People’s concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals’ beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept (Study (...) 1) and by confronting them with a neuroscientific claim that free will is an illusion (Study 2), which invited them to either reconcile or contrast free will with determinism. The results suggest that the core of people’s concept of free will is a choice that fulfills one’s desires and is free from internal or external constraints. No evidence was found for metaphysical assumptions about dualism or indeterminism. (shrink)
Moral judgments about an agent's behavior are enmeshed with inferences about the agent's mind. Folk psychology—the system that enables such inferences—therefore lies at the heart of moral judgment. We examine three related folk-psychological concepts that together shape people's judgments of blame: intentionality, choice, and free will. We discuss people's understanding and use of these concepts, address recent findings that challenge the autonomous role of these concepts in moral judgment, and conclude that choice is the fundamental concept of the three, defining (...) the core of folk psychology in moral judgment. (shrink)
The study of Maximus the Confessor’s thought has flourished in recent years: annual international conferences, publications and articles, new critical editions and translations mark a torrent of interest in the work and influence of perhaps the most sublime of the Byzantine Church Fathers. It has been repeatedly stated that the Confessor’s thought is of eminently philosophical interest, and his work is now often approached from a philosophical perspective. We can witness this tendency both in theological works highlighting the philosophical problems (...) and solutions that Maximus proposes (starting from Hans Urs von Balthasar’s classic monograph Cosmic Liturgy) and in purely philosophical works, written by academic philosophers for a similar audience (e.g., Torstein Tollefsen’s The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor and Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought). However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement with Maximus the Confessor as a Philosopher has taken place—and this volume, together with the colloquium on which it is based, will attempt to start such a discussion. Contributors: Torstein Theodor Tollefsen University of Oslo), Andrew Louth (Durham University), John Panteleimon Manoussakis (College of the Holy Cross, Boston MA), Maximos Constas (College of the Holy Cross, Boston MA), Nicholas Loudovikos (University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki), , Dimitrios A. Vasilakis (King’s College, London), Emma C J Brown (Durham University), Vladimir Cvetkovic (University of Belgrade), Natalie Depraz (Université de Rouen), Nevena Dimitrova (Charles University in Prague), Demetrios Harper (University of Winchester), Michael Harrington (Duquesne University), Miroslav Griško (Ljubljana), Cullan Joyce (MCD University Melbourne), Karolina Kochańczyk – Bonińska (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw), Michail Mantzanas (University Ecclesiastical Academy of Athens), Smilen Markov (St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Tarnovo), Sebastian Mateiescu (University of Bucharest), Sotiris Mitralexis (Freie University Berlin), Jack Pappas (Boston College), Marcin Podbielski (Akademia Ignatianumw Krakowie), Douglas Auld Shepardson (Fordham University), Dionisios Skliris (University Paris IV-Sorbonne), George Steiris (University of Athens), Stoyan Tanev (University of Southern Denmark), Anna Zhyrkova (Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie), Ty Monroe, Jordan Daniel Wood (Boston College), Justin Shaun Coyle (Boston College). (shrink)
The strong weak truth table (sw) reducibility was suggested by Downey, Hirschfeldt, and LaForte as a measure of relative randomness, alternative to the Solovay reducibility. It also occurs naturally in proofs in classical computability theory as well as in the recent work of Soare, Nabutovsky, and Weinberger on applications of computability to differential geometry. We study the sw-degrees of c.e. reals and construct a c.e. real which has no random c.e. real (i.e., Ω number) sw-above it.
We show that in the c.e. weak truth table degrees if b < c then there is an a which contains no hypersimple set and b < a < c. We also show that for every w < c in the c.e. wtt degrees such that w is hypersimple, there is a hypersimple a such that w < a < c. On the other hand, we know that there are intervals which contain no hypersimple set.
Book Symposium on Andrew Feenberg’s Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and Modernity Content Type Journal Article Pages 203-226 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0017-8 Authors Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY 10065, USA David B. Ingram, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626, USA Sally Wyatt, e-Humanities Group, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) & Maastricht University, Cruquiusweg 31, 1019 AT Amsterdam, The Netherlands Yoko Arisaka, Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie (...) Hannover, Gerberstrasse 26, 30169 Hannover, Germany Andrew Feenberg, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University at Harbour Centre, 515 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, BC V6B 5K3, Canada Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433 Journal Volume Volume 24 Journal Issue Volume 24, Number 2. (shrink)
This essay explores Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art” and Andrew Goldsworthy’s artworks. Both Heidegger and Goldsworthy can be seen as refashioning our ontological bearings towards nature through the work of art. After introducing a set of distinctions (e.g., world/earth) in the context of Heidegger’s conception of the artwork as the event of truth, I argue that Heidegger’s releasing of the work of art from metaphysical notions of “the thing” illuminates the ambiguous status of Goldsworthy’s artworks as (...) things. Goldsworthy’s crafting of artworks from natural materials exemplifies Heidegger’s concept of technē as the bringing forth of a work in the midst of phūsis, or beings that arise of their own accord. (shrink)
resumo: O objetivo do artigo é explicitar o projeto de transformação da tecnologia de Andrew Feenberg a partir do conceito de design e da noção de tecnoestética de Gilbert Simondon. Queremos entender qual seria o papel da tecnoestética na transformação do design da tecnologia. O uso das categorias tecnoestéticas, como prazer no uso dos objetos técnicos e a incorporação deste uso ao sentido do eu, pode fornecer um critério para a intervenção democrática na constituição do design dos objetos técnicos? (...) abstract: The article explains Andrew Feenberg’s project of transforming technology through Gilbert Simondon’s concept of design and his notion of the techno-aesthetic. We want to understand what role the techno-aesthetic would play in the transformation of technological design. Can the use of techno-aesthetic categories and the incorporation of this use in the self’s sense provide a criterion for democratic intervention in the constitution of technical objects’ design? (shrink)
A century after its publication, G.E. Moore''sPrincipia Ethica stands as one of theclassic statements of anti-naturalism inethics. Moore claimed that the most basic ethicalproperties were denoted by `good'' and `bad'' andthat all naturalist accounts of thoseproperties were inadequate. His open-questionargument aimed to refute any proposedidentification of good with some naturalproperty, and Moore concluded from theargument that good must be a nonnaturalproperty.The received view is that the open-questionargument is a failure. In this paper,my aim is to breathe some life back intoMoore''s (...) argument. My plan for doing so beginsby presenting the standard interpretation ofthe argument and then showing that there isan alternative to that interpretation. Thealternative is not developed at any length byMoore and stands in need of some elaboration. Isuggest a way of elaborating theargument and then show that the standardcriticisms of Moore fail to undermine thisalternative version of the open-questionargument. (shrink)
The main thrust of my argument was that ad hoc su gge s ti ons of ch a ri ty cannot replace a systematic and theoreti c a lly inform ed approach to poverty rel i ef . Ch a ri t a ble don a ti on som eti m e s h elps—and som etimes harm s — but is no general solution to global poverty, and can be po s i tively dangerous wh en pre s en (...) ted as such. We need to consider, and often choose, other routes to helping the poor—including ethical to u rism and fair trade in lu x u ry goods. We will not be able to invest in such feasible routes if we give away all our extra income, as Singer recommends. Sticking to donation above all, when a combination of other strategies is necessary, is highly likely to harm the poor. Si n ger doe s n’t re a lly en ga ge my argumen t . In s te ad , he cari c a tu res our “f u n d a m ental disa greem en t” :a pp a ren t ly, Si n ger rej ects va ri o u s policies because he takes into account the “f act s” ; wh ereas Ku per is the one seeking a “f a i t h ,” a “po l i tical ph i l o s ophy. . . i m mune to ref ut a ti on on the basis of evi den ce .” Anyon e who has re ad my arti cle (pp. 1 07 - 2 0) must ﬁn d this puzzling. The arti cle explains at len g t h wh i ch kinds of b ack ground theories help us to d i s cern and re s pon s i bly con s i der the rel eva n t f act s . I show that Si n ger sel ects and uses fact s u n c ri ti c a lly prec i s ely because he has no po l i tical econ omy, no po l i tical soc i o l ogy, and no t h eory of ju s ti ce . We are seri o u s ly misled if we do not draw adequ a tely on the wi s dom and.. (shrink)
ResumoEste artigo defende que a teoria da concretização de Gilbert Simondon é útil tanto para os estudos sobre ciência e tecnologia quanto para a teoria política. Por "concretização", Simondon compreende o processo de multiplicação de funções propiciadas pelas estruturas de um dispositivo. Ele oferece o exemplo do motor com resfriamento a ar, que combina resfriamento e contenção em uma única estrutura, a caixa do motor. A concretização contrasta com projetos "abstratos", que acrescentam estruturas para cada função, complicando o dispositivo e (...) reduzindo sua eficiência. De acordo com Simondon, a evolução normal das tecnologias pode ser acompanhada através de suas sucessivas concretizações. O propósito deste artigo é concretizar em um único sistema de referência conceitual as noções funcionalmente distintas de "concretização" em Simondon e de "atores" nos ECT. Essa combinação tem aplicações políticas importantes. Ela mostra como demandas aparentemente contraditórias podem ser reconciliadas através de inovação. Por exemplo, diz-se frequentemente que acrescentar novas funções ambientais a tecnologias existentes implicará na troca da eficiência pela ideologia. Ao invés disso, o novo sistema de referência conceitual abre-nos uma perspectiva de transformação radical da tecnologia requerida pela modernização e sustentabilidade ecológicas. Ao fazer isso, ele sugere um modo de reconstruir a "crítica racional da razão" da Escola de Frankfurt e a noção de "racionalidade tecnológica" de Marcuse.This article argues that Gilbert Simondon's theory of concretization is useful for both science and technology studies and political theory. By "concretization" Simondon means the process of multiplying the functions served by the structures of a device. He gives the example of the air cooled engine which combines cooling and containment in a single structure, the engine case. Concretization contrasts with "abstract" designs that add structures for each function, complicating the device and reducing its efficiency. According to Simondon the normal evolution of technologies can be traced in successive concretizations. The aim of this paper is to concretize in a single conceptual framework the functionally distinct notions of "concretization" in Simondon and "actors" in STS. The combination has important political applications. It shows how apparently contradictory demands can be reconciled through innovation. For example, we are often told that adding new environmental functions to existing technologies will trade off ideology for efficiency. Instead, the new framework opens a perspective on the radical transformation of technology required by ecological modernization and sustainability. In so doing, it suggests a way of reconstructing the Frankfurt School's "rational critique of reason" and Marcuse's notion of "technological rationality". (shrink)
By what steps, historically, did morality emerge? Our remote ancestors evolved into social animals. Sociality requires, among other things, restraints on disruptive sexual, hostile, aggressive, vengeful, and acquisitive behavior. Since we are innately social and not social by convention, we can assume the biological evolution of the emotional equipment – numerous predispositions to want, fear, feel anxious or secure – required for social living, just as we can assume cultural evolution of various means to control antisocial behavior and reinforce the (...) prosocial kind. Small clans consisting, say, of several extended families whose members cooperated in hunting, gathering, defense, and child-rearing could not exist without a combination of innate and social restraints on individual behavior. I shall argue for a naturalistic theory of morality, by which I do not mean the definitional claims G.E. Moore sought to refute, but a broader and more complex theory that maintains that a sufficient understanding of human nature, history, and culture can fully explain morality; that nothing is left hanging. A theory that coherently brings together the needed biological, psychological, and cultural facts I shall call a philosophical anthropology; it is a theory that: 1) takes the good for humans – both an ultimate good and other important goods – to depend on human nature; 2) argues that a rudimentary but improving scientific and philosophical theory of human nature now exists, and thus denies that people are “essenceless”; 3) takes this theory to be evolutionary and historical, making the question “How did morality originate?” pivotal for ethical theory, but leaves open the empirical question of the relative importance of biological and cultural evolution; and 4) takes the origin of the moral ideas to be explainable in terms of human nature and history. (shrink)
_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 70 - 97 In 1946 Heidegger suffered a mental breakdown and received treatment by Dr. Viktor Emil Freiherr von Gebsattel. I explore the themes of health and help in Heidegger’s work before and after his treatment. I begin with Heidegger’s views on health while Rector in 1933–34 and his abandonment of these views by war’s end. A short while later, Heidegger’s breakdown occurs and the treatment under Gebsattel begins. Soon after his treatment, Heidegger (...) lauds what he terms a “broken-down” thinking, and I examine his contribution to a 1958 _Festschrift_ for Gebsattel to better articulate such a thinking. Lastly, I take up Heidegger’s remarks on the role of the medical profession in a technological age from a 1962 speech. In presenting this material, I hope to shed new light on a little known aspect of Heidegger’s career and biography and to situate philosophically his relationship with Dr. Gebsattel. (shrink)
The Anglophone reception of the work of T. W. Adorno has yet to succeed in making him a major part of mainstream philosophical debate. Among the reasons for this are the refusal of too many analytic philosophers to consider alternative approaches to philosophy, and Adorno's writing style, which does not always offer direct points of access for other philosophical traditions. Things are also not helped by the fact that writers on Adorno can tend to adopt some of his mode of (...) writing, on the basis of the claim that Adorno's esoteric style is part of the content of his writing. However, Adorno's lectures on the topics of his major books are actually often remarkably lucid, offering ways of bringing him into almost any... (shrink)