premises that are untestable in principle. (shrink)

In her recent book Gillian Brock argues that states’ legitimacy depends on their being part of a just state system that protects human rights. Here I discuss some practical limitations raised by Brock’s legitimacy framework: mainly, the problematic real-world implications of such an account, and the epistemic challenges that judgements inspired by this account would have to face, were we to proceed solely on the basis of it.

The paper examines the fundamental concepts of the political publicist Miloš Štefanovi?, which in the 1980ies and 1990ies suggested the transformation of Slovak political thinking as well as abandoning the voluntarily adopted passive attitude. Štefanovi? developed a consistent conception of national politics based on self-respon- sible, independent, bottom up political work grounded in patriotic self-criticism. He was also one of the prime movers of the cooperation between nationalities in Hungary as well as a critique of the distorted political culture of (...) the government establishment. (shrink)