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Andrew Bailey [39]Andrew R. Bailey [29]Andrew M. Bailey [27]
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Andrew Bailey
University of Guelph
Andrew M. Bailey
Yale-NUS College
  1. How to Build a Thought.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):75-83.
    We uncover a surprising discovery about the basis of thoughts. We begin by giving some plausible axioms about thoughts and their grounds. We then deduce a theorem, which has dramatic ramifications for the basis of all thoughts. The theorem implies that thoughts cannot come deterministically from any purely “thoughtless” states. We expect this result to be too dramatic for many philosophers. Hence, we proceed to investigate the prospect of giving up the axioms. We show that each axiom’s negation itself has (...)
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  2. Magical Thinking.Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    According to theists, God is an immaterial thinking being. The main question of this article is whether theism supports the view that we are immaterial thinking beings too. I shall argue in the negative. Along the way, I will also explore some implications in the philosophy of mind following from the observation that, on theism, God’s mentality is in a certain respect magical.
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  3. How Valuable Could a Person Be?Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    We investigate the value of persons. Our primary goal is to chart a path from equal and extreme value to infinite value. We advance two arguments. Each argument offers a reason to think that equal and extreme value are best accounted for if we are infinitely valuable. We then raise some difficult but fruitful questions about the possible grounds or sources of our infinite value, if we indeed have such value.
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  4. A New Puppet Puzzle.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
    We develop a new puzzle concerning a material being's relationship to the smallest parts of the material world. In particular, we investigate how a being could be responsible for anything if its behavior is completely determined by the behavior of those small parts. Many discussions of determinism and responsibility have focused on a determinism that moves from past to future. The determination at issue in our paper is importantly different: it moves from the bottom up.
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  5. The Feeling Animal.Andrew M. Bailey & Allison Krile Thornton - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    For good or for ill, we have animal bodies. Through them, we move around, eat and drink, and do many other things besides. We owe much – perhaps our very lives – to these ever-present animals. But how exactly do we relate to our animals? Are we parts of them, or they of us? Do we and these living animals co-inhere or constitute or coincide? Or what? Animalism answers that we are identical to them. There are many objections to animalism, (...)
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  6. Freedom in a Physical World.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (1):31-39.
    Making room for agency in a physical world is no easy task. Can it be done at all? In this article, I consider and reject an argument in the negative.
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  7. Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450.
    Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.
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  8. Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  9. Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism, by Yujin Nagasawa. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):275-279.
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  10. Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
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  11. Our Animal Interests.Andrew Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
    Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.
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  12. On the Concept of a Spirit.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (4):449-457.
    Substance dualism is on the move. Though the view remains unfashionable, a growing and diverse group of philosophers endorse it on impressive empirical, religious, and purely metaphysical grounds. In this note, I develop and evaluate one conceptual argument for substance dualism. According to that argument, we may derive a conclusion about our nature from the mere fact that we have the concept of a spirit. The argument is intriguing and fruitful; but I shall contend that it is, nonetheless, unsound.
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  13. No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...)
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  14. You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
    According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.
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  15. How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
    Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly non-material beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one extant version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be (...)
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  16. The Priority Principle.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):163-174.
    I introduce and argue for a Priority Principle, according to which we exemplify certain of our mental properties in the primary or non-derivative sense. I then apply this principle to several debates in the metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
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  17.  46
    Towards an Understanding of Ethical Behaviour in Small Firms.S. Vyakarnam, Andrew R. Bailey, A. Myers & D. Burnett - 1997 - Journal of Business Ethics 16 (15):1625-1636.
    Allthough small business accounts for over 90% of businesses in U.K. and indeed elsewhere, they remain the largely uncharted area of ethics. There has not been any research based on the perspective of small business owners, to define what echical delemmas they face and how, if at all, they resolve them. This paper explores ethics from the perspective of small business owner, using focus groups and reports on four clearly identifiable themes of ethical delemmas; entrepreneurial activity itself, conflicts of personal (...)
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  18. You Needn't Be Simple.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160.
    Here's an interesting question: what are we? David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer: we are simple. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnett's argument fails. First, there aren't any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper (...)
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  19. Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
    Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition. And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate (...)
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  20. The Elimination Argument.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
    Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.
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  21. Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
    There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
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  22.  14
    Contemporary Hylomorphism.Andrew M. Bailey & Shane Wilkins - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies 3:1-12.
    Aristotle famously held that objects are comprised of matter and form. That is the central doctrine of hylomorphism (sometimes rendered “hylemorphism”—hyle, matter; morphe, form), and the view has become a live topic of inquiry today. Contemporary proponents of the doctrine include Jeffrey Brower, Kit Fine, David Hershenov, Mark Johnston, Kathrin Koslicki, Anna Marmodoro, Michael Rea, and Patrick Toner, among others. In the wake of these contemporary hylomorphic theories the doctrine has seen application to various topics within mainstream analytic metaphysics. Here, (...)
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  23. No Pairing Problem.Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke Van Horn - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...)
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  24. The Feeling Body. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (4):816-817.
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  25. Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality.Andrew Bailey & Bradley Richards - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the (...)
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  26. Persons, Animals, Ourselves, by Paul F. Snowdon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 260, £30. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):411-414.
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  27. The Incompatibility of Composition as Identity, Priority Pluralism, and Irreflexive Grounding.Andrew M. Bailey - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):171-174.
    Some have it that wholes are, somehow, identical to their parts. This doctrine is as alluring as it is puzzling. But in this paper, I show that the doctrine is inconsistent with two widely accepted theses. Something has to go.
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  28. Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  29. Warrant is Unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
    Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn’t: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. (...)
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  30. Review Of: The Waning of Materialism. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):534-538.
  31. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
    The University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, CANADA.
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  32. The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
    It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to (...)
     
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  33. Physicalism and the Preposterousness of Zombies.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
  34. Supervenience and Physicalism.Andrew Bailey - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):53-73.
    Discussion of the supervenience relation in the philosophical literature of recent years has become Byzantine in its intricacy and diversity. Subtle modulations of the basic concept have been tooled and retooled with increasing frequency, until supervenience has lost nearly all its original lustre as a simple and powerful tool for cracking open refractory philosophical problems. I present a conceptual model of the supervenience relation that captures all the important extant concepts without ignoring the complexities uncovered during work over the past (...)
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  35. Zombies Support Biological Theories of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
     
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  36. Qualia and the Argument From Illusion.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
     
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  37. Multiple Realizability, Qualia, and Natural Kinds.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
    Are qualia natural kinds? In order to give this question slightly more focus, and to show why it might be an interesting question, let me begin by saying a little about what I take qualia to be, and what natural kinds. For the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming a fairly full-blooded kind of phenomenal realism about qualia: qualia, thus, include the qualitative painfulness of pain (rather than merely the functional specification of pain states), the qualitative redness in (...)
     
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  38. The Myth of the Myth of the Given.Andrew R. Bailey - 2004 - Manuscrito 27 (2):321-60.
    Qualia have historically been thought to stand in a very different epistemological relation to the knower than does the external furniture of the world. The ‘raw feels’ of thought were often said to be ‘given’, while what we might call the content of that thought – for example, claims about the external world – was thought only more or less doubtfully true; and this was often said to be because we are ‘directly’ or ‘non-inferentially’ confronted by qualia or experiences, whereas (...)
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  39.  52
    Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Andrew Bailey - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):265-270.
  40. Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.
    RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est (...)
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  41. Beyond the Fringe: William James on the Transitive Parts of the Stream of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):141-53.
    One of the aspects of consciousness deserving of study is what might be called its subjective unity - the way in which, though conscious experience moves from object to object, and can be said to have distinct ‘states', it nevertheless in some sense apparently forms a singular flux divided only by periods of unconsciousness. The work of William James provides a valuable, and rather unique, source of analysis of this feature of consciousness; however, in my opinion, this component of James’ (...)
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  42. Books for Review and for Listing Here Should Be Addressed to Emily Zakin, Review Editor, Department of Philosophy, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056.Gareth B. Matthews New, Andrew R. Bailey, Sarah Buss, Steven M. Cahn, Howard Caygill, David J. Chalmers, John Christman, Michael Clark, David E. Cooper & Simon Critchley - 2002 - Teaching Philosophy 25 (4):403.
  43. Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers.Andrew R. Bailey (ed.) - forthcoming - Continuum.
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  44. Consciousness and the Embodied Self.Andrew R. Bailey - unknown
    This paper deals with the relationship between the embodied cognition paradigm and two sets of its implications: its implications for the ontology of selves, and its implications for the nature and extent of phenomenal consciousness. There has been a recent wave of interest within cognitive science in the paradigm variously called ‘embodied,’ ‘extended,’ ‘situated’ or ‘distributed’ cognition. Although ideas applied in the embodied cognition research program can be traced back to the work of Heidegger, Piaget, Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Dewey, the (...)
     
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  45.  96
    Bonner, Anthony. The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull: A User's Guide. Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesge-Schichte des Mittelalters, 95. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007. Pp. Xx+ 333. Cloth, $150.00. Boros, Gábor, Herman De Dijn, and Martin Moors, Editors. The Concept of Love in 17th and 18th Century Philosophy. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007. Pp. 269. Paper,€ 35.50. Boulnois, Olivier. Au-Delà de l'Image, Une Archéologie du Visual au Moyen Âge, Ve-XVIe Siècle. Paris: Des. [REVIEW]Roger T. Ames, Peter D. Hershock, Andrew R. Bailey, Samantha Brennan, Will Kymlicka, Jacob Levy, Alex Sager & Clark Wolf - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):653-56.
  46. What is It Like to See a Bat? A Critique of Dretske’s Representationalist Theory of Qualia.Andrew Bailey - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 27.
    This paper critiques the representationalist account of qualia, focussing on the Representational Naturalism presented by Fred Dretske in Naturalizing the Mind. After laying out Dretskes theory of qualia and making clear its externalist consequences, I argue that Dretskes definition is either too liberal or runs into problems defending its requirements, in particular naturalness and mentalness. I go on to show that Dretskes account of qualia falls foul of the argument from misperception in such a way that Dretske must either admit (...)
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  47. Representation and a Science of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
    The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving through various choice-points that map out the main peaks in the landscape of philosophical debate about representation. The choice-points considered are: (1) whether representations are conceptual or non-conceptual; (2) given that mental representation is conceptual, whether conscious perceptual representations are analog or digital; (3) given that the content of a representation is the concept it expresses, whether that content is individuated extensionally or intensionally; (4) whether (...)
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  48. Qualia and the Argument From Illusion: A Defence of Figment. [REVIEW]Andrew Bailey - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):85-103.
    This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours and other qualities that ‘fill’ our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the ‘objective’ properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly (...)
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  49.  54
    We Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Rebecca Abraham Fred Adams.Ken Aizawa, Anna Alexandrova, Sophie Allen, Michael Anderson, Holly Anderson, Kristin Andrews, Adam Arico, Andre Ariew, Edward Averill & Andrew R. Bailey - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):859-860.
  50.  53
    Philosophical Psychology Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Kenneth Aizawa.Joshua Alexander, Mark Alicke, Holly Andersen, Michael Anderson, Kristin Andrews, István Aranyosi, Adam Arico, Nomy Arpaly, Robert Audi & Andrew R. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):161-163.
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