Originally published in 1941. Professor Ushenko treats of current problems in technical Logic, involving Symbolic Logic to a marked extent. He deprecates the tendency, in influential quarters, to regard Logic as a branch of Mathematics and advances the intuitionalist theory of Logic. This involves criticism of Carnap, Russell, Wittgenstein, Broad and Whitehead, with additional discussions on Kant and Hegel. The author believes that the union of Philosophy and Logic is a natural one, and that an exclusively mathematical treatment cannot give (...) an adequate account of Logic. A fundamental characteristic of Logic is comprehensiveness, which brings out the affinity between logic and philosophy, for to be comprehensive is the aim of philosophical ambition. (shrink)

This comment piece examines the distinction between negation of a statement and denial of its truth, in the context of an early examination of Quine's related views. Where P is "Jones is ill," the author maintains, in contrast to Quine, that the negation of P is "Jones is ill" is false.

2. An explicit sense datum appears enframed within the present at a definite place. By contrast a tendency is to be described as an agency that bears upon something other than itself. It tends toward something. Accordingly, power is distinguished not only by its magnitude or intensity but also by directedness. And, since directedness takes the form of cross-references within the field of tension, power is a factor of integration.

Originally published in 1941. Professor Ushenko treats of current problems in technical Logic, involving Symbolic Logic to a marked extent. He deprecates the tendency, in influential quarters, to regard Logic as a branch of Mathematics and advances the intuitionalist theory of Logic. This involves criticism of Carnap, Russell, Wittgenstein, Broad and Whitehead, with additional discussions on Kant and Hegel. The author believes that the union of Philosophy and Logic is a natural one, and that an exclusively mathematical treatment cannot give (...) an adequate account of Logic. A fundamental characteristic of Logic is comprehensiveness, which brings out the affinity between logic and philosophy, for to be comprehensive is the aim of philosophical ambition. (shrink)

The premise of functional meaning is to the effect that the appropriate use of words--the employment of words in accordance with the standard usage--discloses their meaning. In its extreme or radical version the premise is a downright identification of a meaning with an act, or acts, of using words, i.e., with actual occurrences. Since actual occurrences are particulars, this extreme form would appeal to a nominalist who wants to eschew universals, especially in a concern with meaning. But the radical premise (...) is incompatible with the second premise of a dispositional semantics. For the second premise is intended to do justice to the fact that the same word may take care of endless variations of its meaning or, at any rate, of a number which is not limited to particular variations that occur with the act, or acts, of using the word. Accordingly, a dispositional semantics requires a moderate version of the premise of functional meaning. (shrink)

I have admitted different kinds of power but the admission does not make it objectionable--in spite of Dr. Beardsley's point and Mr. Grünbaum's opening statement--to use the same word in order to indicate that all these kinds are under the same category--Mr. Williams' rejection of the category notwithstanding--of latent but directed tendencies or dispositions. Let my critics envisage power by analogy with, and including, the physical vector of force. i.e. as something which we represent by an arrow, to induce them (...) to reconsider Dr. Beardsley's point and to concede that the Gestalt forces of cohesion and personal dispositions belong to the category under consideration since both are directed agencies. The directedness of power--let me add with reference to Mr. Feigl's point and to one of Mr. Krikorian's questions --enables me to account for the so-called teleological situations without assuming a metaphysics of teleology. In particular, I can mention a "feed-back" mechanism in order to give an example of the transformation of directed into directing, or controlling, power. (shrink)