Scepticism, a philosophical tradition that casts doubt on our ability to gain knowledge of the world and suggests suspending judgment in the face of uncertainty, has been influential since its beginnings in ancient Greece. Harald Thorsrud provides an engaging, rigorous introduction to the central themes, arguments, and general concerns of ancient Scepticism, from its beginnings with Pyrrho of Elis to the writings of Sextus Empiricus in the second century A.D. Thorsrud explores the differences among Sceptics and (...) examines in particular the separation of the Scepticism of Pyrrho from its later form—Academic Scepticism—the result of its ideas being introduced into Plato's Academy in the third century B.C. Steering an even course through the many differences of scholarly opinion surrounding Scepticism, the book also provides a balanced appraisal of the philosophy's enduring significance by showing why it remains so interesting and how ancient interpretations differ from modern ones. _Copub: Acumen Publishing Limited _. (shrink)

This chapter, which analyses the ethical theories of Greek sceptic Sextus Empiricus, begins by considering other sceptical figures who preceded Sextus, both for their intrinsic interest and to set the context for Sextus's work. These include Pyrrho, Arcesilaus of Pitane, Carneades of Cyrene, and Philo of Larissa. The chapter then examines surviving works of Sextus Empiricus, the best known being Outlines of Pyrrhonism.

This volume offers a comprehensive survey of the main periods, schools, and individual proponents of scepticism in the ancient Greek and Roman world. The contributors examine the major developments chronologically and historically, ranging from the early antecedents of scepticism to the Pyrrhonist tradition. They address the central philosophical and interpretive problems surrounding the sceptics' ideas on subjects including belief, action, and ethics. Finally, they explore the effects which these forms of scepticism had beyond the ancient (...) period, and the ways in which ancient scepticism differs from scepticism as it has been understood since Descartes. The volume will serve as an accessible and wide-ranging introduction to the subject for non-specialists, while also offering considerable depth and detail for more advanced readers. (shrink)

This paper reviews Juha Sihvola, editor. Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition.

Review of Vogt, K., & Vlasits, J. (Eds.). (2020). Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus. New York: Oxford UP.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 573-579, May 2011.

The idea that Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato is simplistic and inaccurate. Much of modern and contemporary epistemology owes a debt not so much to Platonism or Aristotelianism as to their antithesis: scepticism. Recent discussions in the history of philosophy have sparked a great deal of interest in the ancient sceptics, but until now they have been misunderstood and the significance of their philosophy not fully appreciated.

In this paper, I examine how the Mode of Infinite Regress functions in Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue that it is used both to generate an infinite regress of reasons and to show that such infinite regresses are epistemically defective. I clarify precisely how this occurs while examining the Mode’s efficaciousness and whether ancient philosophers might have accepted infinite regresses of reasons. I ultimately argue that they would not for reasons which have hitherto not been adequately appreciated and which (...) shed further light on how the Mode of Infinite Regress functions, its efficacy, and the relevant notions of justification at stake. (shrink)

The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most important and influential of all ancient philosophical texts. The texts made an enormous impact on Western thought when they were rediscovered in the 16th century and they have shaped the whole future course of Western philosophy. Despite their importance, the Modes have been little discussed in recent times. This book translates the texts and supplies them with a discursive commentary, concentrating on philosophical issues but also including historical material. The (...) book will be of interest to professional scholars and philosophers but its clear and non-technical style makes it intelligible to beginners and the interested layman. (shrink)

Es un hecho natural que la vida no puede ser suspendida, al contrario de los juicios. Admitimos que tenemos que decidir en la vida, y que nos movemos o tenemos impulsos hacia las cosas. Por ello, actuamos de una manera o de otra, sirviéndonos y prestando cierta validez a impresiones de nuestros sentidos, frente a otras que no nos merecen confianza. Esto es lo que quiere decir Sexto, cuando advierte que el escéptico tiene un criterio no para distinguir lo verdadero (...) de lo falso, sino para conducirse en la vida. En este artículo queremos defender que las diferencias entre los diversos tipos de filosofías, y hasta de escepticismos, se producen más en el plano gnoseológico que en el práctico. Es más, defendemos que, en la mayoría de las ocasiones, no actuamos con principios establecidos, actuamos con cierto escepticismo “socializado” que todos activamos, dejándonos convencer con los datos que tenemos, de manera relativa, asimilando que lo probable o lo plausible o lo razonable en cada situación decide que actuemos en una dirección u otra, y todo presidido por lo que se nos aparece, por el fenómeno. (shrink)

Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism is the third volume of Jonathan Barnes' papers on ancient philosophy. It contains twenty-two pieces on epistemological matters, some of them revised, and one or two which appear for the first time in English. Anyone with an interest in ancient philosophy will find them enriching and amusing.

Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III. By. Edited by.

This book proposes a reexamination of ancient skepticism with the purpose of both throwing new light on ancient skepticism and contributing to modern epistemological debate. The author hopes to achieve these goals by approaching the ancient texts with a more developed philosophical viewpoint than is found in much historical scholarship, and by showing how the account of ancient skepticism thus achieved is philosophically superior in various ways to modern versions of skepticism. He interprets ancient skepticism (...) as being essentially directed against "realist truth," that is, against the theory that "a claim is true if it corresponds to an objective world that exists independently of the mind". Ancient skepticism is therefore antirealist: it is a mitigated form of skepticism which admits an antirealist conception of truth, "arguing that our beliefs are necessarily relative to human nature and perception, the culture we live in, philosophical commitments, and so on". Ancient skeptics are thus much nearer to modern antirealists than would be the case if their skepticism were unmitigated, as is frequently claimed in modern work on ancient skepticism. Interpreted as antirealism, ancient skepticism turns out to present certain philosophical advantages as compared to modern forms of antirealism. (shrink)