"How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge, since the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong? Andrea Kern argues that we can disarm this skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a rational capacity. In this book, she develops a metaphysics of the mind as existing through knowledge of itself."--Provided by publisher.
Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity (...) for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality. (shrink)
In his treatment of subjective mind, Hegel argues that the development that characterizes the vital process of a human individual is logically unique in that it dissolves the contradiction between two logical determinations that characterize any vital activity: the contradiction between the ‘immediate singularity’ of the subject of this process and its ‘abstract generality’. Hegel employs the term Bildung to characterize any vital activity that has this form. The idea that the distinction between human life and non-human life is a (...) logical distinction is one of the main lessons that Hegel thinks we should learn from Aristotle's treatment of the idea of life. In this article I distinguish between two contemporary varieties of this Aristotelian idea: a sophisticated variety that emphasizes the idea of second nature in order to characterize the distinctiveness of the human, and a naive variety that thinks of the human's uniqueness in terms of characterizations that already belong to its first nature. I argue that Hegel is neither sophisticated nor naive but offers a third variety of Neo-Aristotelianism that solves the difficulties of the other two. This has decisive consequences for his understanding of Bildung. Although the notion of Bildung describes an empirical process, Hegel argues, it is not an empirical concept. Rather, it is the concrete concept of the process of actualization that characterizes a self-conscious form of life that reflects the inner temporality of this form's actuality. (shrink)
_ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 13 - 28 Linking the idea of knowledge with the idea of a certain form of life is uncontestedly one of the lessons the later Wittgenstein wanted to teach us. However, what Wittgenstein exactly meant by this is highly contested in the Wittgenstein literature. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of appealing to the idea of a form of life in order to understand knowledge. According to the first way, the appeal to (...) the idea of a form of life is supposed to “solve” the skeptical problem. On that account the appeal to a form of life is conceived of as an appeal to something that is more fundamental than knowledge and thereby explains how knowledge is possible. According to the second way, the appeal to the idea of a form of life is taken to be a consequence of an insight that makes it impossible for the skeptical problem to even get formulated: it is the insight that the fundamental meaning of the concept of knowledge is to describe a kind of capacity, more precisely, a capacity for knowledge. I take this to be Wittgenstein’s deepest lesson for epistemology which is still to be acknowledged. According to this interpretation, the thought that knowledge is linked with a certain form of life no longer expresses the idea that knowledge rests upon something that is more fundamental than knowledge. It rather expresses the idea that knowledge rests upon a form of life that cannot exist without knowledge. (shrink)
Kant’s conception of the relation between knowledge and doubt stands opposed to much of contemporary epistemology. For Kant denies that it is possible for one to have knowledge of how things are without having a ground for one’s judgment that guarantees its truth. Knowledge, according to him, is judgment that is based on a ground that the judger recognizes to guarantee the truth of her judgment. A judgment that is based on such a ground, trivially, excludes any doubt the judger (...) might have had with respect to it. Therefore knowledge implies certainty. Much of contemporary epistemology has no room for the idea of a truth-guaranteeing ground. By contrast, Kant thinks that the rejection of the idea of a truth-guaranteeing ground has a devastating effect. It does not only render unintelligible the idea of knowledge, but, because of that, the very idea of a subject that is able to be ignorant about things, to have doubts about them or even to err about them. The paper defends the Kantian account of knowledge with the aim to show that ignorance, doubt and error can only characterize, and hence trouble, a subject that knows herself to have a capacity that enables her to overcome any possible doubt and error. (shrink)
In der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie ist die Idee verbreitet, dass der Erwerb von Wissen davon abhängig ist, dass das Subjekt des Wissens an einer bestimmten Lebensform teilhat, die grundlegender als sein Wissen ist. Das ist eine Lesart der Position Wittgensteins, deren exemplarischer Vertreter etwa Stanley Cavell ist. Meine These dagegen lautet, dass die Lebensformtheorie einem erkenntnistheoretischen Dogma aufruht, dessen Überwindung Wittgensteins eigentliches Anliegen war: Es ist das Dogma, dass die grundlegende Bedeutung des Wissensbegriffs in der Beschreibung eines einzelnen Aktes besteht, und (...) nicht in der Beschreibung von etwas, das auf einer logisch anderen Ebene steht: nämlich einer Fähigkeit. Damit soll nicht bestritten werden, dass die Idee einer bestimmten Lebensform wesentlich ist für die Beschreibung erkenntnisfähiger Subjekte. Doch diese ist nicht grundlegender als die Idee des Wissens selbst. (shrink)
Der Aufsatz behandelt die Frage, in welcher Weise die Erfahrung einer Illusion und der Vollzug einer Reflexion konstitutive Merkmale der ästhetischen Erfahrung sind. Nach einem weit verbreiteten Verständnis der ästhetischen Erfahrung beschreiben der Begriff der Illusion und der Begriff der Reflexion zwei einander entgegengesetzte Akte: Mit einem Akt der Reflexion machen wir uns eine Illusion bewusst, deren Opfer wir andernfalls waren. Der Beitrag zeigt dagegen, dass im Bereich des Ästhetischen der Begriff der Reflexion keinen Akt beschreibt, der einem Akt der (...) Illusion entgegengesetzt ist. Die Begriffe der Reflexion und Illusion beschreiben hier vielmehr einen einzigen Akt, und zwar so, dass sie hierbei einander wechselseitig erläutern. (shrink)