In this article I respond to Yuk Hui by revisiting the crossroads in the philosophy of technology as represented by the philosophies of Stiegler and Ihde. Whereas Hui proposes the concept of cosmotechnics as an integrating perspective, I conceive of the crossroads in other terms, namely from the perspective of substantivism. I characterize our present situation, what a philosophy of technology should address and then examine Hui’s notion of cosmotechnics from this alternative perspective. My main concern is to show future (...) paths of development for cosmotechnical thought. (shrink)

This paper is an enquiry into the philosophical fault-line that leads from mechanicism to posthumanism. I focus on a central aspect of posthumanism: the erosion of the distinction between organism and machine, nature and art, and the biological and engineering sciences. I claim that this shift can be placed in the seventeenth century, in Descartes’s biology. The Cartesian fusion of the natural and technological opened the door to distinctly posthuman understandings of the living body, its relation to technological extensions, and (...) the possibility of its drastic alteration. Descartes’s mechanicism demanded a reconceptualization of bodily boundaries, organismic unity, natural finality, causation, and bio/technological instrumentality; all of which Descartes boldly theorized in terms of the wondrous technologies of his day. This radical proposal obscured the possibility of thinking the human as ontologically unique, or as having an ideal unity. This paper will examine the posthuman ramifications of these aspects of Descartes’s philosophy. (shrink)

Jacques Lafitte occupies an odd place in the philosophy of technology. He was a French engineer who made a significant and conceptually innovative contribution to this field, yet his influence has been elusive and largely ignored until relatively recently. Many of Lafitte’s ideas find echoes in the work of later philosophers, yet, notably in the case of Simondon, apparently without any direct line of influence. Lafitte placed the machine at the centre of his thinking about technology and articulated various layers (...) of analysis around it; for example, he considered machines in the broader context of an artificial world or “mechanosphere”, which encompassed certain aspects of philosophical anthropology. In this work we seek to reconstruct Lafitte’s ideas and briefly trace some of their later impact. We identify three dimensions in Lafitte’s analysis: epistemological, ontological and anthropological. We argue that the most remarkable fact about Lafitte’s thought is the way it inaugurates, and anticipates, the approach of later currents, not just in the “French tradition”, who also made an effort to integrate machine theory into broader philosophical, anthropological and political aspects, in terms that echo Lafitte’s. In particular, we will focus on Gilbert Simondon and cybernetics. (shrink)

The 'More-than-Human' reader brings together texts by writers across a wide array of disciplines that reflect on the state of post-anthropocentric thinking today. Focusing on the ecologies and technologies of climate injustice and inequalities, as well as the destructive structures lurking within anthropocentrism, More-than-Human proposes complex entanglements, frictions, and reparative attention across species and beings. Thinking past the centrality of the human subject, the texts that compose this reader begin to imagine networks of ethics and responsibility emerging not from the (...) ideologies of old, but from the messy and complex liveliness around us, and underfoot. (shrink)

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument, the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of “directed evolution.” In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed (...) its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and the reasons themselves. I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement. (shrink)

El cibermundo como sistema tecnológico digital, cibercultural y cibersocial, ha sido construido por el sujeto cibernético, el cual, como entidad biológica, pertenece a la especie, pero que se diferencia de otros seres vivos por sus prácticas sociales, las que despliega gracias al cerebro-lenguaje - el discurso y su relación social con el poder cibernético, y las cibersociedades que él mismo ha forjado y que, a la vez, le forja. Este, como tal, constituye las mismas fibras del cibermundo virtual y ciberespacial. (...) De ahí que estos se definan de acuerdo a su relación social con el poder cibernético. Por lo que hablo de varias clases de sujetos cibernéticos, que van desde los hackers y sus diversas modalidades de acuerdo a las variables de poder (mercenarios, rebeldes de ciberseguridad de instituciones públicas o privadas, entre otros), ciberempresarios, cibereducadores hasta los ciberpolíticos. (shrink)

Il s’agira d’aborder dans cette contribution l’œuvre de Carl Andre en tant qu’arrangement de pièces combinatoires, selon des ensembles minimaux qui se parcourent, dont l’expérience et littéralement la compréhension ne peuvent se faire qu’à partir du déplacement physique du visiteur. Un déplacement qui prend son impulsion à partir du sol, départ de la sculpture mais aussi plan selon lequel la plus existentielle des dimensions se donne, condition fondatrice de l’habiter humain. Si l’installation a souvent été considérée comme une extension des (...) pratiques de l’assemblage et du collage, c’est-à-dire en fonctionnant selon des principes d’association, de contamination et de télescopage, le travail de Carl Andre pose de manière très radicale et rigoureuse les conditions mêmes qui rendent possible toute installation : la mise en tension sans cesse renouvelée d’une proximité et d’un lointain qui fonde l’horizon d’un spectateur toujours dessaisi de ce qui ad-vient, l’avènement de la corporéité en tant que mouvement, des prises sensori-motrices sans cesse reconduites et indexées sur la perception des objets qui occupent l’espace et le redistribuent, enfin la nature éminemment trajective de cette catégorie d’œuvre que l’on tente de définir par le terme d’installation. Les environnements sculpturaux proposés par l’artiste américain donnent lieu, ils instituent l’espace et l’ouvrent, ils sont autant de places à investir. In this contribution, we will deal with the works by Carl Andre as an arrangement of combinatory parts, according to minimal sets you can go by whose experience and literally the understanding can only be made from the visitor’s physical moves. A movement that origins from the ground, the start of the sculpture but also a map according to which the most existential of dimensions emerges, the founding condition of human beings. If the installation has often been considered an extension of assembly and collage habits, that is to say functioning according to association, contamination and going back and forth principles, the works by Carl Andre set the very conditions which make any kind of installation possible in an extremely radical and strict way: the forever renewed focus of a proximity and a distance which founds the horizon for a spectator who keeps being deprived of what will come, the surge of corporeality as a movement, of forever renewed sensorimotor grips indexed to the perception of objects which fill space and redistribute it, and at last the trajective nature of this kind of works one tends to define by the word of installation. The sculptural environment offered by the American artist gives place, they institute space and widen it, they are as many places to invest. (shrink)

La presente obra ofrece una perspectiva abierta de la filosofía de al-Andalus con enfoques diversos y complementarios a cargo de reconocidos especialistas del arabismo, el hebraísmo y el pensamiento medieval: Miguel Asín Palacios, Manuel Alonso, Roger Arnaldez, Miguel Cruz Hernández, Fernando Díaz Esteban, Salvador Gómez Nogales, David Gonzalo Maeso, Joaquín Lomba, Andrés Martínez Lorca y Juan Vernet. Novedad importante que reflejan estas páginas es la integración de los filósofos judíos y musulmanes en la casa común de al-Andalus, como históricamente aconteció. (...) En la primera parte se analizan las influencias clásicas y orientales que confluyeron en la vida intelectual de la España musulmana. En la segunda se traza un amplio y detallado panorama de los principales filósofos de al-Andalus. El editor ha reconstruido en la introducción el desarrollo del pensamiento andalusí dentro de su contexto histórico. Rigor histórico-filológico, contextualización social, profundización en las cuestiones especulativas y espíritu crítico constituyen rasgos comunes de estos ensayos. (Fuente: Almuzara). (shrink)

Aunque el derecho probatorio y el derecho procesal se han dedicado desde siempre al estudio de los problemas relacionados con las pruebas y el establecimiento de los hechos en los procesos judiciales, el énfasis ha estado siempre en el aspecto formal, doctrinal y procedimental en detrimento de los fundamentos filosóficos y teóricos. Durante los últimos años ha habido un intento sostenido de explorar estos fundamentos combinando no sólo las herramientas tradicionales proporcionadas por la lógica, la gramática y la retórica, sino (...) también los avances hechos en ciencias como la estadística y la probabilidad, la medicina y la psicología forenses, la psicología de la percepción, la epistemología y la filosofía de la ciencia. El presente libro reúne las contribuciones de destacados juristas y filósofos latinoamericanos a esta nueva perspectiva interdisciplinaria, conocida como epistemología jurídica. El libro está dividido en tres grandes temas: la primera parte explora los problemas epistemológicos del conocimiento de los hechos en los procesos judiciales; la segunda se enfoca en el problema de los estándares de prueba; y la sección final discute el testimonio de los expertos. En su conjunto el libro ofrece un panorama tanto de los problemas centrales de la epistemología jurídica, como del estado del arte de la disciplina. (shrink)

This book examines the human ability to participate in moments of joint feeling. It presents an answer to the question concerning the nature of our faculty to share in what might be called episodes of collective affective intentionality. The proposal develops the claim that our capacity to participate in such episodes is grounded in an ability central to our human condition: our capacity to care with one another about certain things. The author provides a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective (...) intentionality that takes seriously the idea that feelings are at the core of our emotional relation to the world. He details a form of group emotional orientation that relies on the fact that the participating individuals have come to share a number of concerns. Readers will learn that at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode, one does not merely find a set of shared concerns, but also a particular mode of caring. In the end, the argument presented in this monograph makes plausible the idea that the emotions through which humans participate in moments of affective intentional community express our nature. In addition, it shows that the debate on collective affective intentionality also permits us to better understand the relationship between two conflicting philosophical pictures of ourselves: the idea that we are essentially social beings and the claim that we are creatures for whom our personal existence is an issue. Thus, aiming at an elucidation of the nature of our ability to feel together, the book offers a detailed account of what it is to situationally express our human nature by caring about something in a properly joint manner. (shrink)

Averroes, un pensador cuyo legado sigue vivo -- Acerca de la felicidad y la amistad -- Sobre el deseo -- La crítica de Averroes al teólogo iraní al-Gazzali -- Los rostros del comentador -- Averroes, el filósofo andalusí que revolucionó Europa -- "Averroes recuperó el racionalismo griego olvidado en Europa" -- Apéndices.

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)