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Andrew Howat [7]Andrew W. Howat [5]Andrew William Howat [1]
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Profile: Andrew Howat (California State University, Fullerton, University of Sheffield)
  1.  28
    Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
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  2. Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence.Andrew Howat - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):231-253.
    Mark Johnston claims the pragmatist theory of truth is inconsistent with the way we actually employ and talk about that concept. He is, however, sympathetic enough to attempt to rescue its respectable core using ‘response-dependence’, a revisionary form of which he advocates as a method for clarifying various philosophically significant concepts. But Johnston has misrepresented pragmatism; it does not require rescuing, and as I show here, his ‘missing explanation argument’ against pragmatism therefore fails. What Johnston and other critics including Putnam (...)
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  3.  16
    Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (4):419-443.
    pragmatic clarifications of concepts and propositions are best seen as accounts of the commitments we incur when we assert or judge the proposition in question.For those unfamiliar with the distinctive character and methodology of Peirce’s philosophy, it typically appears as though Peirce identifies truth with a particular epistemic property.4 On this interpretation, Peircean Truth is the view that a true proposition is one that would, at least under certain conditions, generate convergence of opinion among rational inquirers, or something along these (...)
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  4.  57
    Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
  5.  9
    Constituting Assertion: A Pragmatist Critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' (...)
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  6.  30
    Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists.Andrew W. Howat - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
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  7.  27
    Peirce on Grounding the Laws of Logic.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (4):480-500,.
    Instead of merely jeering at metaphysics … the pragmaticist extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give life and light to cosmology and physics.Nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable [hereafter, Peirce’s Rule].In his paper “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic”, Peirce attempts to explain the validity of the syllogism :What could it possibly mean to explain the validity of a pattern of inference such as this one?2 Or more generally—what sort of explanations can (...)
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  8.  18
    Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.
    Peircean Truth is the view that truth is in some sense epistemically constrained, constrained that is by what we would, if we inquired long enough and well enough, eventually come to believe. Contemporary Peirceans offer various different formulations of the view, which can make it difficult, particularly for critics, to see exactly how PT differs from popular alternatives such as correspondence theories or deflationism. This article, therefore, considers four possible formulations of PT, and sets out the different objections and challenges (...)
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  9.  1
    David S. Clarke, Some Pragmatist Themes. [REVIEW]Andrew Howat - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):143-149.
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  10.  32
    Review: David L. Hildebrand. Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003. [REVIEW]Andrew W. Howat - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
  11.  7
    Some Pragmatist Themes (Review).Andrew Howat - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):143-149.
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  12.  17
    Some Pragmatist Themes By David S. Clarke.Andrew Howat - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):143-149.
  13.  18
    Review: Some Pragmatist Themes. [REVIEW]Andrew Howat - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):143-149.
    David S. Clarke is clearly passionate about pragmatism. In this short, compelling book he explores what he calls "two fundamental claims" of pragmatism. He does this, he explains, with the "conviction that if pragmatism is to continue as a viable force in contemporary philosophy it must incorporate advances in philosophical method introduced by the linguistic philosophers of the past century" (xi). The two fundamental claims that interest Clarke are as follows: that cognitive inquiry and belief are to be understood in (...)
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