Sixteenth century pharmacology was still very much under the influence of a distinction going back to ancient medicine: the distinction between effects of medicaments that were taken to be explainable by the elementary qualities, their mutual modification in mixture, and the combination of these modified elementary qualities on the one hand, and the effects of medicaments that were taken not to be explicable in this manner.1 Galen coined the expression that a medicament of the latter kind possesses the capacity of (...) acting "by its whole substance,"2 and the question of how actions of the whole substance could be explicated gave rise to heated controversies in early modern pharmacology. Did Galen just... (shrink)

This article explores some continuities between Late Aristotelian and Cartesian embryology. In particular, it argues that there is an interesting consilience between some accounts of the role of imagination in trait acquisition in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian embryology. Evidence for this thesis is presented using the extensive biological writings of the Padua-based philosopher and physician, Fortunio Liceti . Like the Cartesian physiologists, Liceti believed that animal souls are material beings and that acts of imagination result in material images that can (...) be transmitted by means of medical spirits to the embryo. Moreover, while the Cartesian embryologists accepted such a view in a quite speculative way, one finds penetrating criticism of imagination theories of trait acquisition in the Late Aristotelian tradition. Evidence for this thesis is presented using the no less extensive biological writings of Liceti's contemporary, Emilio Parisano . In conclusion, the Late Aristotelian tradition itself provides the theoretical tools for excising immaterial formative forces from embryology and at the same time evinces a much more acute sense for the problems inherent in imagination theories of trait acquisition than the Cartesian tradition. (shrink)

In the history of seventeenth-century philosophy, the distinction between material and immaterial extension is closely associated with the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687). The aspect of More’s conception of immaterial extension that proved most influential is his theory of absolute divine space. Very plausibly, the Newtonian conception of space owes a great deal to More’s views on space. More’s views on space in turn were closely linked to his views on the nature of individual spirits—the souls of brutes and humans, (...) as well as the intelligences of the angels. It has been acknowledged that More’s theory of absolute space was not without precedents. Most importantly, Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529– .. (shrink)

According to Wittgenstein, internal relations are such that, once their terms are given, it is unthinkable that they do not hold. In his early philosophy, the concept of internal relation plays a central role in his views on meaning. The present paper addresses the question of how Wittgenstein's views about internal relations develop during his years of transition (1930-32). In particular, it investigates the connections between the concepts of internal relation, logical multiplicity, and aspect seeing in two thematic fields: (1) (...) Wittgenstein's discussion of the relation between an expectation and what fulfils it, and (2) his discussion of the relation between a sign and an action guided by it. (shrink)

The sixteenth-century physician and philosopher Julius Caesar Scaliger combines the view that living beings are individuated by a single substantial form with the view that the constituents of the organic body retain their identity due to the continued existence and operation of their own substantial forms. This essay investigates the implications of Scaliger's account of subordinate and dominant substantial forms for the question of the constancy of biological species. According to Scaliger, biological mutability involves not only change on the ontological (...) level of accidents but, in some cases, also change on the level of substantial forms. While he shares the received view that substantial forms themselves cannot undergo change, he maintains that relations of domination and subordination between substantial forms can undergo change. He uses his theory of how such changes can occur to explain cases of revertible plant degeneration. Moreover, in his view plants that belong to previously unknown biological species can emerge from changes in the relations between the many forms contained in plant seeds. (shrink)

Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz’s rehahilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained etlort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim that (...) Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between some corpuscularian and Aristotelian strands that run through the thought of the sixteenth-century philosopher and physician Julius Caesar Scaliger. Scaliger often uses the concepts of corpuscles, pores, and vacuum. At the same time, he also describes mixture as involving the fusion of particles into a continuous body. The paper explores how Scaliger’s combination of corpuscularian and non-corpuscularian views is shaped, in substantial aspects, by his response to the views on corpuscles and the vacuum in (...) the work of his contemporary, Girolamo Fracastoro. Fracastoro frequently appears in Scaliger’s work as an opponent against whom numerous objections are directed. However, if one follows up Scaliger’s references, it soon becomes clear that Scaliger also shares some of Fracastoro’s views. Like Scaliger, Fracastoro suggests corpuscularian explanations of phenomena such as water rising in lime while at the same time ascribing some non-corpuscularian properties to his natural minima. Like Scaliger, Fracastoro maintains that there is no vacuum devoid of bodies since places cannot exist independently of bodies (although their opinions diverge regarding how exactly the relevant dependency relation might be explicated). Finally, like Scaliger, Fracastoro connects a continuum view of mixture with a theory of natural minima. (shrink)

This paper has two aims: In the first part it is argued, that - contrary to a predominant line of interpretation in recent literature - Wittgenstein holds no implicit assumptions conceming the categorial status of objects in the Tractatus. The second part tries to explain the categorial indeterminacy of Tractarian objects as a consequence of Wittgenstein's concept of logic and his distinction between "logic" and "application of logic".

Neuere Interpretationen von Leibniz' Notizen zur Metaphysik aus den Jahren 1675-1676 tendieren dazu, diese Texte im Licht eines spinozistischen Substanz-Monismus zu lesen. Obwohl es für eine solche Interpretation überzeugende Anhaltspunkte gibt, vertritt Leibniz jedoch in denselben Texten auch einen Substanzen-Pluralismus in Bezug auf geistige Substanzen. Substanz-Monismus und Substanzen-Pluralismus scheinen miteinander vereinbar zu sein, weil für Leibniz, ähnlich wie für Descartes in den Principia philosophiae, der Terminus ‚Substanz‛ nicht in univoker Weise von Gott und von Gegenständen in der Welt ausgesagt werden (...) kann. (shrink)

Leibniz’s claim that possibles strive towards existence has led to diverging interpretations. According to the metaphorical interpretation, only the divine will is causally efficacious in bringing possibles into exisence. According to the literal interpretation, God endows possibles with causal powers of their own. The present article suggests a solution to this interpretative impass by suggesting that the doctrine of the striving possibles can be understood as a consequence of Leibniz’s early cognitivist theory of volition. According to this theory, thinking the (...) degree of goodness of something is identical with wanting it to this degree. Arguably, this analysis of volition is relevant not only for Leibniz’s early analysis of the human mind but also for his early analysis of the divine mind. (shrink)

Recently, the idea that our desire for the esteem of others could function as a regulative principle of social life has been criticized because the economy of esteem could reinforce oppressive structures due to expressions of mutual esteem within oppressing groups with deviant group norms. This article discusses this problem from a historical point of view, focusing on the moral and political writings of the eighteenth-century French materialist Paul Thiry d’Holbach. D’Holbach’s thoughts are relevant in two respects: For situations of (...) extreme power and wealth differences within oppressing groups, he shows that the economy of esteem does not work in favour of the members of these groups. This is so because the conditions of esteem and self-esteem of the members with lower hierarchical standing tend to be precarious, while the members with higher standing cannot use the flatteries of their inferiors as credible sources of esteem. D’Holbach concedes that self-esteem could be stabilized by refraining from self-reflection but argues that such a strategy comes at the price of an impaired capacity for protecting one’s natural needs. The upshot of his considerations is that our interest in esteem and self-esteem provides strong pragmatic and moral reasons for opposing oppression. (shrink)

Abstract This article examines the little-explored remarks on verification in Wittgenstein's notebooks during the period between 1930 and 1932. In these remarks, Wittgenstein connects a verificationist theory of meaning with the notion of logical multiplicity, understood as a space of possibilities: a proposition is verified by a fact if and only if the proposition and the fact have the same logical multiplicity. But while in his early philosophy logical multiplicities were analysed as an outcome of the formal properties of simple (...) objects and simple signs, Wittgenstein in the early 1930s connects the notion of logical multiplicity with the notion of ways of seeing. I will argue that the relevant ways of seeing are closely similar to seeing-as or aspect seeing. According to Wittgenstein's view in the early 1930s, logical multiplicities are part of our perceptual experience of propositions and facts. In this sense, the verification relation depends on how we experience propositions and facts as being surrounded by a logical space of possibilities. Strikingly, Wittgenstein's way of thinking about the verification relation offers solutions to a set of seemingly intractable problems connected with the versions of verificationism developed by members of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This article explores Wittgenstein's little known remarks on colour from his notebooks of the early 1930s. It emphasizes the importance of the notion of logical multiplicity contained in these remarks. The notion of logical multiplicity indicates that Wittgenstein, as in the years of the Tractatus, is committed to a theory of logical space in which every colour is embedded. However, logical multiplicities in his remarks of the early 1930s do not depend on an apparatus of simple objects, states of (...) affairs, and elementary propositions. I suggest that, in this period, the logical multiplicity of colour space is a matter of how we see colours.RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine les remarques trap peu connues de Wittgenstein sur les couleurs dans ses cahiers du début des années 1930. Je souligne l'importance qu'y prend la notion de multiplicité logique, qui est le signe que Wittgenstein souscrivait alors, tout autant que dans les années du Tractatus, à une théorie de l'espace logique propre à chaque couleur. Dans ces remarques du début des années 1930, les multiplicités logiques ne dépendent toutefois pas du dispositif conceptuel constitué par les objets simples, les états de choses et les propositions élémentaires. Mon propos est de montrer que, dans cétte periode, la multiplicité logique de l'espace chromatique est relative à la manière dont nous voyons les couleurs. (shrink)

In this discussion note, I defend four claims: (1) The interpretation of Leibniz's theory of simple substances as a philosophy of panpsychism has no direct support from Leibniz's texts. (2) According to Leibniz there is a perfect continuity between perceptions of different degrees of distinctness. (3) Nevertheless, due to the reflective structure of sensation, there is a discontinuity between the perceptions of bare simple substances and sensations, which are characteristic of souls. (4) Finally, Leibniz's principle of continuity leaves room for (...) this kind of discontinuity between different kinds of simple substances. (shrink)

As Peter Niebyl has documented, one of the issues in which the Wittenberg-based physician and philosopher Daniel Sennert (1572–1637) departed from Paracelsus and his followers was the concept of disease. Paracelsus and some of his followers regarded diseases as real beings—so-called “disease-entities” (entia morbis) that can enter into the body of a living being and thereafter possess a clearly defined location in the affected organism. 1 For Sennert, such a view is a dangerous confusion between disease and its causes. According (...) to him, causes of disease can be present in an organism without actually causing a disease (Sennert 1629, p. 253). Moreover, he shares the traditional Christian doctrine .. (shrink)

This article studies Madame de Lambert's early eighteenth-century views on aging, and especially the aging of women, by contextualizing them in a twofold way: It understands them as a response to La Rochefoucauld's skepticism concerning aging, women, and the aging of women; It understands them as being closely connected to a long series of scattered remarks concerning esteem, self-esteem, and honnêteté in Lambert's moral essays. Whereas La Rochefoucauld describes aging as a decline of intellectual, emotional, and physical powers and is (...) suspicious of the mechanisms of esteem and self-esteem, Lambert develops a view of aging as offering the chance to become more independent of the judgment of others, especially the chance for women to become more independent of the judgment of men. As she argues, aging offers women the possibility of cultivating genuinely estimable intellectual and emotional qualities that attract the justified esteem essential for a stable friendship, as well as the opportunity to develop a form of self-esteem that is based on respect for one's own capacities of judgment. (shrink)

According to the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, individual ?spirits? ? the souls of humans and non-human animals ? are extended but cannot be physically divided. His contemporaries and recent commentators have charged that More has never given an explication of the grounds on which the indivisibility of spirits is based. In this article, I suggest that exploring the usage that More makes of the analogy between spirits and light could go some way towards providing such an explication. More compares the (...) relation between spirit and matter to the relation that, according to Aristotelian theories of light, holds between ?intentional species? and matter. I will argue that the purpose of his comparison is to highlight that both intentional species and spirits are existentially independent from matter. The existential independence of intentional species from matter expresses itself in the fact that light is not moved through the motion of the illuminated body. The existential independence of spirits from matter expresses itself in the fact that when a body that is coextensive with a spirit is divided, the spirit is not thereby divided but rather contracts into the remaining living organism. (shrink)

In den Elementa juris naturalis behauptet Leibniz, dass es rational ist zu präsumieren, dass eine gegebene Handlung gerecht ist. Diese Behauptung scheint in Widerspruch zu seiner Auffassung zu stehen, dass das, was präsumiert wird, einfacher ist als sein Gegenteil. Nach Leibniz ist einfacher, was weniger Voraussetzungen hat als etwas anderes, wobei er zwischen logischen und ontologischen Voraussetzungen unterscheidet. Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag versucht zu zeigen, dass Voraussetzungen auf der ontologischen Ebene eine oft übersehene Rolle für die Präsumption der Gerechtigkeit einer Handlung spielen (...) und dass sich der scheinbare Widerspruch auf dieser Ebene auflösen lässt. Nach Leibniz ist eine gerechte Handlung eine spezielle Art von Möglichkeit: eine Handlung, die für eine moralische Person möglich ist. Ihm zufolge hat aber ein mögliches Ereignis weniger ontologische Voraussetzungen als ein unmögliches Ereignis, weil die ontologischen Voraussetzungen eines möglichen Ereignisses ein Teil der Voraussetzungen eines unmöglichen Ereignisses sind. Die Präsumption zu Gunsten der Gerechtigkeit einer Handlung lässt sich als Spezialfall der Präsumption zu Gunsten der Möglichkeit eines Ereignisses auffassen. (shrink)

Theorien von Gerechtigkeit als einer ethischen Tugend spielen eine große Rolle in der protestantischen Ethik vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Eines der hervorstechenden Merkmale dieser Theorien ist ihr eklektischer Charakter: Sie verbinden Elemente aus verschiedenen Traditionen der antiken Tugendethik, vor allem der platonischen, aristotelischen und stoischen. Die Gerechtigkeitstheorien von protestantischen Philosophen wie Rudolph Goclenius, Clemens Timpler und Bartholomäus Keckermann illustrieren gut dokumentierte Merkmale des frühneuzeitlichen Eklektizismus wie die Rolle der Reinterpretation von ausgewählten Lehrstücken und die konziliatorische Strategie, scheinbare Widersprüche zwischen verschiedenen (...) Traditionen aufzulösen. Darüber hinaus illustrieren sie aber auch ein weniger gut dokumentiertes Merkmal des frühneuzeitlichen Eklektizismus, nämlich seine Funktion als philosophische Problemlösungsstrategie. Dieser Artikel versucht zu zeigen, wie Goclenius, Timpler und Keckermann einerseits Elemente aus den platonischen (und stoischen) Traditionen nutzen, um diagnostizierte Probleme in der aristotelischen Tradition zu beheben und andererseits Elemente aus der aristotelischen Tradition verwenden, um Probleme in der platonischen Tradition zu lösen. (shrink)

Julius Caesar Scaliger was a natural philosopher and literary theorist whose work was widely discussed throughout the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. After this period, it fell into oblivion, only to be rediscovered during the last three decades or so. His natural philosophy has triggered a series of specialized studies on particular aspects of his thought, especially those aspects that were influential in the development of early modern corpuscularianism. Sakamoto's book goes considerably (...) beyond such fragmentary approaches and presents central strands of Scaliger's most important work in natural philosophy, a thousand-page critique of Girolamo Cardano's De... (shrink)

Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz’s rehahilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained etlort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim that (...) Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)