Results for 'Andrew E. Reisner'

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  1. Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
    Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
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  2. A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.
    This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
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  3. Evidentialism and the Numbers Game.Andrew E. Reisner - 2007 - Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
    In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The objection arises from difficulties that evidentialism has with explaining our reasons for belief in unstable belief contexts with a single fixed point. I consider what other kinds of reasons for belief are relevant in such cases.
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  4. Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It is not attractive (...)
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  5. The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
    In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety (...)
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  6.  86
    Not Fittingness, Not Reasons, and Not Value: Against the 'First' Views.Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    [May 11 version] This is part of a book project, The Pragmatic Foundations of Theoretical Reason, in which I explore the claim that both alethic and pragmatic reasons for belief are basic, but that they share a pragmatic foundation in a pluralist theory of wellbeing in which being in a positive epistemic state is a non-derivative component of wellbeing. This chapter argues that all three of fittingness first, reasons first, and value first views are false. It does so by showing (...)
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  7. Normativity: A Unit Of.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwells.
    This entry discusses the notion of a unit of normativity. This notion may be understood in two distinct ways. One way to understand a unit of normativity is as some particular type of assignment of normative status, e.g., a requirement, an ought, a reason, or a permission. A second way to understand a unit of normativity is as a measure of a quantity of normativity, perhaps associated with the numerical assignment given to the strength of reasons. This entry outlines some (...)
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  8. How to Compare Pragmatic and Alethic Reasons for Belief (Ch 2. Of The Pragmatic Foundations of Theoretical Reason).Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    This book develops a view, welfare pluralism, which comprises two theses. One is that there are both irreducibly alethic or epistemic reasons for belief and irreducibly pragmatic (and non-alethic) reasons for belief. The other is that despite this, the source of all normativity is pragmatic in a particular way, i.e. that all reasons are reasons in virtue of their being conducive to wellbeing. The pluralist theory of reasons emerges from the irreducibly plural nature of the components of wellbeing, on of (...)
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  9. From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will.Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):211-224.
    People’s concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals’ beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept (Study (...)
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  10. Who is a Refugee?Andrew E. Shacknove - 1985 - Ethics 95 (2):274-284.
  11.  42
    Bringing Free Will Down to Earth: People’s Psychological Concept of Free Will and its Role in Moral Judgment.Andrew E. Monroe, Kyle D. Dillon & Bertram F. Malle - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:100-108.
  12.  12
    This Isn’T the Free Will Worth Looking For: General Free Will Beliefs Do Not Influence Moral Judgments, Agent-Specific Choice Ascriptions Do.Andrew E. Monroe, Garrett L. Brady & Bertram F. Malle - 2016 - Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (2):191-199.
    According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will beliefs (...)
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  13.  15
    Two Paths to Blame: Intentionality Directs Moral Information Processing Along Two Distinct Tracks.Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 146 (1):123-133.
  14.  59
    A C.E. Real That Cannot Be SW-Computed by Any Ω Number.George Barmpalias & Andrew E. M. Lewis - 2006 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (2):197-209.
    The strong weak truth table (sw) reducibility was suggested by Downey, Hirschfeldt, and LaForte as a measure of relative randomness, alternative to the Solovay reducibility. It also occurs naturally in proofs in classical computability theory as well as in the recent work of Soare, Nabutovsky, and Weinberger on applications of computability to differential geometry. We study the sw-degrees of c.e. reals and construct a c.e. real which has no random c.e. real (i.e., Ω number) sw-above it.
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  15.  5
    Not so Motivated After All? Three Replication Attempts and a Theoretical Challenge to a Morally Motivated Belief in Free Will.Andrew E. Monroe & Dominic W. Ysidron - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 150 (1):e1-e12.
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  16.  95
    At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.
    Moral judgments about an agent's behavior are enmeshed with inferences about the agent's mind. Folk psychology—the system that enables such inferences—therefore lies at the heart of moral judgment. We examine three related folk-psychological concepts that together shape people's judgments of blame: intentionality, choice, and free will. We discuss people's understanding and use of these concepts, address recent findings that challenge the autonomous role of these concepts in moral judgment, and conclude that choice is the fundamental concept of the three, defining (...)
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  17. Free Will Evolved for Morality and Culture.Andrew E. Monroe, Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister - 2016 - In Arthur G. Miller (ed.), The Social Psychology of Good and Evil. Guilford Publications.
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  18. The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin.Andrew E. Benjamin (ed.) - 1991 - Routledge.
  19. Style and Time: Essays on the Politics of Appearance.Andrew E. Benjamin - 2006 - Northwestern University Press.
  20.  86
    Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail).Andrew E. Newman - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169.
    Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or (...)
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  21.  64
    Architectural Philosophy: Repetition, Function, Alterity.Andrew E. Benjamin - 2000 - Athlone Press.
    Architectural Philosophy is the first book to outline a philosophical account of architecture and to establish the singularity of architectural practice and ...
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  22.  88
    Walter Benjamin and the Architecture of Modernity.Andrew E. Benjamin & Charles Rice (eds.) - 2009 - Re.Press.
    Walter Benjamin's Politics of 'bad tasteMichael Mac Modernity as an unfinished Project: Benjamin and Political RomanticismRobert Sinnerbrink Violence, ...
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  23.  16
    Randomness, Lowness and Degrees.George Barmpalias, Andrew E. M. Lewis & Mariya Soskova - 2008 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 73 (2):559 - 577.
    We say that A ≤LR B if every B-random number is A-random. Intuitively this means that if oracle A can identify some patterns on some real γ. In other words. B is at least as good as A for this purpose. We study the structure of the LR degrees globally and locally (i.e., restricted to the computably enumberable degrees) and their relationship with the Turing degrees. Among other results we show that whenever α in not GL₂ the LR degree of (...)
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  24. What is History? Lects., Tr. By E.A. Andrews.Karl Gotthart Lamprecht & E. A. Andrews - 1905
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  25. Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
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  26.  43
    The Importance of Π1 0 Classes in Effective Randomness.George Barmpalias, Andrew E. M. Lewis & Keng Meng Ng - 2010 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 75 (1):387-400.
    We prove a number of results in effective randomness, using methods in which Π⁰₁ classes play an essential role. The results proved include the fact that every PA Turing degree is the join of two random Turing degrees, and the existence of a minimal pair of LR degrees below the LR degree of the halting problem.
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  27.  10
    Diagonally Non-Computable Functions and Bi-Immunity.Carl G. Jockusch & Andrew E. M. Lewis - 2013 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 78 (3):977-988.
  28. Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This is a discussion of the state of discussion on pragmatic reasons for belief.
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  29.  4
    The ibT Degrees of Computably Enumerable Sets Are Not Dense.George Barmpalias & Andrew E. M. Lewis - 2006 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 141 (1-2):51-60.
    We show that the identity bounded Turing degrees of computably enumerable sets are not dense.
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  30.  23
    Π 1 0 Classes, L R Degrees and Turing Degrees.George Barmpalias, Andrew E. M. Lewis & Frank Stephan - 2008 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 156 (1):21-38.
    We say that A≤LRB if every B-random set is A-random with respect to Martin–Löf randomness. We study this relation and its interactions with Turing reducibility, classes, hyperimmunity and other recursion theoretic notions.
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  31.  17
    William James and the Metaphysics of Experience (Book).Paul Jerome Croce & Andrew E. Spinnenweber - 2002 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):641-643.
    Reviews the book 'William James and the Metaphysics of Experience,' by David C. Lamberth.
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  32.  54
    Health of Organisms and Health of Persons: An Embedded Instrumentalist Approach.Kenneth A. Richman & Andrew E. Budson - 2000 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (4):339-354.
    In a time when we as a society are in the process of deciding what our basic rights to health care are, it is critically important for us to have a full and complete understanding of what constitutes health. We argue for an analysis of health according to which certain states are healthy not in themselves but because they allow an individual to reach actual goals. Recognizing that the goals of an individual considered from the point of view of biology (...)
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  33. Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
    In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
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  34. Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
    This paper argues that both a limited doxastic voluntarism and anti-evidentialism are consistent with the views that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that this aim plays an important role in norm-setting for beliefs. More cautiously, it argues that limited doxastic voluntarism is (or would be) a useful capacity for agents concerned with truth tracking to possess, and that having it would confer some straightforward benefits of both an epistemic and non-epistemic variety to an agent concerned with (...)
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  35. Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?Andrew Reisner - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):436-462.
    In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.
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  36. Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    An important advance in normativity research over the last decade is an increased understanding of the distinction, and difference, between normativity and rationality. Normativity concerns or picks out a broad set of concepts that have in common that they are, put loosely, guiding. For example, consider two commonly used normative concepts: that of a normative reason and that of ought. To have a normative reason to perform some action is for there to be something that counts in favour of performing (...)
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  37.  20
    Properly Σ2 Minimal Degrees and 0″ Complementation.S. Barry Cooper, Andrew E. M. Lewis & Yue Yang - 2005 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 51 (3):274-276.
    We show that there exists a properly Σ2 minimal degree b, and moreover that b can be chosen to join with 0′ to 0″ – so that b is a 0″ complement for every degree a such that 0′ ≤ a < 0″.
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  38. Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest (...)
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  39. Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
    This paper looks at the question of what form the requirements of practical rationality take. One common view is that the requirements of rationality are wide-scope, and another is that they are narrow-scope. I argue that the resolution to the question of wide-scope versus narrow-scope depends to a significant degree on what one expects a theory of rationality to do. In examining these expectations, I consider whether there might be a way to unify requirements of both forms into a single (...)
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  40. Photographic Theory: An Historical Anthology.Andrew E. Hershberger - 2014 - Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  41. Malachi.Andrew E. Hill - 1998
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  42.  45
    The Hypersimple-Free C.E. WTT Degrees Are Dense in the C.E. WTT Degrees.George Barmpalias & Andrew E. M. Lewis - 2006 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (3):361-370.
    We show that in the c.e. weak truth table degrees if b < c then there is an a which contains no hypersimple set and b < a < c. We also show that for every w < c in the c.e. wtt degrees such that w is hypersimple, there is a hypersimple a such that w < a < c. On the other hand, we know that there are intervals which contain no hypersimple set.
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  43.  22
    A ten-Year Follow-Up of a Study of Memory for the Attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb Memories and Memories for Flashbulb Events. [REVIEW]William Hirst, Elizabeth A. Phelps, Robert Meksin, Chandan J. Vaidya, Marcia K. Johnson, Karen J. Mitchell, Randy L. Buckner, Andrew E. Budson, John D. E. Gabrieli, Cindy Lustig, Mara Mather, Kevin N. Ochsner, Daniel Schacter, Jon S. Simons, Keith B. Lyle, Alexandru F. Cuc & Andreas Olsson - 2015 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144 (3):604-623.
  44.  8
    Andrew E. Larsen, The School of Heretics: Academic Condemnation at the University of Oxford, 1277–1409. (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 40.) Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pp. Xii, 323. $166. ISBN: 9789004206618. [REVIEW]Jennifer Illig - 2013 - Speculum 88 (3):821-823.
  45.  6
    Social Work with Older Adults in the United States.Andrew E. Scharlach - 2015 - Arbor 191 (771):a207.
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  46. The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views of Mental Content.Andrew E. Newman - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.
    Recent philosophy of psychology has seen the rise of so-called "dual-component" and "two-dimensional" theories of mental content as what I call a "Middle Way" between internalism (the view that contents of states like belief are "narrow") and externalism (the view that by and large, such contents are "wide"). On these Middle Way views, mental states are supposed to have two kinds of content: the "folk-psychological" kind, which we ordinarily talk about and which is wide; and some non-folk-psychological kind which is (...)
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    Lamberth, David C. William James and the Metaphysics of Experience.Andrew E. Spinnenweber - 2002 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):641-643.
  48. Complexity: Architecture, Art, Philosophy.Andrew E. Benjamin (ed.) - 1995 - Distributed to the Trade in the United States of America by National Book Network.
    JPVA Journal of Philosophy and the Visual Arts No 6 Complexity Architecture / Art / Philosophy 'Beginning with complexity will involve working with the recognition that there has always been more than one. Here however this insistent "more than one" will be positioned beyond the scope of semantics; rather than complexity occurring within the range of meaning and taking the form of a generalised polysemy, it will be linked to the nature of the object and to its production. Complexity, therefore, (...)
     
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  49.  19
    The Role of “Action-at-a-Distance” in the Electro-Magnetic Field Radiation Produced by an Accelerated Charge.Andrew E. Chubykalo & Escuela de Física - 1997 - Apeiron 4 (2-3):39.
  50. Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press.
    This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.
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