The first of the two epigraphs selected for this paper comes from G. J. Warnock’s book, English Philosophy Since 1900. As one might expect given the title, Warnock’s subject is what has come to be known as analytic philosophy, and the hostility to metaphysics he mentions is that peculiar hostility which, for a time at least, seemed to be part and parcel of the analytic movement. What is important about this quotation in the present context (...) is the pregnant suggestion that what was for a long time thought to be one of analytic philosophy’s defining features might have been a matter of mere fashion rather than the result of sufficiently well formulated arguments and views. My primary aim in this paper will be to develop this suggestion vis-à-vis the phenomenon of conformism and to show that, thus construed, there are good grounds for thinking it true. Specifically, I shall argue for what I call the conformist hypothesis: the view that it is a mistake to regard analytic philosophy as a philosophical school, movement, or tradition, and that, instead, it is a purely social entity unified by what are called interactional memes, maintained at high frequency by conformist transmission. My secondary aim will be to make a case for the claim that, if Warnock was right, then something was terribly wrong about the way analytic philosophy came not only to exist, but to dominate the social world of academic philosophy in certain geographical regions during the twentieth century. (shrink)

This collection of previously unpublished essays presents a new approach to the history of analytic philosophy--one that does not assume at the outset a general characterization of the distinguishing elements of the analytic tradition. Drawing together a venerable group of contributors, including John Rawls and Hilary Putnam, this volume explores the historical contexts in which analytic philosophers have worked, revealing multiple discontinuities and misunderstandings as well as a complex interaction between science and philosophical reflection.

In this paper I put together insights from the ordinary-language approach and perspectival realism, and use them in developing and clarifying themes in African philosophy. I therefore appeal to language and how African individuals are using it in a particular context. In order to achieve this, I will firstly introduce the analytic philosophical framework in the context of Anglophone African philosophy. This exposition also aims at identifying gaps in the general studies that build on this (...) approach. Secondly, I will clarify the perspectival approach, indicating further how it is reflected in African thought. Thirdly, I will demonstrate the abstraction of philosophical themes using the perspectival approach through the analysis of how Africans are using language. It is argued that this approach leads to the development of African philosophy from the grassroots and helps in opening up a multiplicity of philosophical themes on the African continent. (shrink)

A study of the philosophical problems associated with the concept of action. Professor Danto is concerned to isolate logically the notion of a 'basic action' and to examine the way in which context and intention, for example, can convert physiological movements into significant actions. He finds many suggestive parallels between the concepts - the logical architecture - of action and cognition and in developing this theme he becomes involved in and proposes new approaches to various long-standing problems connected with (...) causality, determinism and materialism. As in his earlier books, Analytical Philosophy of History and Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, Professor Danto places the discussion in a broad historical and philosophical perspective and brings to it a wide reading and an unusual range of interests. He is always prepared to venture novel ideas to stimulate further debate and research and the book as a whole is presented as an original contribution to a subject which is attracting increasing attention from philosophers and from psychologists with an interest in the conceptual assumptions behind their work. (shrink)

Robert Sinclair’s *Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction* persuasively argues that Quine’s epistemology was deeply influenced by C. I. Lewis’s pragmatism. Sinclair’s account raises the question why Quine himself frequently downplayed Lewis’s influence. Looking back, Quine has always said that Rudolf Carnap was his “greatest teacher” and that his 1933 meeting with the German philosopher was his “first experience of sustained intellectual engagement with anyone of an older generation” (1970, 41; 1985, 97-8, my emphasis). Quine’s autobiographies contain only (...) a handful of biographical references to Lewis and he regularly soft-pedaled the latter’s influence in private correspondence. In this note, I discuss some archival evidence that helps us better understand Quine’s reluctance to acknowledge Lewis’s influence. I contextualize the relation between Lewis and Quine and argue that the latter viewed his teacher as a retrograde force in modern epistemology, impeding the more rigorous approach that Carnap had been developing in Europe. Next, I briefly discuss Lewis’s contribution to the development of scientific philosophy in the United States and argue that Quine underestimated his teacher’s role in this process. In doing so, I hope to show that Quine’s zealous commitment to Carnap’s approach negatively affected his assessment of Lewis’s influence, thereby supplementing Sinclair’s praiseworthy reconstruction with an explanation of why Quine himself underestimated Lewis’s role. (shrink)

The author argues that the philosophical and cultural origins of analytic philosophy can be determined through its connection with the Enlightenment, but this thesis should not be accepted without reservations. The position of analytic philosophy in the context of scientism is not absolute. In particular, Moore is in "open conflict" with scientism and "all forms of skepticism." According to the author, this conflict is a consequence of the Enlightenment roots of analytic philosophy. The (...) article compares the strategies of antiskeptic polemics of Thomas Reed and George Edward Moore, in particular, their attitude to common sense and criteria of truth. The conclusion of this comparison is the thesis that the crisis of the philosophy of common sense is inevitable both in case of its failure and in case of complete success. The author claims that the attempt to combine philosophy and common sense can ultimately lead to the self-destruction of philosophy. (shrink)

This collection, with contributions from leading philosophers, places analytic philosophy in a broader context comparing it with the methodology of its most important rival tradition in twentieth-century philosophy--phenomenology, whose development parallels the development of analytic philosophy in many ways. _The Analytic Turn _will be of great interest to historians of philosophy generally, analytic philosophers, and phenomenologists.

I take as my starting point recent concerns from within educational psychology about the need to treat the conceptual and philosophical underpinnings of empirical research in the field more seriously, specifically in the context of work on the self, mind and agency. Developing this theme, I find such conceptual support in the writings of P. F. Strawson and Donald Davidson, two giants of analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. Drawing particularly on Davidson’s later (...) work, in which he seeks to integrate key claims about subjectivity, objectivity, belief, truth and knowledge, within what he refers to as a triangular framework of two speakers and a common world, I find support for pedagogic and classroom organizational structures based on collaborative thinking and dialogue. While Davidson did not write about education, I argue that his framework has much to offer, most particularly in view of the priority it affords language and dialogue as the necessary and sufficient conditions for reason, belief and thought—in short, for being a person in the world. (shrink)

The present paper is a commentary on O.A. Domanov’s paper devoted to the use of modern type theory in the analysis of quantification in opaque contexts (e. g., propositional attitudes and believe reports). The article briefly mentions several recent attempts to use type theory to solve a number of philosophical problems. The paper suggests that the use of modern type theory, which has a number of significant advantages over classical logic and set theory, is a very promising direction in the (...) development of philosophical problems in the spirit of analytic philosophy. In addition, the paper indicates a number of questions on which it would be desired to receive a clarification from the author of the paper being commented. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, (...) and the critical role played by an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

According to immunology’s prevailing paradigm, immunity is based on self/nonself discrimination and thus requires a construction of identity. Two orientations vie for dominance: The original conception, conceived in the context of infectious diseases, regards the organism as insular and autonomous, an entity that requires defense of its borders. An alternate view places the organism firmly in its environment in which both benign and onerous encounters occur. On this latter relational account, active tolerance allows for cooperative relationships with other organisms (...) in the larger ecological economy. These contending orientations —one derived from biomedicine and the other from the ecological sciences— have drawn the attention of social scientists and culture critics. On the one hand, feminists have portrayed immune theory as based upon borrowed social notions of identity that reflect male aggressive values and thus distort more balanced accounts of immunity; and, on the other hand, other commentary projects immune theory as a framework in which analysis of Western societies putatively reveals analogous patterns of ‘self’ and ‘other’ interactions, where autoimmunity and immunization are understood as expressions of the insular understanding of identity. Here, a meta-interpretation is presented that shows how these critiques place the immune self on a spectrum stretching from its formulation as an autonomous agent, a modernist conception of the independent individual, to a postmodern portrayal in which this conception of selfhood has been deconstructed. Accordingly, immunology is drawn into a wide-ranging debate about agency, where differing interpretations of immunity serves as a template in which competing understandings of human social intercourse is modeled.Según el paradigma dominante en inmunología, la inmunidad está basada en la discriminación entre yo/noyo y requiere, por tanto, una construcción de la identidad. Dos orientaciones compiten por dominar: la concepción original, concebida en el contexto de las enfermedades infecciosas contempla al organismo como aislado y autónomo, como una entidad que necesita defender sus fronteras. Una visión alternativa sitúa firmemente al organismo en su entorno, en el cual suceden tanto encuentros beneficiosos como costosos. En este enfoque relacional, la tolerancia activa permite relaciones cooperativas con otros organismos en una economía ecológica más amplia. Estas orientaciones en liza —una derivada de la biomedicina y otra de las ciencias ecológicas— han llamado la atención de los científicos sociales y de los críticos de la cultura. Por una parte, el feminismo ha descrito la teoría inmunológica como basada en nociones sociales prestadas de identidad que reflejan los valores agresivos del macho y que, de este modo, impiden una explicación más equilibrada de la inmunidad. Por otra parte, otro comentario proyecta la teoría inmunológica como un marco en el que el análisis de las sociedades occidentales revela aparentemente patrones análogos de interacciones ‘yo’ y ‘otros’, en las que la autoinmunidad y la inmunización son entendidas como expresiones de la comprensión insular de la identidad. Se ofrece aquí una meta-representación que muestra cómo estas críticas sitúan al yo inmune en un espectro que va desde su formulación cómo un agente autónomo, una concepción modernista del individuo independiente, a una visión postmoderna en la que esta concepción de la identidad ha sido deconstruida. De acuerdo con esto, la inmunología recoge un amplio debate sobre la agencia en el que diferentes interpretaciones de la inmunidad sirven como molde en el que se modelan comprensiones competidoras de la comprensión de las relaciones sociales humanas. (shrink)

Scientific philosophy is a sui generis project and it is not possible to assimilate it into analytic philosophy tout court, nor, a fortiori, into the philosophy of science. Scientific philosophy was practised during the early stage of the Vienna Circle before the influence of Wittgenstein’s thought became decisive. Afterwards, there was a quick transition to philosophy intended as subsidary to science, as a mere classification of meaning, coming, in the end, to its liquidation with (...) Carnap’s logical syntax. Different was the path of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which remained committed to Brentano’s original programme and never abandoned the idea of the possibility of scientific philosophy. Decisive, here, was the absence of Wittgenstein’s influence and the utter irrelevance of that of Mach. It is in Poland that at the present days it has its strongest roots and there we find considerable trends of thought inspired by it. (shrink)

This unique collection looks at analytic philosophy in its historical context. Prominent philosophers discuss key figures, including Russell and Wittgenstein, methods and results in analytic philosophy to present its story. This volume assesses the challenge posed by changing cultural and philosophical trends and movements.

There is a lively debate in contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion about the consistency of the Trinitarian doctrine. In this context, the notion of ‘mystery’ has become crucial. However, although it is currently considered the main challenge of Trinitarian theology, its definition remains rather partial and superficial. After a brief description of today’s Mysterianism, I analyse three ‘emblematic’ positions in light of the current debate: Aquinas, Leibniz and Hegel present three ways to believe in a mysterious Trinity. (...) I will point out a few possible weaknesses in the positions of the first two authors in order to better highlight the usefulness of the Hegelian position, often underestimated in the contemporary analytic debate. I will also analyse the connection between the three positions and their respective metaphysics, showing the epistemological premises (e.g., analogy and univocity) that need to be better investigated in the future. (shrink)

The unit of metaphor isn’t always a complete sentence; often it is a single word or phrase. In such a case, the word or phrase in question makes a nonstandard, metaphorically determined contribution to the propositional content of the sentence in which it appears, a content whose other ingredients are determined in routine ways by routine recursive procedures of truth-conditional semantics. In this respect, metaphor belongs to semantics. In other respects, it doesn’t belong to semantics at all. To identify what (...) Yeats contributed to the content of his own sentence when he wrote. (shrink)

For fifty years, Willard Van Orman Quine's books and articles have stimulated intense debate in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language. Many scholars in fact, regard Quine as the greatest living English-speaking philosopher; yet his views remain widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. This book provides the first major explication and defense of Quine's systematic philosophy and is ideally suited for use as a required or supplementary text in a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate courses in (...) philosophy and linguistics.The book explores the far-reaching implications of Quine's views on language for contemporary analytic philosophy. It is unique in providing a lucid and rich description and reconstruction of the historical context from which Quine's work grew, focusing in particular on the role that Russell and Wittgenstein played in shaping the problems inherited by Quine. It presents Quine's difficult later views in an accessible fashion, bringing out as no other study has the very radical nature of his position. One of the book's highlights is its careful examination and assessment of Tarski's theory of truth as it relates to the traditions of Russell and Wittgenstein and to Quine's own philosophy.George D. Romanos took his Ph.D. in philosophy under George D. W. Berry and Paul T. Sagal at Boston University. This book grew out of his dissertation with the active criticism and support of Quine himself. (shrink)

The psychological writings of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna are noted for the hypothetical example he gives of the man suspended in space—the “Flying Man.” This example, which left its impress on the Latin scholastics and has engaged the attention of modern scholars, occurs thrice in his writings in contexts that are closely related, but not identical. Its third occurrence, which represents a condensed version, conveys the general idea. It states, in effect, that if you imagine your “entity,” “person,” “self” to (...) be created at birth fully mature, sound in mind and body, but suspended in temperate air in such a manner that this “self” is totally unaware of its body and physical circumstances, “you will find that it will be unaware of everything except the ‘fixedness’ of its individual existence.”. (shrink)

My presentation deals with developments and transformations of the concept of the transcendental within Anglo-American analytical philosophy. According to Kant – the “founding father” of transcendental philosophy – the methodical domain of the transcendental is to denote and to expose the a priori epistemic structureof human mind and cognition (perception, experience, knowledge), as well as to provide a priori foundations for normative ethics. Analytical philosophy has adopted the term of the transcendental, mostly within sceptical argumentations or for (...) sceptical refutations. What is the methodological function of the transcendental in these debates, in the context of philosophical scepticism? My contribution tries to show that the notion of the transcendental becomes concave in analytical contexts. It might be appropriate to refute scepticism, but in these analytical contexts it’s not possible to deduct epistemic structures (e.g. categories,epistemic schemes) of experience and knowledge or to bridge the gap to foundations in ethics – one of the core goals in Kantian transcendental philosophy. What is the importance in transcendental analysis and reflection or is this term obsolete all together nowadays? My paper tries to discuss and mediate between various positions and ideas. (shrink)

An instance of the use of a version of the analytic method known as the “ordinary-language approach” in African philosophy is characterised by a systematic examination (for the purpose of clarity) of philosophically significant concepts in an African language as used in ordinary discourse contexts among a local linguistic community. Central to this approach is the idea that the meaning of concepts depends on the ways ordinary people use them, and that this may form the basis of a (...) philosophy. This article examines Barry Hallen and Olubi Sodipo’s critical engagements with the epistemological concepts of ìmọ (knowledge) and ìgbàgbọ (belief) as an instance of this analytic methodological orientation in African philosophy. The article finds the resultant analysis of these Yoruba concepts theoretically faulty because it defeats both the rational structure of complex concept formation in Yoruba language and the logical presupposition embedded in every language. The article concludes that in order to correct this, African philosophy needs to evolve its own unique method of analysis, or otherwise reject altogether the analytic method and erect in its place its own peculiar method suitable for what it does, and consistent with the general nature of philosophy. (shrink)

Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to (...) Frege; relative to a context 0* whose agent is Alexius.. (shrink)

The author enters an already old dispute, that is, whether a countеrpart of the notion of philosophy could be encountered in the traditional India, upholds the view that the term ānvīkṣikī (lit. “investigation”) was nearest to it and traces its meaning along the texts on dharma, politics, poetics and philosophy properly. Two main avenues to the understanding of philosophy’s vocations in India have been paved in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, along with the commentaries thereon and by Kamandaki, the author (...) of the Nītisāra (as the knowledge of Ātman) and in the Arthaśāstra and the Nyāya texts composed by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (as a metascience helping the other branches of knowledge bear their fruits). Therefore philosophy in India as well was regarded as the duality of ideological and methodological constituents, while the emphasis on analytic practice in the definitions of ānvīkṣikī (Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a practice is also referred to in this context) paves a good promise for comparative philosophy. (shrink)

For this year’s Virtual Issue, our guest editor, Omar W. Nasim, has collected together papers from the Aristotelian Society archives that represent a substantial part of a dispute that contributed to the emergence of analytic philosophy in Britain at the turn of the 20th Century. The dispute was primarily concerned with the problem of the external world – the nature of the sensible objects of perception, and how they relate to physical things and the perceiving subject. The participants (...) in this controversy contested the nature of the appearance-reality distinction, whether it is it is possible for a thing to instantiate contrary sensible qualities at the same place and time, the distinction between presentation and representation, the nature of knowledge by acquaintance, and the nature of sense-data – e.g., whether sense-data are psychical or physical, whether they persist unperceived, and how they give rise to knowledge of the external world. G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell were significant contributors to these debates, but so too were several philosophers whose names are now less well known: G. F. Stout, G. Dawes Hicks, Abraham Wolf, T. Percy Nunn, and S. Alexander. This Virtual Issue collects together, for the first time, the important contributions made to these debates by all of these figures. In doing so it provides a fascinating insight into the ways in which Russell’s earliest attempts to construct the external world from sense-data were influenced by the ideas and arguments of his immediate contemporaries. Omar W. Nasim’s specially commissioned introduction to the Virtual Issue sets out the historical context of these disputes about the external world, and details the prominent role played by the Aristotelian Society in making them possible. (shrink)

Thanks to David Kaplan, we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context c whose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; (...) relative to a context c* whose agent is Alexius Meinong, ‘I’ refers to Meinong. (shrink)

Oskari Kuusela explores Wittgenstein's account of logic in the context of the history of analytic philosophy. He presents Wittgenstein as developing the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries and credits him with resolving the long-standing dispute between the ideal language and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy.

The article summarizes the main developments in virtue epistemology and reacts to the challenges faced by the discipline. This new trend in analytic epistemology emerges as a synthesis of a number of directions (metaethics, social epistemology, metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy). On the one hand, it attempts to overcome some weaknesses of classical epistemology and, on the other hand, it performs this on the same basis, retaining the classical understanding of knowledge as justified true belief. It was dubbed “virtue (...) epistemology” since it focuses on restoration of the normative approach and on the opposition to Quine’s naturalism. It explores intellectual virtues like epistemology explores knowledge claims though emphasizing their subject-dependent nature. It is the cognitive agent who provides a foundation for intellectual virtues no matter whether they are understood as cognitive ability or mental traits. However, the most researchers take epistemic virtues as individual mental states available through introspection, and the entire analysis in fact boils down to the articulation of virtue intuitions in the cognitive process. For those intuitions, thought experiments serve as a test simulating everyday cognitive situations. Still, in the context of virtue epistemology some alternative approaches arise, contributing significant revisions to the subject matter and the methods of analytical epistemology. A collective agent replaces an individual one, and knowledge engages in an integral subject-object and subject-subject context. Normativism mitigates its opposition to naturalism, enabling the utilization of the empirical data from the social sciences and humanities. As a result, a dialogue of virtue epistemology with the philosophy and ethics of science gets the chance. (shrink)

While the school of analytical philosophy of education is often credited for providing Philosophy of Education with a sense of identity, purpose and academic respect and for marking out a legitimate field in which philosophy of education could lay claim to funds and positions in competition with sociologists and psychologists, it has not escaped falling prey to criticism from different schools of thoughts. Whereas analytical traditions propound the idea of liberal education as value free, neutral and irrespective (...) of the context in which the concepts are embedded, Marxist school of thought criticizes the tradition for serving the propaganda of liberal education. Analytical philosophy of education, according to Marxists, is the educational representative of a liberal rationalist world view which has political, economic, historical and cultural manifestations. The paper presents a Marxist critique of the School of Analytical Philosophy of Education as discussed by Michael R. Mathews in his book The Marxist theory of Schooling: A Study of Epistemology and Education (1980). (shrink)

Empathy remains poorly understood, under-theorized, and subject to conflicting and opportunistic uses. Its systematic role in human experience has not been analyzed and interpreted from top to bottom. In this book, the author attempts to provide such an analysis in the philosophical traditions of hermeneutics, phenomenology, analytic philosophy of language, and psychoanalysis. applying his interpretation of empathy to the philosophical issues of intentionality, the emotions, and the checkered transformations of empathy itself. In doing so the author aims to (...) rescue empathy from the margins of intelligibility and reveal its central role in our understanding of the emotions, the integrity of our relations with others, and human community (“intersubjectivity”). -/- The work draws on both the Anglo-American (“analytic”) tradition of ordinary language philosophy and the continental ones of phenomenology and hermeneutics. This work follows the movement of empathy from the periphery of ethics, aesthetics, and theory of mind to a key place in establishing and maintaining the integrity and emotional equilibrium of dynamic interrelations with other individuals. Beginning with the philosophical infrastructure of the hermeneutics of empathy, this work thoroughly explains the complex architecture of empathy, tracing it downward through the levels of authentic human interrelations, empathy with unexpressed emotions, the empathic penetrability of cognitively impenetrable affect, the first-ever intentional analysis of both the empathizer and the “empathasand” in interrelation, and the hermeneutic infrastructure. The consequences of empathy are exposed in the context of the emotions, cognitive impenetrability, empathy and altruism, and the intentionality of empathy as accessed through language and story telling. Drawing on the multi-method approach of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and story telling, this work demonstrates that empathy forms the foundation for community in ways not clearly appreciated in the on-going debate. In a bootstrap operation that is guided by Heidegger’s call for a “special hermeneutic of empathy,” this work achieves a delicate balancing act of unpacking the rich intellectual traditions from which empathy - the phenomenon itself, not the concept - emerged historically. The result is an exposure of the deep structure of empathy as a fundamentally human capability for creating possibilities of community and human relations. (shrink)

Here is the concluding volume of Sir Anthony Kenny's monumental four-volume history of philosophy, the first major single-author narrative history to appear for several decades. In this volume, Kenny tells the fascinating story of the development of philosophy in the modern world, from the early nineteenth century to the end of the millennium. Alongside (and intertwined with) extraordinary scientific advances, cultural changes, and political upheavals, the last two centuries have seen some of the most intriguing and original developments (...) in philosophical thinking, which have transformed our understanding of ourselves and our world. In the first part of the book, Kenny offers a lively narrative introducing the major thinkers in their historical context. Among those we meet are the great figures of continental European philosophy, from Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche to Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida; the Pragmatists such as C.S. Pierce and William James, who first developed a distinctively American philosophical tradition; Marx, Darwin, and Freud, the non-philosophers whose influence on philosophy was immense; and Wittgenstein and Russell, friends and colleagues who set the agenda for analytic philosophy in the twentieth century. Kenny then proceeds to guide the reader lucidly through the nine main areas of philosophical work in the period, offering a serious engagement with ideas and arguments about logic, language, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, politics, and the existence of God. Graced with many beautiful illustrations, Philosophy in the Modern World concludes Kenny's stimulating history of the intellectual development of Western civilization, allowing readers to trace the birth and growth of philosophy from antiquity to the present day. (shrink)

Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida, by John C. Maraldo, is the first of three volumes collecting his essays in Japanese philosophy. This volume, which is divided into two sections, gathers together thirteen essays reflecting on the thought of Nishida Kitarō. The first section, “Pathways to Nishida,” is comprised of three essays clarifying some of the metatheoretical, intellectual and scholarly contexts around the study of Nishida’s thought. The remaining essays represent “Pathways Through Nishida,” which (...) engage Nishida’s philosophy from a variety of analytic, thematic, and comparative perspectives. These pathways are genuinely penetrating and unfold around a handful of fundamental... (shrink)

The paper begins with an account of the emergence of analytic philosophy of language in the twentieth century in the context of the development of logic and the linguistic turn. Subsequently, it describes two examples of analytic philosophy of language in its heyday when the discipline was conceived as first philosophy. Finally, it provides, by way of conclusion, a succinct outline of the current state of philosophy of language, marked by modesty and fragmentation. (...) It is claimed that even if one retains optimism about the prospects of philosophy of language in the first century of the new millennium, it would be unreasonable to disagree with the opinion that the present-day philosophy of language is a highly specialized and diversified discipline and no longer so central for philosophical enterprise as it used to be. (shrink)

There are at least three ways to write the history of philosophy. Some historians of philosophy emphasize the context and development of ideas, concentrating on the intellectual, social, and personal factors that affect the way philosophers have thought about their subject. Some contextualists limit their accounts to intellectual factors. Others take account of broad social and cultural factors as well. Analytic philosophers take a critical approach, considering the logic and merit of the arguments of past philosophers (...) almost as though they are engaging in contemporary debates. Others use the ideas of historical figures to support their own philosophical agendas. I examine the merits and difficulties of developing a truly contextualized approach to the history of philosophy by using the writings of the French philosopher, Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), as an example. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala recast Karl Marx's theories at a time when capitalism's metaphysical moorings are buckling. Leaving aside the ideal of development and the general call for revolution, hermeneutic communism relies on interpretation rather than truth and proves more flexible in different contexts. It motivates a resistance to capitalism's inequalities yet intervenes against violence and authoritarianism by emphasizing the interpretative nature of truth. Paralleling Vattimo and Zabala's work on the weakening of religion, Hermeneutic Communism realizes the effective potential (...) of Marxist thought. (shrink)

Traditionally, work in epistemology has been dominated by two general approaches: foundationalism and coherentism. Epistemological contextualism, which has its roots in the writings of pragmatists like Dewey and in the later Wittgenstein, represents an alternative to the dominant views, but an alternative that is typically ignored. Poor management and bad press have certainly contributed to lack of interest in this philosophical product. However, when it comes to philosophical questions about justification and knowledge in ethics, contextualism strikes me as a promising (...) approach—more promising than either foundationalism or coherentism. The central aim of this paper is to put ethical contextualism into serious contention by developing, at least in outline, a plausible version of the view—something missing from the current philosophical landscape. Anything like a full defense of this view would require developing it in the context of a story about the semantics and associated metaphysics of moral discourse. That project is for another occasion. Here, I have the more limited aim of convincing the reader to take ethical contextualism seriously. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers have until recently been reluctant to pursue historical investigations into the Central European roots of their own philosophical tradition. The most recent book by Michael Dummett, however, entitled Origins of Analytic Philosophy, shows how fruitful such investigations can be, not only as a means of coming to see familiar philosophical problems in a new light, but also as a means of clarifying what, precisely, ‘analytic philosophy’ might mean. As Dummett points out, the newly (...) fashionable habit of referring to analytic philosophy as ‘Anglo-American’ leads to a ‘grave historical distortion’. If, he says, we take into account the historical context in which analytic philosophy developed, then such philosophy ‘could at least as well be called "Anglo-Austrian"’ (p. 7). We here show the implications of this assertion for a more adequate understanding of the relations between analytic and Continental philosophy. (shrink)

The central theme of this book concerns the structure of narratives and the analysis of a special class of narrative sentences. This seemingly specialized technical job has surprisingly broad and fruitful application. In the course of a single connected argument the author manages to throw light on a wide range of problems that have puzzled philosophical students of history including the relation between speculative philosophy of history and history proper, the verification of statements about the past, the alleged relativism (...) of historical interpretation, the distinction between "history" and "chronicle," the nature of historical explanation, and the debate about methodological individualism. The argument also draws upon and contributes to discussions dealing with some broader issues generally carried on outside the context of the philosophy of history such as the logic of temporal language and the problem of future contingencies. The approach is fresh and exciting, the style both clear and lively.—R. C. S. (shrink)

Much recent analytic philosophy has dealt with the problem presented to realism by the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: is it possible to know the world in contrasting, if not contradictory, ways and not thereby rule out the possibility of knowing an independent reality? Lynch argues that pluralism and realism are compatible and proposes what he calls a “relativized Kantianism.” We do not know the world the way it is in itself, but only by means of some conceptual (...) scheme. The model of a conceptual scheme employed is not Kantian, however, which allows for no alternatives, is identified by its foundationally structured categorical concepts, and involves a commitment to the analytic/ synthetic distinction. Nor is it Quinean, where the basic components are sentences accepted as true, the structure is holistic, the analytic/ synthetic distinction is abandoned, and the alternatives are untranslatable. Instead, a “Wittgensteinian” model is proposed. Composed of concepts, the alternatives share contextually basic but not nonbasic concepts. Fuzzy distinctions, like the analytic/synthetic, are usable. (shrink)

Polanyi belongs to a tradition which is neither modernist nor postmodernist, but which affirms speculative philosophy as an alternative to both and as an important form of public discourse. With his origins in the philosophical culture of central Europe, he may well emerge as a bridge between continental and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. He was a moral philosopher in the Aristotelian tradition who anticipated the turn in recent years away from the modern ethics of rules to the classical (...) ethics of virtue. Within this context he espoused a new kind of liberalism and a different understanding of liberty. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers have until recently been reluctant to pursue historical investigations into the Central European roots of their own philosophical tradition. The most recent book by Michael Dummett, however, entitled Origins of Analytic Philosophy, shows how fruitful such investigations can be, not only as a means of coming to see familiar philosophical problems in a new light, but also as a means of clarifying what, precisely, ‘analytic philosophy’ might mean. As Dummett points out, the newly (...) fashionable habit of referring to analytic philosophy as ‘Anglo-American’ leads to a ‘grave historical distortion’. If, he says, we take into account the historical context in which analytic philosophy developed, then such philosophy ‘could at least as well be called "Anglo-Austrian"’ (p. 7). We here show the implications of this assertion for a more adequate understanding of the relations between analytic and Continental philosophy. (shrink)

This monograph considers the challenges of science globalization, new trends of development in global studies and globalistics boosted by application of the evolutionary approach. Evolutionary globalistics focuses on the study of development and co-evolution of global processes and systems, and on their synergistic systemic phenomenon - global development. The concept of evolutionary globalistics is defined in the context of the universal (global) evolutionism and in terms of transition to new safer forms of civilization development and of interaction of civilization (...) with the nature of the Earth and Space. Special emphasis is placed on methods and approaches used in globalistics, as well as to spatio-temporal expansion of global studies. The evolution of globalistics itself is analyzed, including the development of such areas as political globalistics, legal globalistics, information globalistics, futuroglobalistics, nooglobalistics, cosmoglobalistics and other. Target audience: experts, lecturers, students, post-graduate students, a wide range of readers interested in the issues of globalistics and global studies. (shrink)