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Andrea Christofidou
University of London
  1.  81
    Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity.Andrea Christofidou - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):539-570.
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.
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  2.  16
    Self, Reason, and Freedom in Descartes' Metaphysics.Andrea Christofidou - 2012 - Routledge.
    I offer a new understanding of Descartes’ metaphysics, arguing that his primary question is ‘what is real and true?’ – not as we have been accustomed to believe, ‘how can I be certain?’ – an inquiry that requires both reason’s authority and freedom’s autonomy. I argue that without freedom and its internal relation to reason, Descartes’ undertaking would not get off the ground; yet that relation has gone unnoticed by successive studies of his philosophy. I demonstrate that it is only (...)
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  3. Descartes on Freedom, Truth, and Goodness.Andrea Christofidou - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):633-655.
    Freedom is the least discussed thesis of Descartes' works. Two major issues are: (i) the Fourth Meditation is seen as an unfounded theodicy, an interlude, an interruption to the analytic order; (ii)some passages in Descartes' other works are seen as inconsistent with the Fourth Meditation. First, I argue that Descartes' treatment is philosophical, that freedom underlies his entire philosophical project, defending the indispensability of the Fourth to his metaphysics.I demonstrate that Descartes' conception of freedom differs from the mainstream conceptions, in (...)
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  4.  22
    Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity.Andrea Christofidou - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (4):539-569.
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to ‘I’ and, at worst, subject to error. Central to my thesis is that, first, ‘I’ is immune to error through misidentification absolutely, and that if there is any problem (...)
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  5.  84
    Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions.Andrea Christofidou - 2001 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):215-238.
    Citation: Christofidou, A.. Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39:2 , 215-238. © Journal of the History of Philosophy. Reprinted with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  6.  10
    First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference.Andrea Christofidou - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223.
  7. Self, Reason, and Freedom: A New Light on Descartes' Metaphysics.Andrea Christofidou - 2012 - Routledge.
    Freedom and its internal relation to reason is fundamental to Descartes’ philosophy in general, and to his _Meditations on First Philosophy_ in particular. Without freedom his entire enquiry would not get off the ground, and without understanding the rôle of freedom in his work, we could not understand what motivates key parts of his metaphysics. Yet, not only is freedom a relatively overlooked element, but its internal relation to reason has gone unnoticed by most studies of his philosophy. Self, Reason, (...)
     
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  8.  49
    Subjectivity and the First Person: Some Reflections.Andrea Christofidou - 1999 - Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3/4):1-27.
  9.  14
    The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes.Andrea Christofidou - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):519-523.
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  10.  86
    First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference.Andrea Christofidou - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.
  11. Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions.Andrea Christofidou - 2001 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):215-238.
    Citation: Christofidou, A.. Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39:2 , 215-238. © Journal of the History of Philosophy. Reprinted with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  12.  58
    God, Physicalism, and the Totality of Facts.Andrea Christofidou - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (4):515-542.
    The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible (...)
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  13. Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian Duality.Andrea Christofidou - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):134-162.
    The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively (...)
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  14.  9
    Scepticism: Interdisciplinary Approaches (Proceedings on the Second International Symposium of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research, 1988).Peter J. King & Andrea Christofidou - 1992 - Philosophical Books 33 (3):154-155.
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