Results for 'Andr�� Gallois'

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  1.  38
    II_– _Andre Gallois.Andre Gallois - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):263-283.
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  2. Andre Gallois, The World Without. The Mind Within.A. Wikforss - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8:135-137.
     
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  3. André Gallois, Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. [REVIEW]Agustín Arrieta & M. J. García-Encinas - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (1):39-41.
     
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  4. Review of André Gallois, Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. [REVIEW]Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):291–295.
    Book Information: Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. By André Gallois. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1998. Pp. xiii + 296. Hardback, £35.00.
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  5. Occasions of identity andré Gallois[REVIEW]Theodore Sider - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):401-405.
    André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity injects a refreshing new perspective into an old debate. Actually, what is new is the advocacy of the perspective: Gallois takes up a view that many consider a non-starter, and shows this reaction to be premature. The debate is over the right way to understand the traditional puzzles involving two things being in the same place at the same time; the perspective is that identity can hold temporarily. Suppose an amoeba, name it AMOEBA, (...)
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  6.  82
    How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. [REVIEW]André Gallois - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):297-300.
  7.  84
    The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority.André Gallois - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously (...)
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  8.  22
    Occasions of identity: a study in the metaphysics of persistence, change, and sameness.André Gallois - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Occasions of Identity is an exploration of timeless philosophical issues about persistence, change, time, and sameness. Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of various rival views about the nature of identity and change, and puts forward his own original theory. He supports the idea of occasional identities, arguing that it is coherent and helpful to suppose that things can be identical at one time but distinct at another. Gallois defends this view, demonstrating how it can solve puzzles about (...)
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  9. Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Stephen Yablo & Andre Gallois - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72:229-283.
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of (...)
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  10.  33
    Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness.Alan Sidelle & Andre Gallois - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):469.
    André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity is a detailed, well-written presentation and defense of one attempt to solve many of the recently much discussed puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects. It is engaging not only for Gallois’s ingenious attempt to defend his view that objects can be “occasionally identical”—identical at one time but not another —but for his discussion throughout of the puzzles and of alternative solutions. Gallois does a fine job of keeping the motivations for a (...)
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  11.  2
    The Metaphysics of Identity.André Gallois - 2016 - New York: Routledge.
    The philosophical problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke, and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? In this (...)
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  12. Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
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  13. Berkeley's master argument.Andre Gallois - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (1):55-69.
    In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.
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  14. The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority.André Gallois - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (1):198-199.
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  15. Comments on Ted Sider: Four dimensionalism. [REVIEW]André Gallois - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):648–657.
    Ted Sider’s book makes a beautifully presented and compellingly argued case for four dimensionalism. Most of the arguments for four dimensionalism to be found in the literature seem to me to be uncompelling. Ted’s argument from vagueness, given in the last section of chapter 4, is a notable exception. After discussing that argument I will respond to his objections in section 5 chapter 5 to my own temporary identity view.
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  16. Occasional identity.André Gallois - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (3):203 - 224.
  17.  34
    The Metaphysics of Identity.André Gallois - 2016 - New York: Routledge.
    The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...)
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  18. Van Inwagen on free will and determinism.André Gallois - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (July):99-105.
  19.  52
    Externalism and Scepticism.André Gallois & John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1 - 26.
    According to an externalist theory of content the content of an individual’s thoughts and the meaning of her words need not supervene on her intrinsic history. Two individuals may be intrinsically exactly alike yet entertain different thoughts, and attach different meanings to the words they use. ETC, which has been most notably defended by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, has attained the status of current orthodoxy. Nevertheless, some maintain that combining ETC with the premisses that we have privileged (...)
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  20. Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
  21.  62
    The Simplicity of Identity.André Gallois - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):273-302.
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  22. The fixity of reasons.Andre Norman Gallois - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):233 - 248.
    I consider backtracking reasoning: that is, reasoning from backtracking counterfactuals such as if Hitler had won the war, he would have invaded Russia six weeks earlier. Backtracking counterfactuals often strike us as true. Despite that, reasoning from them just as often strikes us as illegitimate. A number of diagnoses have been offered of the illegitimacy of such backtracking reasoning which invoke the fixity of the past, or the direction of causation. I argue against such diagnoses, and in favor of one (...)
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  23.  69
    Externalism and skepticism.Andr Gallois - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1-26.
  24. Rigid designation and the contingency of identity.André Gallois - 1986 - Mind 95 (377):57-76.
  25.  58
    Asymmetry in attitudes and the nature of time.André Gallois - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (1):51-69.
  26.  32
    INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL: A QUIZZICAL RESPONSE.Andre Gallois - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):263-283.
  27.  25
    First-Person Accessibility and Consciousness.Andre Gallois - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):101-124.
  28. Locke on Causation, Compatibilism and Newcomb's Problem.André Gallois - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):42 - 46.
  29.  17
    Is Knowing Having the Right To Be Sure?André Gallois - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. pp. 169--81.
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  30.  97
    Occasional identity: Thereby hangs the tale.André Gallois - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):188-202.
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  31.  43
    Deflationary self-knowledge.Andr Gallois - 1994 - In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--63.
    As a number of philosophers have observed, our knowledge of what is passing through our own minds appears to be quite different to our knowledge of other things. I do not, it seems, need to accumulate evidence in order to know what psychological states I am in. 1 Without relying on evidence I am able to effortlessly attribute to myself beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, fears, and a host of other psychological states. The distinctive knowledge we have of our own psychological (...)
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  32. Basic properties and sense datum attributes.Andr Gallois - 1979 - Personalist 60 (January):53-60.
     
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  33. Basic Properties and Sense Datum Attributes.Andre Gallois - 1979 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 60 (1):53.
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  34. Deflationary self-knowledge.André Gallois - 2008 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
     
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  35.  65
    Reply to Ramachandran.André Gallois - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):159-162.
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  36.  26
    Langford and Ramachandran on occasional identities.André Gallois - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):378-385.
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  37.  66
    Ramachandran on restricting rigidity.André Gallois - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):151-155.
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  38.  9
    Emotion and Imagination, by Adam Morton: Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, pp. viii + 230, AU$105.95 , AU$31.95.André Gallois - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):190-192.
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  39.  18
    Expert intuitions and the interpretation of social psychological experiments.André Gallois & Michael Siegal - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):492.
  40.  4
    Langford and Ramachandran on Occasional Identities.AndrÉ Gallois - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):378-385.
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  41. Lorraine Code: "Epistemic Responsibility". [REVIEW]André Gallois - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:256.
  42.  85
    How Not to Make a Newcomb Choice.André Gallois - 1979 - Analysis 39 (1):49 - 53.
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  43.  49
    The Indubitability of the Cogito.Andre Gallois - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):363-384.
    Why does Descartes give some propositions, most notably cogito, a privileged epistemic status? In the first part of the paper I consider, and reject, the standard account of the indubitability of cogito championed by, among others, Hintikka, Ayer, Slezak, and Frankfurt. After examining what I call the Cartesian regress, I invoke the fiction of a self-blind individual, close to the one originally introduced by Shoemaker, to give an alternative account of the indubitability of cogito. I argue that Descartes initially needs (...)
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  44.  60
    Carter on contingent identity and rigid designation.Andre Gallois - 1988 - Mind 97 (386):273-278.
  45.  56
    Is global scepticism self-refuting?André Gallois - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):36 – 46.
    My concern is with a version of scepticism which, following a number of philosophers, I will entitle global scepticism. According to global scepticism no one is to any degree justified in holding any belief. Global scepticism is a live option, and has at least one compelling argument in its favour1 Nevertheless, one's first reaction to global scepticism is likely to be that it is self-refuting. The issue I will be discussing here is whether global scepticism is self-refuting. In the first (...)
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  46.  26
    Can an anti-realist live with the past?André Gallois - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):288 – 303.
  47.  22
    True believers and radical sceptics.André Gallois - 1984 - Philosophia 14 (3-4):349-368.
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  48. Rigidity, occasional identity and Leibniz' law.Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518-526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these (...)
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  49.  24
    The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. [REVIEW]Irene Switankowsky - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):852-854.
    André Gallois’s book is a sustained defence of first-person authority in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His work is set against the externalist tide of current epistemology in which many philosophers are sceptical about first-person authority with respect to their beliefs. This implies that other individuals are in a better position to determine what our beliefs are than we ourselves can be, which highlights the authority of third person accounts of justification. Gallois’s work is a direct attack (...)
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  50.  31
    Occasional Identity or Occasional Reference?H. E. Baber - 2015 - Prolegomena 14 (2):157-166.
    André Gallois argues that individuals that undergo fission are on some occasions identical, but on others distinct. Occasional identity however, is metaphysically costly. I argue that we can get all the benefits of occasional identity without the metaphysical costs. On the proposed account, the names of ordinary material objects refer indeterminately to stages that belong to reference classes determined by the context of utterance or temporal adverbs. In addition, temporal markers indicating the perspective from which we count objects and (...)
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