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Andrew Howat [5]Andrew W. Howat [3]Andrew William Howat [1]
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Andrew Howat
California State University, Fullerton
  1.  52
    Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
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  2.  49
    Misak's Peirce and Pragmatism's Metaphysical Commitments.Andrew Howat - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (3):378.
    In this comment on Misak’s Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak’s ‘truth-affirming,’ Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak’s Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her ‘analytic pragmatism’ thus far offers few clues about how we should defend such a commitment from skeptical arguments emerging from (...)
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  3. Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence.Andrew Howat - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):231-253.
    Mark Johnston claims the pragmatist theory of truth is inconsistent with the way we actually employ and talk about that concept. He is, however, sympathetic enough to attempt to rescue its respectable core using ‘response-dependence’, a revisionary form of which he advocates as a method for clarifying various philosophically significant concepts. But Johnston has misrepresented pragmatism; it does not require rescuing, and as I show here, his ‘missing explanation argument’ against pragmatism therefore fails. What Johnston and other critics including Putnam (...)
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  4.  27
    Constituting Assertion: A Pragmatist Critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' (...)
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  5.  80
    David L. Hildebrand, Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. [REVIEW]Andrew W. Howat - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
  6.  70
    David S. Clarke, Some Pragmatist Themes. [REVIEW]Andrew Howat - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):143-149.
    David S. Clarke is clearly passionate about pragmatism. In this short, compelling book he explores what he calls “two fundamental claims” of pragmatism. He does this, he explains, with the “conviction that if pragmatism is to continue as a viable force in contemporary philosophy it must incorporate advances in philosophical method introduced by the linguistic philosophers of the past century” (xi). -/- The two fundamental claims that interest Clarke are as follows: -/- that cognitive inquiry and belief are to be (...)
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  7.  34
    Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.
    Peircean Truth is the view that truth is in some sense epistemically constrained, constrained that is by what we would, if we inquired long enough and well enough, eventually come to believe. Contemporary Peirceans offer various different formulations of the view, which can make it difficult, particularly for critics, to see exactly how PT differs from popular alternatives such as correspondence theories or deflationism. This article, therefore, considers four possible formulations of PT, and sets out the different objections and challenges (...)
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  8.  76
    Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
    This paper explores a distinction between two types of response- dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker (...)
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  9.  25
    Review: Some Pragmatist Themes. [REVIEW]Andrew Howat - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (1):143-149.
    David S. Clarke is clearly passionate about pragmatism. In this short, compelling book he explores what he calls "two fundamental claims" of pragmatism. He does this, he explains, with the "conviction that if pragmatism is to continue as a viable force in contemporary philosophy it must incorporate advances in philosophical method introduced by the linguistic philosophers of the past century" (xi). The two fundamental claims that interest Clarke are as follows: that cognitive inquiry and belief are to be understood in (...)
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