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Andre J. Abath [8]Andre Abath [4]André Joffily Abath [1]
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Andre Abath
Federal University of Minas Gerais
  1. Epistemic Contextualism, Semantic Blindness and Content Unawareness.André J. Abath - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):593 - 597.
    It is held by many philosophers that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that speakers are typically semantically blind, that is, typically unaware of the propositions semantically expressed by knowledge attributions. In his ?Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness? (this journal, 2009), Martin Montminy argues that semantic blindness is widespread in language, and not restricted to knowledge attributions, so it should not be considered problematic. I will argue that Montminy might be right about this, but that contextualists still face a (...)
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  2.  27
    Mcdowell and Hegel: Perceptual Experience, Thought and Action.Andre Abath & Federico Sanguinetti (eds.) - 2018 - Springer Verlag.
    This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...)
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  3.  11
    Frustrating Absences.André J. Abath - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (53):45-62.
    Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...)
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  4. Nonconceptual Content, Fineness of Grain and Recognitional Capacities.André Abath - 2005 - Abstracta 1 (2):193-206.
    One of the current debates in philosophy of mind is whether the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual or nonconceptual. The proponents of nonconceptual content, or nonconceptualists, typically support their position by appealing to the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which, in rough terms, has as its conclusion that we do not possess concepts for everything we perceive. In his Mind and World, John McDowell tried to give a response to the argument, and show that we do possess concepts for (...)
     
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  5. Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons.André J. Abath - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (2):543-571.
    John McDowell and Bill Brewer famously defend the view that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs, where reasons are understood in terms of subject’s reasons. In this paper I show, first, that it is a consequence of the adoption of such a requirement for one to have empirical beliefs that children as old as 3 years of age have to considered as not having genuine empirical beliefs at all. But we (...)
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  6. Possessing Demonstrative Concepts.André J. Abath - 2008 - Facta Philosophica 10 (1):231-245.
  7. A Note on McDowell's Response to the Fineness of Grain Argument.Andre J. Abath - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):677-686.
  8.  76
    Doing Without Concepts – Edouard Machery.André J. Abath - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):654-655.
  9.  10
    Incomplete Understanding of Concepts and Knowing in Part What Something Is.André J. Abath - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).
    Burge famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of (...)
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  10.  39
    Brewer’s Switching Argument.Andre Abath - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):255-277.
    In his Perception and Reason, Bill Brewer argues that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs. His argument for this idea relies on a premise according to which in order for the relations with perceptual experience to determine the contents of empirical beliefs, these relations must be reason-giving. He offers an argument for this premise, the so-called Switching Argument. In this paper, I show that the Switching Argument does not work, in (...)
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  11. The Constitution Argument Against Conceptualism.André Abath - 2008 - Sorites 20:49-66.
    According to philosophers such as McDowell and Brewer, the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, a number of critics have argued that they are wrong in thinking this, for they claim that there is an argument, the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which is valid and sound, and has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism. Although McDowell and Brewer seem to acknowledge that the Fineness of Grain Argument, if valid and (...)
     
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  12.  42
    Nada Vendo no Escuro, Nada Ouvindo no Silêncio.André Joffily Abath - 2012 - Doispontos 9 (2).
    Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Podemos ver na ausência de luz, e ouvir na ausência de som? Em seu livro Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen defende que sim, que podemos ver a escuridão na ausência de luz, e ouvir o silêncio na ausência de som. Neste artigo, defendo que (...)
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  13.  27
    The Asymmetry Between the Practical and the Epistemic: Arguing Against the Control-View.André J. Abath & Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (3):383.
    It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...)
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