6 found
  1.  93
    Accountability for Reasonableness: Opening the Black Box of Process.Andreas Hasman & Søren Holm - 2005 - Health Care Analysis 13 (4):261-273.
    Norman Daniels' and James Sabin's theory of “accountability for reasonableness” (A4R) is a much discussed account of due process for decision-making on health care priority setting. Central to the theory is the acceptance that people may justifiably disagree on what reasons it is relevant to consider when priorities are made, but that there is a core set of reasons, that all centre on fairness, on which there will be no disagreement. A4R is designed as an institutional decision process which will (...)
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  2.  88
    An inquiry into the principles of needs-based allocation of health care.Tony Hope, Lars Peter Østerdal & Andreas Hasman - 2009 - Bioethics 24 (9):470-480.
    The concept of need is often proposed as providing an additional or alternative criterion to cost-effectiveness in making allocation decisions in health care. If it is to be of practical value it must be sufficiently precisely characterized to be useful to decision makers. This will require both an account of how degree of need for an intervention is to be determined and a prioritization rule that clarifies how degree of need and the cost of the intervention interact in determining the (...)
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  3.  35
    Health care need: Three interpretations.Andreas Hasman, Tony Hope & Lars Peter Osterdal - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2):145–156.
    abstract The argument that scarce health care resources should be distributed so that patients in ‘need’ are given priority for treatment is rarely contested. In this paper, we argue that if need is to play a significant role in distributive decisions it is crucial that what is meant by need can be precisely articulated. Following a discussion of the general features of health care need, we propose three principal interpretations of need, each of which focuses on separate intuitions. Although this (...)
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  4.  50
    Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Should There Be a Free Market in Healthcare Information?Andreas Hasman & Søren Holm - 2006 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15 (1):42-49.
    On June 3, 2003, the European Council of health ministers rejected a proposal from the European Commission to allow drug manufacturers to advertise directly to particular groups of patients; the proposal had already been rejected by the European Parliament subsequent to a heated public debate in which consumer and patient groups almost unanimously argued that it was not the role of drug companies to provide information to patients. The pilot scheme suggested by the Commission would only have applied to patients (...)
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  5.  11
    Eliciting Reasons: Empirical Methods in Priority Setting.Andreas Hasman - 2003 - Health Care Analysis 11 (1):41-58.
    In this paper I review empirical methods applied in recent analysis of decision-making on priorities in health care. I outline a number of discrete methods and discuss their applicability and efficacy in the field of bioethics. Three key methodological issues seem to be important: choice of subject group; choice of approach and the extent of background information given to respondents. I conclude that a combination method is needed to give a comprehensive representation of values in priority setting and thus to (...)
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  6.  52
    Equal value of life and the pareto principle.Andreas Hasman & Lars Peter Østerdal - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):19-33.
    A principle claiming equal entitlement to continued life has been strongly defended in the literature as a fundamental social value. We refer to this principle as ‘equal value of life'. In this paper we argue that there is a general incompatibility between the equal value of life principle and the weak Pareto principle and provide proof of this under mild structural assumptions. Moreover we demonstrate that a weaker, age-dependent version of the equal value of life principle is also incompatible with (...)
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