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Andrew Forcehimes
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
  1.  42
    Belief and the Error Theory.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Robert B. Talisse - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):849-856.
    A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.
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  2. Download This Essay: A Defence of Stealing Ebooks.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2013 - Think 12 (34):109-115.
    ExtractPhilosophers write essays. Nowadays most of them are highly technical and argumentative. They have titles like ‘A Rejoinder to So and So’ or ‘A Critique of Such and Such’. This is somewhat understandable. Like others in my field, as a philosopher, my work is predicated on having interlocutors – all of whom, with a few exceptions, I have never met. This is the beauty of the written word combined with public libraries. Because of printing I can engage the ideas of (...)
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  3.  25
    Beneficence: Does Agglomeration Matter?Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2019 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (1):17-33.
    When it comes to the duty of beneficence, a formidable class of moderate positions holds that morally significant considerations emerge when one's actions are seen as part of a larger series. Agglomeration, according to these moderates, limits the demands of beneficence, thereby avoiding the extremely demanding view forcefully defended by Peter Singer. This idea has much appeal. What morality can demand of people is, it seems, appropriately modulated by how much they have already done or will do. Here we examine (...)
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  4.  36
    Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):699-717.
    A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.
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  5.  4
    The Difference We Make.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-7.
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  6.  61
    A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism.Andrew T. Forcehimes - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non-analytic reductions of the normative. Nevertheless, non-analytic naturalists face a damning dilemma: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus, reasonhood. Since, for example, a desire-based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. Yet, if the desire-based account of (...)
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  7.  53
    Clarifying Cohen: A Response to Jubb and Hall.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Robert B. Talisse - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (4):371-379.
    In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.
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  8.  2
    Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2).
    One vexing question for Desire Satisfactionism is this: At what time do you benefit from a satisfied desire? Recently Eden Lin has proposed an intriguing answer. On this proposal – Asymmetrism – when past-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the desire; and, when future-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the object. In this essay, I argue that Asymmetrism forces us to give implausible (...)
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  9. From Town-Halls to Wikis: Exploring Wikipedia's Implications for Deliberative Democracy.Nathaniel J. Klemp & Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2010 - Journal of Public Deliberation 6 (2).
    This essay examines the implications Wikipedia holds for theories of deliberative democracy. It argues that while similar in some respects, the mode of interaction within Wikipedia represents a distinctive form of “collaborative editing” that departs from many of the qualities traditionally associated with face-to-face deliberation. This online mode of interaction overcomes many of the problems that distort face-to-face deliberations. By mitigating problems that arise in deliberative practice, such as “group polarization” and “hidden profiles,” the wiki model often realizes the epistemic (...)
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  10.  11
    Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy?J. Caleb Clanton & Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):165-183.
    There is a tension between Robert Talisse's rejection of Deweyan democracy and his project of formulating a workable Peircean conception of democracy. If he follows Rawls in taking reasonable pluralism to be a permanent condition, then his Peircean conception of democracy is undermined. But, if he does not commit to the permanence of reasonable pluralism, then his rejection of Deweyan democracy is problematic. Since he chooses the latter interpretation, Talisse must bite the bullet and recognize that Peircean epistemic perfectionists cannot (...)
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  11.  18
    Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):46-56.
    ABSTRACTAgent-relative consequentialism is thought attractive because it can secure agent-centred constraints while retaining consequentialism's compelling idea—the idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available outcome. We argue, however, that the commitments of agent-relative consequentialism lead it to run afoul of a plausibility requirement on moral theories. A moral theory must not be such that, in any possible circumstance, were every agent to act impermissibly, each would have more reason to prefer the world thereby actualized over the (...)
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  12.  55
    Putting Reasons First: A Defense of Normative Non-Naturalism.Andrew T. Forcehimes - unknown
    Against non-analytic naturalism and quietist realism, I defend a robust form of non-naturalism. The argument proceeds as follows: In the face of extensional underdetermination, quietist realism cannot non-question-beggingly respond to alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are. They face what we might call the reasons appropriation problem. In light of this problem, quietists ought to abandon their view in favor of robust realism. By permitting substantive metaphysical claims we can then argue, based on (...)
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  13.  19
    Well-Being: Reality's Role.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (3):456-68.
    A familiar objection to mental state theories of well-being proceeds as follows: Describe a good life. Contrast it with one identical in mental respects, but lacking a connection to reality. Then observe that mental state theories of well-being implausibly hold both lives in equal esteem. Conclude that such views are false. Here we argue this objection fails. There are two ways reality may be thought to matter for well-being. We want to contribute to reality, and we want our experience of (...)
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  14.  32
    On L. W. Sumner’s “Normative Ethics and Metaethics”.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1142-1144.
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  15.  9
    Actualism Doesn’T Have Control Issues: A Reply to Cohen and Timmerman.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):271-277.
    Recently, Cohen and Timmerman, 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism.
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  16.  27
    Expectations and the Limits of Legal Validity.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):263-278.
    Drawing on the work of Jeremy Bentham, we can forward a parity thesis concerning formal and substantive legal invalidity. Formal and substantive invalidity are, according to this thesis, traceable to the same source, namely, the sovereign's inability to adjust expectations to motivate obedience. The parity thesis, if defensible, has great appeal for positivists. Explaining why contradictory or contrary mandates yield invalidity is unproblematic. But providing an account of content-based invalidity invites the collapse of the separation between what the law is (...)
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  17.  18
    Luck Libertarianism? A Critique of Tan’s Institutional View.Andrew T. Forcehimes & Robert B. Talisse - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):187-196.
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  18.  20
    From Epistemic Democracy to Epistemic Multiculturalism.J. Caleb Clanton & Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):175-184.
  19.  11
    Leviathans Restrained: International Politics for Artificial Persons.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2015 - Hobbes Studies 28 (2):149-174.
    _ Source: _Volume 28, Issue 2, pp 149 - 174 This essay challenges the _analogy argument_. The analogy argument aims to show that the international domain satisfies the conditions of a Hobbesian state of nature: There fails to be a super-sovereign to keep all in awe, and hence, like persons in the state of nature, sovereigns are in a war every sovereign against every sovereign. By turning to Hobbes’ account of authorization, however, we see that subjects are under no obligation (...)
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  20.  17
    David Kaspar: Intuitionism. [REVIEW]Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1093-1094.
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  21.  6
    A Peircean Epistemic Argument for a Modest Multiculturalism.J. Caleb Clanton & Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2011 - Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (2):163-185.
    Extending recent appropriations of Charles S. Peirce's work in political theory, we argue that the same epistemic norms that justify democracy offer a plausible basis for justifying multiculturalist policies aimed at protecting at-risk cultural groups. Because this epistemic argument is compatible with a full range of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, it fully accommodates the fact of reasonable pluralism, thereby skirting the Rawlsian objection to which the multiculturalisms of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka fall prey.
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