14 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Andrew Eshleman [15]Andrew S. Eshleman [4]
  1. Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  2. Can an Atheist Believe in God?Andrew S. Eshleman - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (2):183 - 199.
    Some have proposed that it is reasonable for an atheist to pursue a form of life shaped by engagement with theistic religious language and practice, once language and belief in God are interpreted in the appropriate non-realist manner. My aim is to defend this proposal in the face of several objections that have been raised against it. First, I engage in some conceptual spadework to distinguish more clearly some varieties of religious non-realism. Then, in response to two central objections, I (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  3. (1 other version)Religious fictionalism defended: Reply to Cordry.Andrew Eshleman - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):91-96.
    In his paper, 'A critique of religious fictionalism', Benjamin Cordry raises a series of objections to a fictionalist form of religious non-realism that I proposed in my earlier paper, 'Can an atheist believe in God?'. They fall into two main categories: those alleging that an atheist would be unjustified in adopting fictionalism, and those alleging that fictionalism could not be successfully implemented, or practised communally. I argue that these objections can be met.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  4. Worthy of Praise: Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency.Andrew Eshleman & Andrew S. Eshleman - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 2:216-241.
    Much recent work on moral responsibility has focused on responsibility as accountability—a type of responsibility associated with the blame-oriented reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. The preoccupation with this admittedly important form of responsibility fosters a truncated portrait of our moral lives by largely ignoring responsibility for actions that merit praise and emulation. Through an examination of what is presupposed in the attitudes of gratitude and esteem, this essay argues that praiseworthiness is not best understood as the mirror image (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5.  80
    The afterlife: beyond belief.Andrew Eshleman - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):163-183.
    When a Christian refers to the future full realization of the kingdom of God in an afterlife, it is typically assumed that she is expressing beliefs about the existence and activity of God in conjunction with supernatural beliefs about an otherworldly realm and the possibility of one’s personal survival after bodily death. In other words, the religious language is interpreted in a realist fashion and the religious person here is construed as a religious believer. A corollary of this widely-held realist (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Alternative possibilities and the free will defence.Andrew Eshleman - 1997 - Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.
    The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes free (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7.  36
    A moral freedom to which we might aspire.Andrew Eshleman - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):1-20.
    Reflection on free agency has largely been motivated by perceived threats to its very existence, which, in turn, has driven the philosophical conversation to focus on the question of whether we have the freedom required for moral responsibility. The Stoics were early participants in this conversation, but they were also concerned about an ideal of inner moral freedom, a freedom over and above that required for responsibility, and one to which we might aspire over the course of our lives. Though (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  90
    Responsibility for Character.Andrew Eshleman - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):65-94.
    In this work I argue that an agent assumes responsibility for her traits of character by making them her own during the process of their formation. One makes a character trait one's own by identifying oneself with its constitutive desires, or in the case of a particular kind of vice, by failing to identify oneself with desires to act in the corresponding virtuous manner. Unlike the view traditionally attributed to Aristotle, this view does not require that an agent be the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Reflection and Ideal Reasons-Responsiveness in advance.Andrew Eshleman - forthcoming - Midwest Studies in Philosophy.
    Reasons-responsiveness theorists often employ examples suggesting that agents paradigmatically exercise the responsiveness required for moral responsibility through reflective deliberation and conscious choice. However, given the fact that unreflective agency can be suitably responsive to reasons, we need an explanation for why reflection is a distinctive mark of being a responsible agent and why cases involving reflection might be regarded as paradigmatic instances of responsible agency. Here, I discuss recent attempts to meet this explanatory burden—in particular, the claim that while not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  22
    Responsibility and moral bricolage.Andrew S. Eshleman - 2013 - Dissertatio 38:157-179.
    Na longa disputa sobre o tipo de liberdade requerida para a responsabilidade, os participantes tenderam a assumir que estavam concernidos com um conceito de responsabilidade moral compartilhado. Esta assunção foi questionada recentemente. Uma visível divisão entre ‘Lumpers’ e ‘Splitters’ surgiu. Os Lumpers defendem a suposição tradicional que há um conceito unificado de responsabilidade, enquanto os Splitters sustentam que há dois ou mais conceitos de responsabilidade moral. Aqui, eu ofereço um argumento em nome dos Splitters que conecta um tipo de pluralismo (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  42
    Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West.Andrew Eshleman (ed.) - 2008 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Through a diverse collection of carefully chosen selections, _Readings in Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West_ offers an enlightening array of perspectives on Western and non-Western religious thought that makes more meaningful trans-cultural connections possible within philosophy of religion. Includes a substantial selection of non-Western religious perspectives that are accessible to both students and instructors Provides further clarity with comprehensive chapter introductions to orient reader to upcoming selections Incorporates discussion of topics often neglected, such as religious non-realism, post-modernism, and feminist (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  24
    Book Reviews:Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. [REVIEW]Andrew Eshleman - 2000 - Ethics 111 (1):167-170.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  42
    Arguing for Atheism. [REVIEW]Andrew Eshleman - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):272-276.
  14.  12
    (1 other version)God and Realism. [REVIEW]Andrew Eshleman - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (3):347-352.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark