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  1. The Way Things Look: A Defence of Content.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):541-562.
    How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? In the first introductory section, I set up a contrast between the representational and the purely relational conception of perceptual experience. In the second section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis against perceptual content. The third section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 3.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 3.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a (...)
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    Appearances and the Metaphysics of Sensible Qualities: A Response to Ivanov.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Topoi 39 (4):1011-1015.
    Siegel has argued that visual experience has content. Ivanov has convincingly shown that there is a confusion in Siegel’s argument between perception presenting property-instances and perception presenting properties as being instantiated. According to Ivanov, whether a revised version of Siegel’s argument succeeds depends on the metaphysics of sensible qualities. I argue that Ivanov’s argument rests on a mistake, and I conclude by suggesting how we might go about arguing for or against perceptual content.
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    I Know How I Know: Perception, Self-Awareness, Self-Knowledge.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10355-10375.
    When a subject has perceptually grounded knowledge, she typically knows how she knows what she knows, and is able to appeal to perceived items and her own experiences in reason-giving practices. What explains this ability? In this paper I focus on vision, and I submit that paradigmatic cases of visual perceptual knowledge are such that, when a subject acquires knowledge that p by seeing that p, she also acquires tacit knowledge that she sees that p; I also argue that the (...)
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    Perception, Content, Generality.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):245-267.
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    The Weight of Facts: A Puzzle About Perception, Reasons and Deliberation.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):104-113.
    How should we understand the epistemic role of perception? According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), a subject’s perceptual knowledge that p is to be explained in terms of the subject believing that p for a factive and reflectively accessible reason. I argue that ED raises far-reaching questions for rationality and deliberation; I illustrate those questions by setting up a puzzle about belief-suspension, and I argue that ED does not have the resources to make sense of the rationality of belief-suspension in cases (...)
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