ABSTRACT: In this essay I characterize arguments by analogy, which have an impor- tant role both in philosophical and everyday reasoning. Arguments by analogy are dif- ferent from ordinary inductive or deductive arguments and have their own distinct features. I try to characterize the structure and function of these arguments. It is further discussed that some arguments, which are not explicit arguments by analogy, nevertheless should be interpreted as such and not as inductive or deductive arguments. The result is that (...) a presumed outcome of a philosophical dispute will have to be reconsidered. (shrink)

This paper discusses the method when an argument is refuted by a parallel argument since the flaw of the parallel argument is clearly displayed. The method is explicated, examined and compared with two other general methods.

This paper addresses several issues in argumentation theory. The over-arching goal is to discuss how a theory of analogical argument schemes fits the pragma-dialectical theory of argument schemes and argument structures, and how one should properly reconstruct both single and complex argumentation by analogy. I also propose a unified model that explains how formal valid deductive argumentation relates to argument schemes in general and to analogical argument schemes in particular. The model suggests “scheme-specific-validity” i.e. that there are contrasting species of (...) validity for each type of argument scheme that derive from one generic conception of validity. (shrink)

Wellman identified three types of conductive arguments, the third of which contains both pro and counter-considerations in the same piece of reasoning. This paper provides a pragma-dialectical analysis of this type of argumentation, with special focus on argumentation reconstruction. It argues that the account of pro/con argumentation in the framework of argument-as-product has problems solvable by a pragma-dialectical approach. The paper asserts that pro/con argumentation should be analyzed as a dialectical strategy of a protagonist, where acknowledgement of counter-considerations shows that (...) the antagonist’s reasons have been taken into consideration, although the pro-considerations override them. Thus, the pro-considerations of pro/con argumentation should be interpreted as the protagonist’s overriding defeaters of the antagonist’s counter-arguments, the protagonist incorporating the latter as counter-considerations. The paper further argues that the pragma-dialectical framework needs an additional conceptual tool to properly reconstruct complex forms of pro/con argumentation. Finally, the pragma-dialectical approach to reconstruct pro/con argumentation has several advantages, especially to a more logical-structural approach to complex pro/con argumentation. (shrink)

Accounts of analogical inference are usually categorized into four broad groups: abductive, deductive, inductive and sui generis. The purpose of this paper is to defend a sui generis model of analogical inference. It focuses on the sui generis account, as developed by Juthe [2005, 2009, 2015, 2016] and Botting’s [2017] criticism of it. This paper uses the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation as the methodological framework for analyzing and reconstructing argumentation. The paper has two main points. First, that Juthe’s (...) arguments against a deductive interpretation of prima facie analogy argumentation remain unaffected by Botting’s criticism, which means that many of the reasons against deductive reformulation of analogy argumentation still stand. The additional argument, which Botting himself brings up, that a deductive interpretation cannot account for the cumulative effect of analogies, just provides further reason to reject deductivism. The second main point of this paper is that an inductive interpretation of analogical inference also fails. There are constitutional differences between inductive and analogical inference that cannot be bridged. The result is a firm defense of the sui generis view of analogical inference. (shrink)

André Tosel, décédé en mars 2017, était un philosophe engagé, attaché tout au long de son existence à faire vivre un marxisme critique puisant notamment dans le meilleur de la tradition italienne de ce courant de pensée ; il fut l'un des rares français à introduire et discuter les oeuvres majeures d'A. Labriola et surtout d'A. Gramsci, ainsi par ailleurs que celles de Vico dont il fut un fin connaisseur. Il consacra sa thèse de doctorat d'état aux rapports entre religion, (...) politique et philosophie chez Spinoza et contribua de façon décisive à de nouvelles lectures du philosophe en le mettant en miroir de Marx. Professeur de philosophie des universités de Besançon, Franche Comté, de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne et de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, dans lesquelles il occupa de nombreuses fonctions de directions administratives et scientifiques, il était un homme de collectif attaché à faire vivre le savoir, s'engageant dans la vie universitaire et politique, contribuant également de manière décisive au lancement et à l'animation de la revue Actuel Marx. Passionné par l'évolution des pensées contemporaines, il intervenait régulièrement dans des débats d'actualité, sous la forme de contributions dans L'Humanité ou dans des ouvrages destinés à un public large, tout particulièrement dans la dernière période sur les questions de sécularisation, de laïcité et de religion. Cet ouvrage entend lui rendre hommage en abordant les différentes facettes de son oeuvre, traversant un demi-siècle de vie intellectuelle. (shrink)

This volume gathers contributions at the intersection of history and politics. The essays, covering such topics as diverse as Italian identity in the Tientsin concession, international refugee policies in the interwar period and after, and the myths and realities of the Ukranian-Russian encounter in independent Ukraine, show that history provides better grounding as well as a more suitable paradigm for the study of politics than economics or other hard sciences. All of the contributors have a common link - doctoral work (...) supervised and shaped by Professor Andre Liebich - but have since expanded widely in the world. Hence, the authors of this work at once share a common base and yet benefit from diverse viewpoints. (shrink)

The paper sets out and defends against criticism the claims argued for in the book A minimalist ontology of the natural world.

Coercion and the State: A review of B Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary by Helga Varden.

Rendre hommage à un auteur, ce n'est pas seulement célébrer ce qu'il fut mais c'est aussi alerter sur ce que son oeuvre apporte au présent et à l'avenir de la connaissance. C'est bien le sens donné à cet hommage à André-Jean Arnaud. Repenser le droit, c'était pou r cet auteur érudit : repenser les lieux, les conditions et les façons de l'étudier en dépassant les frontières géographiques en même temps que les frontières disciplinaires. En montrant en quoi André-Jean Arnaud fut, (...) hors des sentiers battus et des orthodoxies de la production et de la transmission des savoirs en la matière, un exceptionnel précurseur et l'infatigable artisan d'un nouveau régime de connaissance sur le droit, le présent ouvrage s'adresse à toutes celles et à tous ceux, enseignants, chercheurs, étudiants ou simples citoyens, pou r qui l'étude du droit permet de mieux comprendre ce que sont et ce que sont susceptibles de devenir nos sociétés. (shrink)

The hypothesis that administering a diagnostic test to an asymptomatic population can detect a relevant proportion of prevalent cases in an early phase and therefore improve the chances of curing disease dates back to the sixties and has been tested and applied mainly to neoplastic diseases. Meanwhile, the practice of screening has benefitted from the progress of diagnostic technology and from the development, particularly in Europe, of efficient national health systems.Half a century later, two Swedish researchers, Niklas Juth and Christian (...) Munthe, undertake the task of reexamining various aspects of screening practices in light of the ethical justification of this secondary prevention tool. Their analysis encompasses all public health actions in which the personal benefit is contrasted with collective health considerations. Screening generates such doubts and conflicts, which are inherently ethical.The publication could be split in two parts. The first is a long section, mainly infor .. (shrink)

In van Benthem (2008), van Benthem proposes a dynamic consequence relation defined as \$$\psi _1}, \ldots ,{\psi _n}{ \models ^d}\phi \,{\rm{iff}}{ \models ^{pa}}[{\psi _1}] \ldots [{\psi _n}]\phi \$$ where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic, a dynamic epistemic logic. In this paper we investigate the structural properties of a conditional dynamic consequence relation \$$models _{\rm{\Gamma }}^\$$ extending van Benthem, inspired by Makinson (2003) wherein Makinson calls this reasoning a set Γ. In the presence of common knowledge, conditional dynamic (...) consequence is definable from (unconditional) dynamic consequence. An open question is whether dynamic consequence is compact. We further investigate a dynamic consequence relation for soft instead of hard announcements. Surprisingly, it shares many properties with (hard) dynamic consequence. Dynamic consequence relations provide a novel perspective on reasoning about protocols in multi-agent systems. (shrink)

" Au bas de la statue d'Auguste Comte, place de la Sorbonne, à Paris, on pouvait lire récemment - et peut-être le peut-on encore : "Ni Comte ni Sponville". Ce graffiti exprime à sa manière l'un des grands défis de la philosophie française de cette fin de siècle, à savoir celui de sa popularité. Car la philosophie est désormais au centre de la vie publique : elle trône dans les cafés, se fait une place dans l'entreprise et s'installe même dans (...) les cabinets privés. Mais ce qui ne laisse pas d'étonner, c'est l'écho qu'elle rencontre auprès d'un grand public avide de lectures philosophiques. Il convient de s'interroger sur cet engouement, ou plutôt d'interroger les philosophes à ce sujet, eux qui sont sans doute les mieux placés pour y répondre. " Précédés d'une introduction à l'œuvre des auteurs interviewés, les six entretiens réunis dans ce livre font le point à la fois sur la pensée de chacun d'eux et sur la situation générale de la philosophie française actuelle. Bien qu'on n'ait dans aucun sens affaire ici ni à une école ni à une improbable " pensée 98 ", il se dégage quand même de ces rencontres l'image d'une philosophie qui a renoué avec la vie, qui est arrivée à reformuler, à nouveaux frais, les questions de la philosophia perennis et qui a rétabli le dialogue avec son temps. (shrink)

This book involves an in-depth analysis of the ethical, political and philosophical issues related to health-oriented screening programs.

In this article we argue that the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal.The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it (...) has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today. (shrink)

What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer two (...) distributive questions: when do we have sufficient and how should we prioritise among those who do not yet have a sufficiency? Furthermore, it is argued that Roger Crisp’s theory of need, which combines sufficientarianism with prioritarianism below the threshold of need, is better equipped than alternatives to answer these questions as well as meeting the challenges formulated by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. However, Crisp’s theory faces two major challenges. First, it has to say something about the currency of distribution: a principle of need must be complemented either with a theory on the human good or a theory about the proper goals of health care. Second, it has to say something about where the threshold should be set. However, any attempt to set a threshold seems morally arbitrary in the light of the sufficientarian idea that those just above the threshold never should be given priority over those just below the threshold. (shrink)

The result of two key social developments in recent years are examined here: the partial dismantling of the welfare state and the progress of genetics. Genetic insights are increasingly valuable for risk assessment, and insurers would like to use these insights to help determine premiums. Combined with the fact that social welfare is being curtailed, this could potentially create an uninsured high-risk population. Along with considerations of autonomy and privacy, this is the basis for an ethical critique of insurer's access (...) to information. The result has often been regulation of such information; but the authors argues that due to adverse selection, regulation will not solve these problems, and this may jeopardize the survival of private personal insurance. Instead, we should look towards the resurrection of social insurance, a key component of the welfare state. This will interest academic researchers as well as professionals involved with genetics and insurance. (shrink)

This article is about the justifiability of accepting worse cost effectiveness for orphan drugs, that is, treatments for rare diseases, in a publicly financed health care system. Recently, three arguments have been presented that may be used in favour of exceptionally advantageous economic terms for orphan drugs. These arguments share the common feature of all referring to considerations of justice or fairness: the argument of the irrelevance of group size, the argument from the principle of need, and the argument of (...) identifiability. It is argued that all of these arguments fail to support the conclusion that orphan drugs should be subsidized to a larger extent than treatments for common diseases. The argument of the irrelevance fails to distinguish between directly and indirectly relevant considerations of fairness or justice. The recent attempt to revive the moral relevance of identifiability has provided no novel reasons to think that identifiability is morally relevant in itself or due to considerations of fairness and justice. The argument from the principle of need does not fail due to any inherent flaw in the principle as such. Rather, this principle can be interpreted in different ways, and none of these interpretations support exceptionally advantageous terms economically for treating rare diseases specifically. It is concluded that we are awaiting justice based reasons for the preferential treatment of orphan drugs. (shrink)

AimsTo examine attitudes towards physician-assisted suicide among physicians in Sweden and compare these with the results from a similar cross-sectional study performed in 2007.ParticipantsA random selection of 250 physicians from each of six specialties and all 127 palliative care physicians in Sweden were invited to participate in this study.SettingA postal questionnaire commissioned by the Swedish Medical Society in collaboration with Karolinska Institute in Stockholm. ResultsThe total response rate was 59.2%. Slightly fewer than half [47.1% ] of the respondents from the (...) six specialties accepted PAS, which is significantly more than accepted PAS in the 2007 study [34.9% ]. Thirty-three percent of respondents were prepared to prescribe the needed drugs. When asked what would happen to the respondent’s own trust in healthcare, a majority [67.1% ] stated that legalizing PAS would either not influence their own trust in healthcare, or that their trust would increase. This number is an increase compared to the 2007 survey, when just over half [51.9% ] indicated that their own trust would either not be influenced, or would increase.ConclusionsThe study reveals a shift towards a more accepting attitude concerning PAS among physicians in Sweden. Only a minority of the respondents stated that they were against PAS, and a considerable proportion reported being prepared to prescribe the needed drugs for patient self-administration if PAS were legalized. (shrink)

According to Ronald Dworkin's mature views on jurisprudence, legal normativity depends on judges’ views about political morality. Plato's own mature views on this subject seem to take the contrary position as he claims that the law is expected to be authoritative in order to preserve a given state of affairs. Therefore, in Plato's view judges are not expected to interpret the law ubiquitously according to their own standards of political morality. In what follows, the discussion starts off by offering a (...) brief account of Dworkin's interpretivism and some of its shortcomings. We shall then move on to Plato's account of legal normativity, especially his views on the authority of law, law as preservation, and finally the politics of law in the light of the debate between conservatism and progressivism. (shrink)

In recent years, the issue of accepting a higher cost per health improvement for orphan drugs has been the subject of discussion in health care policy agencies and the academic literature. This article aims to provide an analysis of broadly egalitarian arguments for and against accepting higher costs per health improvement. More specifically, we aim to investigate which arguments one should agree upon putting aside and where further explorations are needed. We identify three kinds of arguments in the literature: considerations (...) of substantial equality, formal equality, and opportunity cost. We argue that considerations of substantial equality do not support higher costs per health improvement orphan drugs, even if such considerations are considered valid. On the contrary, arguments of formal equality may support accepting a higher cost per health improvement for orphan drugs. However, in order to do so, a number of both normative and empirical issues must be resolved; these issues are identified in the article. For instance, it must be settled to what extent the opportunity cost in terms of foregone health for other patients is acceptable in order to uphold formal equality. We conclude that certain arguments can be set aside, and future focus should be put on the unresolved normative and empirical issues related to formal equality and opportunity cost. (shrink)

Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a (...) conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters’ argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless conception of memory traces. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack and, in (...) part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics . Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’ gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but, we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about. (shrink)

Assessments of quality in healthcare often focus on treatment outcome or patient safety, but rarely acknowledge the importance of patients’ encounters with healthcare personnel. The aim of this study was to gain an improved understanding of negative experiences of healthcare encounters by investigating experiences of the general population. A questionnaire was distributed to a randomly selected sample population of 1484 inhabitants in Stockholm County, Sweden. The material was subjected to conventional content analysis. Seventeen different types of complaint about negative encounters (...) were identified, including unpleasant behavior, not being listened to, inadequate information, and discrimination. Two possible underlying explanations are discussed; structural factors relating to the organization and allocation of healthcare, and individual factors relating to the staff’s attitudes and professional practice. The results indicate that different strands of actions are needed to reduce patients’ negative experiences of encounters in healthcare, depending on the setting as well as on which of the two factors predominates. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to describe the experiences of undergoing a presymptomatic genetic test for the hereditary and fatal Huntington’s disease, using a case study approach. The study was based on 18 interviews with a young woman and her husband from the decision to undergo the test, to receiving the results and trying to adapt to them, which were analysed using a life history approach. The findings show that the process of undergoing a presymptomatic test involves several closely (...) connected ethical and medical questions, such as the reason for the test, the consequences of the test results and how health-care services can be developed to support people in this situation. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study was to examine whether or not strong values might influence physicians' estimations of future events. In an empirical study about physicians' attitudes towards physician assisted suicide (PAS) we asked about the physicians' main reasons for being pro, doubtful or contra PAS and also asked them to estimate what would happen with patients' trust if PAS were to be legally accepted in Swedish society. Finally we asked the physicians about their own trust in healthcare in (...) the event of PAS being legally accepted. We found that in contrast to those who were pro PAS and doubtful, the group who were against PAS did not discriminate between their own opinion and their estimation of what they thought might happen with patients' trust in the future. Against the backdrop of the present study, we present a hypothesis maintaining that feeling strongly against controversial medical procedures is associated with being inclined to let one's own beliefs influence our capacity to interpret and estimate empirical results. We think this hypothesis merits closer examination. (shrink)

Different ideas of the normative relevance of autonomy can give rise to profoundly different action-guiding principles in healthcare. If autonomy is seen as a value rather than as a right, it can be argued that patients’ decisions should sometimes be overruled in order to protect or promote their own autonomy. We refer to this as paternalism in the name of autonomy. In this paper, we discuss different elements of autonomy (decision-making capacity, efficiency, and authenticity) and arguments in favor of paternalism (...) for the sake of autonomy that have been proposed in the bioethical debate. We argue that if autonomy is valuable, then paternalism for the sake of autonomy may be justified. However, policies allowing paternalism in the name of autonomy may be self-defeating. (shrink)

This text is about obtaining and sharing genetic information when there is a potential conflict of interests between patients and their families and relatives. The patient or, in this text, the “index-person,” is someone who is considering obtaining or already has obtained genetic information about herself through genetic testing.The index-person can have several reasons to take an interest in obtaining her genetic information. She may want to know if she has a genetic predisposition for a disorder in order to take (...) measures for preventing its development. Even if there are no preventive measures, as is the case with Huntington's disease, for instance, she may still want to know whether she has the mutation, in order to adjust her future plans. These interests that an individual may have in obtaining genetic information have been used to argue in favour of a right to know. (shrink)

Obtaining and sharing genetic information when there is a potential conflict of interest between patients and their relatives give rise to two questions. Do we have a duty to find out our genetic predispositions for disease for the sake of our relatives, or do we have a right to remain ignorant? Do we have a duty to disclose our known genetic predispositions for disease to our relatives? I argue that the answer to both questions is yes, but to a lesser (...) extent than sometimes claimed. (shrink)

Principles of need are constantly referred to in health care priority setting. The common denominator for any principle of need is that it will ascribe some kind of special normative weight to people being worse off. However, this common ground does not answer the question how a plausible principle of need should relate to the aggregation of benefits across individuals. Principles of need are sometimes stated as being incompatible with aggregation and sometimes characterized as accepting aggregation in much the same (...) way as utilitarians do. In this paper we argue that if one wants to take principles of need seriously both of these positions have unreasonable implications. We then characterize and defend a principle of need consisting of sufficientarian elements as well as prioritarian which avoids these unreasonable implications. (shrink)

In healthcare ethics there is a discussion regarding whether autonomy of personal preferences, what sometimes is referred to as authenticity, is necessary for autonomous decision-making. It has been argued that patients’ decisions that lack sufficient authenticity could be deemed as non-autonomous and be justifiably overruled by healthcare staff. The present paper discusses this issue in relation certain psychiatric disorders. It takes its starting point in recent qualitative studies of the experiences and thoughts of patients’ with anorexia nervosa where issues related (...) to authenticity seem particularly relevant. The paper examines different interpretations of authenticity relevant for autonomy and concludes that the concept, as it has been elaborated in recent debate, is highly problematic to use as a criterion for autonomous decision-making in healthcare. (shrink)