Occasions of Identity is an exploration of timeless philosophical issues about persistence, change, time, and sameness. Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of various rival views about the nature of identity and change, and puts forward his own original theory. He supports the idea of occasional identities, arguing that it is coherent and helpful to suppose that things can be identical at one time but distinct at another. Gallois defends this view, demonstrating how it can solve puzzles about (...) persistence dating back to the Ancient Greeks, and investigates the metaphysical consequences of rejecting the necessity and eternity of identities. (shrink)
In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously (...) hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)
[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of (...) nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second. (shrink)
In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.
I consider backtracking reasoning: that is, reasoning from backtracking counterfactuals such as if Hitler had won the war, he would have invaded Russia six weeks earlier. Backtracking counterfactuals often strike us as true. Despite that, reasoning from them just as often strikes us as illegitimate. A number of diagnoses have been offered of the illegitimacy of such backtracking reasoning which invoke the fixity of the past, or the direction of causation. I argue against such diagnoses, and in favor of one (...) that invokes a principle I call the fixity of reasons. Backtracking reasoning violates the fixity of reasons. But, the fixity of reasons is a principle that must be observed in order to engage in practical reasoning at all. (shrink)
Motivated by a desire to narrate and contextualize the deluge of "French theory," After the Deluege showcases recent work by today's brightest scholars of French intellectual history that historicizes key debates, figures, and turning points in the postwar era of French thought.
Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...) a house burns to the ground and becomes ashes, or when someone dies. Armed with these distinctions, Aristotle would then say that, in the case of accidental changes, (1) and (2) are both false—a changing thing can really change one of its “accidental properties” and yet literally remain one and the same thing before and after the change. (shrink)
My concern is with a version of scepticism which, following a number of philosophers, I will entitle global scepticism. According to global scepticism no one is to any degree justified in holding any belief. Global scepticism is a live option, and has at least one compelling argument in its favour1 Nevertheless, one's first reaction to global scepticism is likely to be that it is self-refuting. The issue I will be discussing here is whether global scepticism is self-refuting. In the first (...) section I consider arguments to the conclusion that global scepticism is self-refuting, and argue that the global sceptic need take only one of them seriously. In the next I examine a global sceptic's reply to the argument in question, and a response to that reply available to the anti-sceptic. What emerges is an apparent impasse. The global sceptic has a response to each reply that the anti-sceptic makes in support of the anti-sceptic's original argument. However, it seems that the anti-sceptic is able to effectively reply to each of the global sceptic's responses. In the last section I develop an argument to show that global scepticism is self-refuting which breaks the deadlock between the global sceptic and anti-sceptic. (shrink)
Pour mener son système philosophique à son achèvement, Kant reprend la question transcendantale dans l’Opus Postumum. Il y revient sur le problème de la jonction du sensible et de l’intelligible. Kant fait alors intervenir l’autoposition du Moi, fondée par et sur une notion inédite dans sa philosophie transcendantale : l’esprit . Il s’agit ici d’en examiner la signification et de voir en quoi l’Opus postumum témoigne d’un passage, dans l’histoire, à une philosophie de l’esprit.In order to bring his philosophical system (...) to completion, Kant goes back to the transcendental question in his Opus Postumum. He reconsiders the problem of the junction of sense and intelligible. Kant comes up with the autoposition of the Self, grounded by and on a notion unheard of in his transcendental philosophy : the spirit . This article examines its meaning and in what way the Opus Postumum is historically a bridge towards a philosophy of the spirit. (shrink)