In this paper Hildebrand’s moral ontology is discussed. It is shown that his moral ontology is, in essence, Platonic rather than Aristotelian. Although Hildebrand’s language differs from that of Plato, the ideas are very similar, given that both are moral absolutists who think that moral eidê are ante rem rather than in re. They agree on the structure of the moral realm and have identical views on participation of the ideal in the real. They also have similar ideas on man’s (...) relationship towards the moral realm. (shrink)

The Finalistic Difficulty in Freedom and Its Solution -- Chapter XVIII: Solution of the Ought-Antinomy -- The Inner Conflict in Free Will as the Moral Will -- Solution of the Conflict. Exposure of Equivocations -- The Conflict of the Two Factors in Moral Freedom -- The Complementary Relation behind the Apparent Conflict -- The Recurrence of "Negative Freedom" in the Ought-Antinomy -- The Scope of " Negative" Freedom and its True Relation to " Positive" Freedom -- Reciprocal Conditionality of Positive (...) and Negative Freedom with Regard to Values -- Two-sided Freedom in the Self-Determination of the Person -- Chapter XIX: Problems Still Unsolved -- The Difficulty Concerning Individuality in Moral Freedom -- The Positive Relation between Universal and Individual Autonomy -- The Question as to the Nature of the Individual Determinant -- Personal Teleology as a Determinational Mode of Positive Freedom -- The Ontological Difficulty in Personal Freedom -- The Categorial Structure of the Complex Conditioning-Relationship -- Moral and Categorial Freedom -- The Limit to the Problem -- Section VI: Appendix to the Doctrine of Freedom -- Chapter XX: Apparent and Real Defects of the Theory -- Chapter XXI: Ethical and Religious Freedom -- Index. (shrink)