Movies can serve valuable didactic purposes teaching clinical ethics to medical students. However, using film sequences as means to develop critical thinking is not a straightforward task. There is a significant gap in the literature regarding how to analyse the ethical content embedded in these clips systematically, in a way that facilitates the students’ transition from anecdotal reflections to abstract thinking. This article offers a pedagogical proposal to approach the ethical analysis of film sequences in a systematic fashion. This structured (...) stepwise method encourages students to identify the main ethical problem of a selected scene and to reflect on the theoretical principles involved, emphasizing the application of these norms and values in a contextually situated analysis. We believe this method in film studies both reinforces the students’ comprehension of the theoretical framework of an ethical topic, and casts light on its pertinence and limitations under the circumstances of the scene, thus proving a constructive tool to strengthen the bridge between the theoretical teaching of clinical ethics and clinical practice. (shrink)

(2001). Reflexive governance and indigenous self‐rule: Lessons in associative democracy? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 4, Associative Democracy: The Real Third Way, pp. 157-186.

RESUMO Neste texto argumento que a filosofia moral de Hume tem uma base realista num sentido específico. Os sentimentos "peculiares" da moralidade, as formas morais de dor e prazer na contemplação das ações, sentimentos e caracteres dos outros, estão assentados sobre uma base pertencente à nossa sensibilidade que envolve o fato bruto da realidade da dor e do prazer. Argumento que a ênfase de Hume na "praticalidade" da moral não está a serviço prioritariamente de um projeto filosófico de explicação do (...) fenômeno moral, mas remete ao fundamento realista da moralidade em sentimentos humanos: "coisas" sentidas por seres humanos a respeito de outros seres humanos. Embora com implicações para a discussão tradicional sobre a ontologia moral de Hume, minha análise procura mostrar que o fundamento encontrado responde, de acordo com a orientação empirista em filosofia, a uma pergunta anterior sobre o que é real quando estão em jogo os interesses práticos de nossas vidas, por oposição aos teóricos. ABSTRACT I argue that Hume's moral philosophy is, basically, realist in that the "peculiar" sentiments constituting morality, the moral forms of pain and pleasure in the contemplation of actions, sentiments and characters are based on our sensibility as it reveals the brute realities of pain and pleasure. I argue that the place of pride Hume gives to the "practicality" of morals is not primarily in the service of the explanation of the moral phenomenon, it concerns rather the realist grounding of morality in the human sentiments: what we feel in regard to other human beings. In spite of the implications to the traditional discussion about Hume's morals ontology, my analysis aims to show that such a grounding answers, in tandem with the empiricist commitments of Hume's philosophy, the previous question about what is real when what concerns us are the practical interests of our lives, not merely the theoretical ones. (shrink)

If there is no inner model with ω many strong cardinals, then there is a set forcing extension of the universe with a projective well-ordering of the reals.

DRACO.WOLFANDDOTCOM.INFO is an interactive proto-videogame installation that immerses users, personified as abstract dragons in a cathartic, stochastic, full-body immersive videogame experience, in cyberspace. The work attempts to playfully shift user consciousness towards non-human embodiment, by real-time 3D meshing the data from the human body into a mirrored abstract, ill-defined dragonic 3D shape. It gifts humans with special virtual powers, such as flying and cusping fireballs, as they fight for their progression in the game-space and facing annihilation, through invisible, interactional (...) camera-based technologies which will be exposed in this paper. Inside the piece’s virtual world, users play as endangered dragons in the XXIst century populated by companies, websites and humanoids eager to stop the mythological beasts. The dragons progress in the game-space by inflicting damage upon the city’s landscape. The stochastic game-space ascends in difficulty as the levels progress, slowly changing the joystick’s response into faster speeds and generating larger city-scapes, inducing the game’s ultimate goal of a cathartic ilinxian state of disruption and otherness in human perception. (shrink)

If the bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA holds and ω 1 = ${\mathrm{\omega }}_{1}^{\mathrm{L}}$ , then there is a lightface ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{1}$ well-ordering of the reals. The argument combines a well-ordering due to Caicedo-Veličković with an absoluteness result for models of MA in the spirit of "David's trick." We also present a general coding scheme that allows us to show that BPFA is equiconsistent with R being lightface ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{4}^{1}$ , for many "consistently locally certified" relations R on $\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}$ . (...) This is accomplished through a use of David's trick and a coding through the ∑ 2 stable ordinals of L. (shrink)

The initial goal of the present paper is to reveal a mistake committed by Hintikka in a recent paper on the foundations of mathematics. His claim that independence-friendly logic is the real logic of mathematics is supported in that article by an argument relying on uniformity concepts taken from real analysis. I show that the central point of his argument is a simple logical mistake. Second and more generally, I conclude, based on the previous remarks and on another (...) standard fact of IFL, that first-order logic can adequately express uniformity concepts in real analysis, whereas IFL cannot. This not only radically contradicts Hintikka’s particular claim in that article, but also undermines his whole enterprise of founding mathematics on his logic system. (shrink)

As a Franciscan friar, student, teacher, philosopher, theologian, and political theorist, William of Ockham was and remains one of the most stimulating thinkers of the Middle Ages. The one consistent characteristic of his professional output—both as a student and later as an opponent of papal authoritarianism—was the provocative nature of his ideas. In required commentaries on standard theological texts as well as in his later, more independently inspired treatises, Ockham demonstrated a genuine talent for suggesting and sustaining a number of (...) original, unorthodox and, occasionally, even outrageous ideas. Accordingly, Ockham holds the distinction of being the most rejected but influential philosopher-theologian of the fourteenth century, an observation that applies to his views on causality in which, for example, Ockham held the principle of action at a distance in order to save the causal account of some phenomena. One of the more interesting distinctions that he made, however, occurs in his treatment of sacramental theology as part of his account of God's causal activity with respect to the sacraments. (shrink)

This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality. Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states, and modes of character development that performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation. I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s uses of moral terms. However, these methods at best reveal a nominal definition of morality, since moral (...) appraisers may be ignorant about the referents of their moral terms. I propose a real definition of morality that characterizes moral systems as a natural kind—more precisely, a copied kind. I explain what it takes for a moral system to satisfy this definition, and I identify the sorts of evidence needed to distinguish moral systems from value systems of other kinds. (shrink)

Resumen Todos los sacramentos son celebraciones de la iglesia, de la comunidad de creyentes que acoge y se transforma ante la presencia salvadora de Dios. En este contexto, la eucaristía ocupa un lugar especial, preeminente y peculiar. Esta especificad no es ajena a la configuración simbólica en la que se organiza la eucaristía: una comida; ni al mandato de repetir el memorial. Por eso, aproximaciones a transformaciones mágicas, a explicaciones complejas y conceptuales, desvían y devalúan la comprensión y la experiencia (...) de esta singular presencia de Cristo que no se limita a la consagración del pan y del vino, ni compite con otras presencias - tan reales - de Dios en la vida del creyente y de la comunidad. El imaginario colectivo necesita hacer un ejercicio de conversión para superar posturas de corte fisicista y caminar hacia el encuentro con quien se hace presente en el sacramento; encuentro este particularmente intenso y transformador, pues llama a la conversión y hace comunidad. Reflexionar sobre la significatividad de los símbolos y de los ritos, también de algunos términos, debe ser una tarea abierta, principalmente al diálogo con la cultura, que favorezca la transparencia para ver y celebrar a través de ellos la Presencia santa que los sustenta. Palabras clave: Eucaristía; Celebración; Comunidad; Sacramentos; Símbolos.All sacraments are celebrations of the Church, of the community of believers which welcome and change before God's saving presence. In this sense, the Eucharist plays a special, peculiar and prominent role. This peculiarity is not deprived of the symbolic configuration in which the Eucharist organizes itself: the fact of being some food. Furthermore, the Eucharist is also concerned with the commandment of reiteration of the memorial. Therefore, some approximations to magic changes, to complex and abstract explanations, deviate and devaluate the comprehension as well as the experience of this singular presence of Christ. Such presence is not confined to the blessing of bread and of wine, nor does it compete with other - remarkably real - presences of God in people's and the community's daily life. The collective imaginary needs to exercise self-conversion in order to overcome physicist attitudes and meet the One whose presence can be felt in the sacrament, which is a particularly intense and transforming experience, as it inspires conversion and creates a community. People should frequently reflect on the meaning of symbols, rites and some terms to develop an open dialogue with culture. Such attitude, no doubt, facilitates transparence to see and celebrate, through those symbols and rites, the Holy Presence that nourishes them. Key words: Eucharist; Celebration; Community; acraments; Symbols. (shrink)

The place of the State in Spinoza's ontology has emerged in scholarly literature as one of the most complex issues involving Spinoza's political thought. At issue is whether Spinoza's State is an actual individual with its own conatus . Some consider it a completely real individual, others say that its individuality can only be metaphoric, whilst others point out the conceptual insufficiency of this polarity for explaining the ontological status of political aggregates and try to overcome it through new (...) concepts, such as the multitude, transindividuality, and figuration. In this paper, each of these interpretations is analyzed and dismissed in favour of a new one stating that Spinoza's State is actually a dynamic network of political concepts operating in resemblance of individuality and reflecting the main characteristics of the modern Nation-State. (shrink)

This article is about an original virtual reality and multimedia system named Visorama, with dedicated hardware and software aimed at the following fields: digital art, entertainment, historical tourism and education. On the software level, the Visorama system includes the research of a new methodology to build and visualize a stereoscope panorama; a high-level language to provide a transition mechanism between panoramas (wipes, blending, etc.); and multipleresolution panoramas to assure the image's resolution level. On the hardware level, the Visorama simulates an (...) optical device that uses a binocular display to show the image generated by the panorama system. This display is attached to a support base that can rotate around vertical and horizontal axes, which have high-resolution sensors that together capture the current viewing orientation. In addition, three buttons allow the control of zoom angle and the generation of discrete events. This form of direct manipulation of the viewing parameters provides a natural interface for virtual panoramas. On the level of its applications, the system as a whole is designed to promote a more natural interaction with the real space, since its basic characteristics allow the possibility of visualization of the real through a virtual window. The viewer travels in space and time following the several link points contained in it, as various possible navigation routes. (shrink)

In the literature there are at least two models for probabilistic belief revision: Bayesian updating and imaging [Lewis, D. K. (1973), Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford; Gärdenfors, P. (1988), Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. In this paper we focus on imaging rules that can be described by the following procedure: (1) Identify every state with some real valued vector of characteristics, and accordingly identify every probabilistic belief with an expected vector of characteristics; (2) (...) For every initial belief and every piece of information, choose the revised belief which is compatible with this information and for which the expected vector of characteristics has minimal Euclidean distance to the expected vector of characteristics of the initial belief. This class of rules thus satisfies an intuitive notion of minimal belief revision. The main result in this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of this class of imaging rules. (shrink)

El objetivo de este pequeño trabajo es ayudar a comprender la necesidad de la composición real en el ser participado. Lo hacemos sirviéndonos de una parte de la magnífica obra del p. Fabro, La noción metafísica de participación. En la primera parte de nuestro trabajo nos serviremos de algunos de los textos de Santo Tomás que reportaba el p. Fabro, los que más nos ayuden a comprender la demostración. En la segunda, y al mismo efecto, estudiaremos el silogismo del (...) p. Fabro, con el cual dicho autor trataba de condensar la demostración de la composición real en todo ser participado. (shrink)

La question de l’abstraction chez Marx n’est pas seulement une question de théorie de la connaissance qui exigerait une distinction entre les mauvaises abstractions génériques et indéterminées et les bonnes abstractions spécifiques et déterminées. Les abstractions sont réelles et sont solidaires d’une domination propre aux formes. L’émancipation du travail vivant est celle d’une « energeia » qui fait l’objet d’un concept adéquat en son mouvement d’actualisation inachevée.

In honour of Detlef Dürr, we report on a mathematical rigorous computation of the electric vacuum polarisation current and extract the well-known expression for the second order perturbation. Intermediate steps in the presented calculation demonstrate, to the knowledge of the authors for the first time, mathematical rigorous versions of the combined dimensional and Pauli-Villars regularisation schemes. These are employed as computational tools to infer convenient integral representations during the computation. The said second order expression is determined up to a remaining (...) degree of freedom of a real number–without ill-defined terms from start to end. (shrink)

This article takes up Diogenes again, investigating some of the reasons Diogenes has been unappreciated, and making a case for Diogenes' mind-based teleology as a significant philosophical contribution. The sophists, too, have suffered from the charge, which goes back to Plato, of not being “real” philosophers. Diogenes did not bother himself with, or was not interested in, showing in what sense the world is organized in the best possible manner; this looked to him as something that happened as a (...) matter of course. What did interest him, on the other hand, was to show what the thing that exercised intelligence is. From this point of view, the emphasis is definitely not on teleology, but rather on noetics. Here, primary textual evidence is available, for the fragments, as well as Simplicius's presentation of them, definitely support the view that the point of Diogenes' argumentation was to show that intelligence is air's. (shrink)

As competências cognitivas pressupostas pelas atualizações sociais (relações, discursos, interpretações) significam a atribuição aos seres humanos de uma certa racionalidade. Essa racionalidade pode ser concebida seja na perspectiva de uma filosofia da história de tipo evolucionista (Habermas), seja numa perspectiva da filosofia da mente (Pettit). Nas duas perspectivas, o tipo de questionamento é quase transcendental, no sentido de que se trata de revelar as condições de possibilidade das operações cognitivas reais efetuadas pelos agentes. Em última instância, as condições de possibilidade (...) devem ser entendidas como "natureza". A questão é a de saber se, metodologicamente, um monismo naturalista é possível, ou se um dualismo de perspectivas não seria imprescindível. Cognitive abilities presupposed by social performances (relations, speeches, interpretations) mean the attribution to human beings of a certain rationality. This rationality can be understood in terms of a type of evolutionary philosophy of history (Habermas), or in terms of the perspective of the philosophy of mind (Pettit). In both perspectives, the type of questioning is almost transcendental in the sense that it is able to reveal the possibility of cognitive operations performed by real actors. Ultimately, the conditions of possibility must be understood as "nature." The question is whether, methodologically, a naturalistic monism is possible, or if a dualism of perspectives would not be indispensable. (shrink)

Buscamos aqui revisitar a leitura de Gyorgy Lukács em História e Consciência de Classe sobre a questão da ação humana. Tendo a história como ponto culminante onde se resolve a relação sujeito-objeto, Lukács propõe uma epistemologia dialética em que o sujeito interfere no conteúdo do real. A problemática central consiste em teorizar a gênese, a geração do novo. A gênese tem sua determinação concreta na contradição da luta de classes. Isso resultará num novo conceito de sujeito. O indivíduo, isoladamente, (...) é incapaz de realizar a gênese. O sujeito da práxis, destarte, não pode ser livre atuando sozinho, mas deve encontrar o fundamento da liberdade na classe social, real sujeito da gênese histórica. We seek here to revisit Gyorgy Lukács' reading in History and Class Conscousness about the question on the human action. Taking at hand history as the culminating point where the relation subject-object is resolved, Lukács proposes a dialectical epistemology in which the subject interferes in the content of reality. The central problematic consists in theorizing the genesis, the genesis of the new. This results in a new concept of subject. The individual isolated is incapable of achieving the genesis. The subject of praxis cannot therefore be free acting alone, but he must find the fundament of freedom in the social class, the real subject of historical genesis. (shrink)

Unification of physical theories is an ambiguous idea. Gravitation is perhaps distinct from “other” interactions. Arguments for a unification can be found, either from an analysis of the nature of time, or from the canonicity of most formalisms used in physics. Space-time continuum requires a physics of fields, but not necessarily of quantized fields. Various notions of space as used in physics show that these spaces—including Newtonian space—are never real spaces, but inventions of the mind not only useful, but (...) necessary for the development of many physical theories. Time is, on the other hand, real. (shrink)

The astronomical traditions on which Copernicus drew for his major works have been well researched. Questions about Copernicus's arguments and his education in logic have been less thoroughly treated. The arguments supplied by Copernicus in his major works are shown to rely to a large extent on well-known dialectical topics or inference warrants. Some peculiar features of his arguments, however, point to sources at Cracow that very likely inspired him to construct arguments based on the requirement of real connections (...) between antecedents and consequents as a condition for the validity of hypothetical conditionals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:370 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Leibniz. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli : Libreria scientifica editrice. Pp. 540. L.4.000.) L'ouvrage d'E. Cione est une presentation d'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Leibniz. L'auteur situe d'abord Leibniz dans son milieu culturel et dans son ambiance historique. Puis il aborde les probl~mes relatifs ~ la monade et ~ l'univers. Une troisi~me partie traite du choix divin, du real et des possibles. La quatri~me s'attache au (...) difficile probl~me de la liberte~ en Dieu et dans l'homme. Enfin, Clone precise queles sont et doivent ~tre les activite~s de l'homme dans los domaines de la logique, de la morale, de l'esth~tique, de la religion. Par consequent, ne serait-que par l'ampleur des mati~res ~tudi~es, on dispose ici d'une vaste fresque qui met en place l'ensemble des preoccupations philosophiques de Leibniz, et qui d~ploie son ~ventail en un certain sens, disons celui de la Monadologie, toute entree dans la philosophie de Leibniz ~tant bonne, pourvu, si j'ose dire, qu'on en sorte. Or, on en sort, car l'au~eur appuie ses connaissanc~s sur une pratique quotidienne des ~extes de Leibniz, sur une documentation de premiere main qui lui fair honneur, sur une somme de lectures [eibniziennes qui l'aident s orienter son dessein. Cet ouvrage repose sur l'humus fertile d'un vaste savoir technique et livresque concernant la philosophic de Leibniz. I1 est donc, de ce point de vue, document~ avec pr4cision, et il atteint le fond des probl~mes abord4s. Enfin, rauteur ne perd pas ses propres droits dans cette ~tude, et pr4cise d'un oeil vigilant quelles sont es d4fectuositds de cette pens4e, qui n'a sa pleine signification que si on ne la coupe pas de sos racines th4ologiques. I1 semble que lh, le destin de Leibniz diff~re de celui de Clone, puisque, pour ce dernier, le philosophe d'Hanovre ne parvient pas ~ p4n~trer le sens profond de la r~alit(~ spirituelle, c'est-h-dire de la libert4 de l'homme. ANDRE ROBINET Orldans, France David Hume: Prophet o] the Counter-Revolution. By Laurence L. Bongie. (Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvii + 182.35s.) This excellent work uncovers and analyzes the amazing influence of Hume's historical and political views on the world of late 18th-century France. First Professor Bongie admirably recounts the immense impact of Hume's History o] England in France when it originally appeared. The work was wildly praised by French royalty, by the philosophes, by Catholic intellectuals, by almost everyone except the Huguenot exiles. Hume's alleged impartiality and philosophical approach made him for France of the time, the finest historian of the age, the new Tacitus. Everyone found great profundity in the History, and each group managed to overlook those aspects of Hume's views that conflicted with their own outlook, and stressed those aspects that fitted in with their own predilections. it was Turgot who apparently first realized that Hume was not the zeal hero of those who were to transform France, and that Hume's political philosophy and his picture of human nature "glean'd" through the study of history were hardly in accord with the theories of the reformers and the future revolutionists. In their correspondence, Hume and Turgot revealed the enormous gulf that separated them, the latter believing in the endless perfectibility of mankind, the former, much more sceptical and much readier to accept man in his historical condition. For Hume, there was always a struggle between order and liberty, and dangers on both sides with no ideal solution in sight, while for the optimistic Turgot a new and better world was just around the corner. What Turgot saw as their differences became clearer a few years later to moderates like Mirabeau, Mably and Brissot. Hume, for them, did not really see the importance of liberty, the fundamental rights of man, the real lessons of History. The moderates began boosting, translating and commenting on an antidote to Hume's History, the liberal Whig version of English history by Catherine Macaulay-Graham, a work finally published in French under Mirabeau... (shrink)

This paper is my best attempt to confute (Kantian) Modern Philosophy at its very core. This implies, of course, that in my view the principles of Critical Realism are Kantian. The basic arguments supporting Critical Realism are powerful: I have tried to show clearly their power, but also to expose clearly their putrid root. Section 3 on the principle of immanence offers the most important contribution in this undertaking. The arguments of critical realism studied in this paper are the following: (...) 1. The Notion of Experience 2. The Nature of Knowledge: Question and Inquiry 3. The Principle of Immanence 4. The Notion of Relation 5. Judgment as the Position of the Real. (shrink)

This study uses a sample of 242 European professional purchasers to examine the six characteristics of the decision-making process developed by Jones. The illustration mobilizes six original scenarios reproducing typical purchasing situations. Two versions of each scenario were used, one representing low moral intensity and the other showing high moral intensity. Two populations were sampled: one of 120 purchasers responding to the first version of the questionnaire and a second of 122 different purchasers responding to version two. Each version contained (...) three low-moral-intensity scenarios and three high-moral-intensity scenarios. The research also investigates two concepts suggested by Hannah et al. :663–685, 2011): examining the complexity of ethical decision-making through scenarios and microsocial professional ethical contexts. The findings reveal that neither traditional individual characteristics nor standard company characteristics have a real impact on two stages of Rest’s model. They also show that internal locus of control and a high microsocial ethical environment have a positive impact on purchaser awareness and intention to act ethically for four of the six dimensions: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, temporal immediacy, and concentration of effect. Moral intensity factors also have a positive impact on these four dimensions. The two other dimensions are not related to the independent variables. (shrink)

In this article, a mixed integer linear program model is proposed for the production, lot sizing, and scheduling of automotive plastic components to minimize the setup, inventory, stockout, and backorder costs, by taking into account injection molds as the main index to schedule on parallel flexible injection machines. The proposed MILP considers the minimum and maximum inventory capacities and penalizes stockout. A relevant characteristic of the modeled problem is the dependence between mold setups to produce plastic components. The lot sizing (...) and scheduling problem solution results in the assignment of molds to machines during a specific time period and in the calculation of the number of components to be produced, which is often called lot size, following a sequence-dependent setup time. Depending on the machine on which the mold is setup, the number of units to be produced will be distinct because machines differ from one another. The stock coverage, defined in demand days, is also included in the MILP to avoid backorders, which is highly penalized in the automotive supply chain. Added to this, the proposed model is extended by considering setup common operators to respond to and fulfill the constraints that appear in automotive plastic enterprises. In this regard, the MILP presented solves a lot-sizing and scheduling problem, emerged in a second-tier supplier of a real automotive supply chain. Finally, this article validates the MILP by performing experiments with different sized instances, including small, medium, and large. The large-sized dataset is characterized by replicating the amount of data used in the real enterprise, which is the object of this study. The goodness of the model is evaluated with the computational time and the deviation of the obtained results as regards to the optimal solution. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa se propõe a ser uma forma de análise da práxis cristã, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência místico-religiosa. A resposta de Friedrich Schleiermacher ao Iluminismo tem muito a nos beneficiar, principalmente se levarmos em consideração as críticas de Rudolf Otto. A compreensão do “sentimento de dependência” em Schleiermacher, que se torna em Otto “sentimento de criatura”, e a realidade da experiência de Deus que se conecta à práxis, nos fornecem um excelente ponto de partida para compreensão daquilo (...) que move as pessoas a uma vida de renúncia, servidão e comprometimento com valores e princípios do Evangelho de Jesus Cristo. Com base em uma pesquisa de campo, foi possível perceber que existe uma conexão entre a práxis cristã e a experiência religiosa. Quando há experiência religiosa, há ações cristãs executadas com naturalidade, com maior incidência do que quando não existe tal experiência. Podemos ter muito a perder se acaso deixarmos de considerar o aspecto experiencial da fé cristã com o sagrado. Em primeiro lugar, em nossas formulações teológicas, as quais podem, em maior ou menor grau, enfatizar em demasia aspectos antropocêntricos, deixando de lado o aspecto numinoso. Em segundo lugar, perderemos a oportunidade de influenciar a igreja a vivenciar uma prática espiritual real, que considere, com toda a relevância devida, a experiência de fé e não somente aspectos catequéticos. Por fim, perderemos a possibilidade de analisar a vida de fé, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência de Deus, que pode ter sido agente influenciador número um para uma vida de exemplo de práxis cristã genuína. (shrink)

In the absence of Woodin cardinals, fine structural inner models for mild large cardinal hypotheses admit forcing extensions where bounded forcing axioms hold and yet the reals are projectively well-ordered.

Al momento de indagar sobre la experimentación en Galileo Galilei, es difícil identificar qué tipo de experimentos, efectivamente, realizó. Esto se debe, fundamentalmente a que, al abordar la obra de Galileo, no se logra diferenciar qué experimentos realizó y cuáles no. Además, nuestra concepción de la experimentación moderna, enturbia nuestra indagación. Y eso es lo que, de alguna manera, vamos a tratar de responder aquí: ¿Galileo hacía experimentos? Para lograrlo, se partirá de la idea de “experimento” desde la intuición más (...) básica: “[…] como un modo de conocer algo inmediatamente antes de todo juicio formulado sobre lo aprehendido”. Y, adicionalmente, de la distinción entre experimentos míticos, experimentos imaginarios –o de pensamiento1– y experimentos reales. (shrink)

It is time for a new paper about open questions in the currently very active area of randomness and computability. Ambos-Spies and Kučera presented such a paper in 1999 [1]. All the question in it have been solved, except for one: is KL-randomness different from Martin-Löf randomness? This question is discussed in Section 6.Not all the questions are necessarily hard—some simply have not been tried seriously. When we think a question is a major one, and therefore likely to be hard, (...) we indicate this by the symbol ▶, the criterion being that it is of considerable interest and has been tried by a number of researchers. Some questions are close contenders here; these are marked by ▷. With few exceptions, the questions are precise. They mostly have a yes/no answer. However, there are often more general questions of an intuitive or even philosophical nature behind. We give an outline, indicating the more general questions.All sets will be sets of natural numbers, unless otherwise stated. These sets are identified with infinite strings over {0, 1}. Other terms used in the literature are sequence and real. (shrink)

The study of social, ethical, and political issues from a naturalistic perspective has been pervasive in social sciences and the humanities in the last decades. This articulation of empirical research with philosophical and normative reflection is increasingly getting attention in academic circles and the public spheres, given the prevalence of urgent needs and challenges that society is facing on a global scale. The contemporary world is full of challenges or what some philosophers have called ‘existential risks’ to humanity. Nuclear wars, (...) natural and/or engineered pandemics, climate change, global totalitarianism, and emergent technologies, are some of the challenges mentioned by many authors devoted to the study of long-term potential risks for the survival of the human species. However, while there are many reasons to be a pessimist about the future of humanity, there is also a lot of ink wasted in showing that the world today is far better than we had in the past and also that there have been many instances of social and moral progress in the last centuries. Some authors have even claimed that “we have made more progress over the last 100 years than in the first 100,000”. According to ‘our world in data’, some of the most relevant advances of humanity in the last centuries have to do with the reduction of poverty and/or inequality, better health and security, the decline of violence and war, and the development of democracy and institutional mechanisms to guarantee individual freedom and rights. Yet, there is a more concrete concern that our world faces nowadays, and requires a particularly detailed analysis. In a few words, the advance in information and communication technologies, the huge volume of people migration because of prevalent instances of global inequality, and the reality of an interconnected world that just mirrors an extensive history of massive human intergroup relations open the question about the feasibility of social and moral progress in the contexts of diverse, multicultural, and unequal societies. This makes it crucial to reflect not only on whether human societies may keep advancing on a path of social progress, but how this can be achieved by addressing the challenges of inequality and potential intergroup conflict. This concern closely relates to the further consolidation of democratic values and the achievement of a more generalized consideration of the equal moral value of human individuals far from group, ethnic, or collective distinctions. This vision of progress follows the moral convictions that have been considered right and worthy to be pursued by most ethical theories explored by philosophers and social scientists so far. This work aims to contribute to the study of the mechanisms and feasibility of social and moral progress grounded on the precept of human equality and is guided by the idea that social and moral progress in a plural world requires the accomplishment of a more democratic and tolerant society. These forms of progress have already been defined by philosophers Allen Buchanan and Russel Powell as inclusivist forms of moral progress. According to these authors, inclusivist moral progress is featured by the transformation of moral judgments, motivations, and norms guided by the rejection of “group-based restrictions on moral standing and moral status” (2018). The work of Buchanan and Powell is fundamental for the argumentation developed in this work since they have pioneered a more complex debate in the field of evolutionary social sciences and philosophical anthropology. In brief, these authors have inquired how human nature, conceptualized by the advances in evolutionary thinking and the empirical sciences, is related to our moral convictions and the possibilities that we have to establish certain forms of social and moral progress. The work of Buchanan and Powell contributes to the debate on moral progress by incorporating empirically-informed concepts and arguments. With this objective in mind, they develop their discussion around a generalized tension between exclusivist and inclusivist forms of moral progress. This tension revolves around the question of whether and to what extent human moral concerns, motivations, and norms, are limited or bounded by social identities, group thinking, or collective values. This question is at the center of this work. In other words, I aim to answer whether and to what extent the nature of our social and moral cognition hinders or enables the development of inclusivist forms of morality and moral progress. As I mentioned so far, the distinction between exclusivist and inclusivist forms of morality has a practical implication and facilitates the reflection on the mechanisms and feasibility of concrete forms of progress based on the precept of human equality, which is the road to progress that we should follow according to most ethical theories. The distinction between exclusivist and inclusivist morality is not used here as a form of summarizing highly divergent descriptive approaches to morality, but as a way to address the practical implications of morality research, particularly around the question of the feasibility of social forms of progress based on the precept of equality and tolerance. My objective then has less to do with offering a conceptualization of human morality or with the proposition of a new ethical perspective. Instead, I aim to identify, from an empirically informed perspective, what enables the achievement of egalitarian forms of social progress, to subsequently offer a normative reflection about what we should do if we want to accomplish such inclusivist forms of progress. This task is of great relevance, having in mind that some theoretical proposals on the matter have claimed that human prosocial behavior and morality are constrained by exclusivist fixed tendencies as a product of our evolutionary history. According to these views, human morality is a group-centered cognitive and behavioral expression that has severe limits in its scope and extent, which hinders in the end the emergence of inclusivist forms of moral concerns and behaviors. These claims align with the philosophical intuition about the ‘dissociation of empathy’, or the fact that human individuals tend to express empathy and sympathy preferably for members of their group whereas their empathic and moral concern and recognition for outgroup individuals tend to be reduced or eliminated in real-life social interactions. Multiple theorists have expressed, however, that these assumptions are wrong for empirical and philosophical reasons, which results in a serious challenge to the conception of human morality as exclusivist by nature. Furthermore, simple intuition and practical experience constantly show us that human individuals can develop and endorse a broad spectrum of moral considerations and adopt an arguably inclusivist stance concerning the kind of persons or agents that deserve moral concern. Moreover, and adopting a historical perspective, the expansion of cultural and commercial exchanges, the consolidation of democracy, the development of welfare states, or the emergence of institutions based on the concept of universal human rights, have partially driven human progress based on the impartial concern for the well-being of persons. These historical instances of cultural evolution and institutional design have shown that it is feasible to promote behaviors and attitudes grounded in impersonal prosocial and inclusivist principles. This optimistic perspective, however, still begs the question of the exact relationship between social, cultural, and historical contexts, and the emergence of certain behavioral expressions of inclusivist morality. This is crucial since a great number of human individuals around the world still do not make part of these instances of social progress, and some authors have suggested that such instances of social and moral progress are particularly favored by the contexts of the WEIRD world, that is the world of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. Some of these approaches consider moral inclusivity a ‘luxury good’ and follow the ‘dependency thesis’ according to which the expression of moral inclusivity depends on the presence of very concrete material conditions that trigger inclusivist and impersonal prosocial tendencies that human beings are not able to express in threatening contexts without physical security. This thesis is problematic for various reasons and has led to incomplete explanations about the enabling and causal factors of inclusivist moral progress, as well as unsatisfactory suggestions about what we should do to foster the accomplishment of more generalized instances of progress based on inclusivist concerns. In an attempt to contribute to this debate, the main objective of this thesis is to offer an alternative proposal about the nature of human morality and a more detailed reflection on what we should do if we want to further accomplish such instances of progress. More precisely, this work adopts a particular developmental and constructivist vision of human morality to answer the question of how feasible it is to reach generalized forms of social progress based on the precepts of moral inclusivity. Furthermore, it offers some ideas about what are the most adequate and favorable conditions to foster such progress both at the individual and the collective level. At this point, a preliminary clarification of some starting points is necessary. In the first place, and contrary to what other authors have proposed when debating moral progress from an empirically-based approach, my perspective adopts a radical developmental and constructivist perspective, following particularly the conceptual and empirical ideas of the social-domain theory in moral psychology. From this perspective, morality is a domain of normative and social knowledge that develops and emerges in human interactions. Moral concerns, judgments, and norms are not only the result of the expression of innate adaptive intuitions, nor the product of social conformity and a simple process of mirroring the normativity that communities have established to organize their social life. Human individuals, instead, construct moral concerns and judgments during their situated interactions. More specifically, the constructivist tradition claims that we need to research how moral concerns, judgments, and reasons emerge in social interactions and how human beings construct the content of their moral knowledge in the first place. Based on these ideas, morality is defined here as the result of a constructive process through which human individuals, by the means of constant interactions on a background of mutual respect and recognition, develop evaluative concerns about how we ought to treat others, and how to ‘care’ and ‘respect’ others’ well-being, needs, and vulnerabilities. This developmental-constructivist theory of human psychology contributes to an alternative understanding of the origins of moral variability and informs a very particular normative stance about the most desirable contexts needed for the urgent accomplishment of inclusivist forms of morality in contemporary societies. This is so given that the very same definition of morality adopted presupposes the feature of inclusivity. The main objective of this work is then to argue, based on a developmental perspective, what are the most favorable conditions to foster the development of moral inclusivity and what we should do to accomplish concrete instances of moral progress that truly help us to overcome our most urgent moral challenges. The whole thesis is organized as follows. In part I, I show how received visions about human social evolution have informed conceptions of morality as an adaptive function evolved to solve the challenges of cooperative life. Based on these assumptions, some theories argue that human morality is limited by the boundaries of group thinking, and always obeys the mandates of collective interests and the will of the majority. However, this conception has problematic implications from a normative and ethical perspective. The aim of Chapter 1 is to present this introductory debate in detail. In chapter 2, I consider a relevant amount of scientific evidence that helps to consolidate a more optimistic and inclusivist perspective about the starting conditions of human prosocial behavior. Later, I will summarize some ideas offered to explain the possible evolutionary mechanisms that led to the consolidation of these inclusivist capacities. However, I will also show how evolutionary theories that share the same adaptationist foundations but initially seem relevant to explain the feasibility of moral inclusivity, result incomplete when considering the complexity of moral behavior and its ethical implications. Part II is devoted to presenting a developmental alternative to the adaptationist versions around the starting conditions of morality. In this section, I first summarize the epistemological, conceptual, and empirical basis of a constructivist perspective already proposed by several authors in the last decades. This is the goal of chapter 3. More precisely, I adopt the conceptualization of morality established by the social-domain theory school and clarify its conception of the situated development of moral concerns, motivations, and norms. All these ideas are essential for my argumentation on the feasibility of inclusivist moral progress offered later. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed idea of constructivist thinking about moral development, by analyzing one particular dimension: the development of moral concerns for fairness and the sense of justice in distributive dilemmas. In Part III, I assume a constructivist perspective on morality to contribute to the philosophy of moral progress. In particular, I discuss the implications of such a perspective for the conceptualization of human moral nature and discuss what are the most favorable conditions for moral inclusivity to emerge. Answering that question is of enormous relevance since favoring the transition of human societies towards more inclusivist forms of moral concern and behavior supposes a more generalized accomplishment of our most urgent moral convictions. Previous developmental or culturally-sensible attempts to explore this issue are already on the market. As mentioned before, most authors have approached the topic by situating the cultural evolution and development of (inclusivist) moral progress in the WEIRD world. For instance, some of these authors claim that very concrete material conditions (mostly present in the Western World) have been necessary for triggering inclusivist and impersonal prosocial tendencies that human beings are not able to express in threatening contexts without physical security. Despite their interest in explaining inclusivist morality and the feasibility of inclusivist forms of progress following a naturalistic and culturally situated approach, these theories are problematic for two main reasons. In the first place, most of the authors that explain moral progress tend to focus exclusively on the consolidation of liberal values in the Western world and the underlying adoption of laws, social-epistemic practices, and public narratives about tolerance and inclusivity, as unequivocal signs of inclusivist morality. Nevertheless, there is an enormous distance between the institutional and public support of inclusivist moral values or the construction of public images of tolerance and inclusivity, and the real materialization of impersonal moralities in situated social interactions. Secondly, the variability of human moral behavior is far bigger than most of the theories in moral psychology and moral progress tend to assume. Accordingly, inclusivist and exclusivist forms of morality may develop simultaneously in similar or divergent geographical and socio-ecological environments, including those with harsh conditions such as competition for scarce resources, potential intergroup conflict, and risks of disease transmission. In addition, harsh environmental conditions are usually present in almost all societies around the globe, and the presence of socio-ecological conditions such as physical security and prosperity, predominant in highly resourced populations, do not prevent the existence of exclusivist moral tendencies. My model explores a different perspective on the relationships between cultural, institutional, and historical factors, and the situated development of human morality. This supposes a clear distinction from previous approaches to the matter since it offers a different view on what we should do to pursue further instances of inclusivist social progress. In the fifth chapter, I first analyze the proposals of some defenders of the ‘dependency’ theory. The attention is focused on the ‘Evolutionary Developmental Model’ proposed by Buchanan and Powell (2018). Based on a critique of this approach, I will argue that to explain the evolution and development of human morality in its multiple manifestations, it is essential to put focus on social interactions. This also involves a different perspective on human-environment relations that in line with a constructivist worldview makes an innovative contribution to the philosophy of moral behavior and moral progress. Later, in the sixth chapter, I will define my alternative relational view of inclusivist morality and I will offer my view on how to establish favorable conditions that make inclusivist morality possible. Complementing the constructivist approach, my conception is based on the essential role of equality and individuality and on how moral inclusivity is favored if moral concerns do not develop driven by the accomplishment of group-centered, binding, and communitarian concerns and values. In brief, my relational model suggests that the accomplishment of moral inclusivity not only depends on the overall achievement of certain levels of physical security or economic prosperity. Instead, its development is favored by transforming the interactional contexts in which moral concerns towards autonomy and individuality emerge. In arguing so, I will need to start with a critique of contemporary situated and embodied approaches in ethics. Then, I will show how societies guided by the accomplishment of group-centered values of power, dominance, and relational inequality tend to express exclusivist moral behaviors, while individualistic societies tend to be more inclusivist. Starting from this diagnosis, my final attempt is then to reflect on which are the best conditions for the moral valuation of individuality to emerge and what we should do to promote the accomplishment of moral inclusivity at the societal level. (shrink)

To offer engaging neurorehabilitation training to neurologic patients, motor tasks are often visualized in virtual reality. Recently introduced head-mounted displays allow to realistically mimic the body of the user from a first-person perspective in a highly immersive VR environment. In this immersive environment, users may embody avatars with different body characteristics. Importantly, body characteristics impact how people perform actions. Therefore, alternating body perceptions using immersive VR may be a powerful tool to promote motor activity in neurologic patients. However, the ability (...) of the brain to adapt motor commands based on a perceived modified reality has not yet been fully explored. To fill this gap, we “tricked the brain” using immersive VR and investigated if multisensory feedback modulating the physical properties of an embodied avatar influences motor brain networks and control. Ten healthy participants were immersed in a virtual environment using an HMD, where they saw an avatar from first-person perspective. We slowly transformed the surface of the avatar from human to stone. We enforced this visual change by repetitively touching the real arm of the participant and the arm of the avatar with a hammer, while progressively replacing the sound of the hammer against skin with stone hitting sound via loudspeaker. We applied single-pulse transcranial magnetic simulation to evaluate changes in motor cortical excitability associated with the illusion. Further, to investigate if the “stone illusion” affected motor control, participants performed a reaching task with the human and stone avatar. Questionnaires assessed the subjectively reported strength of embodiment and illusion. Our results show that participants experienced the “stone arm illusion.” Particularly, they rated their arm as heavier, colder, stiffer, and more insensitive when immersed with the stone than human avatar, without the illusion affecting their experienced feeling of body ownership. Further, the reported illusion strength was associated with enhanced motor cortical excitability and faster movement initiations, indicating that participants may have physically mirrored and compensated for the embodied body characteristics of the stone avatar. Together, immersive VR has the potential to influence motor brain networks by subtly modifying the perception of reality, opening new perspectives for the motor recovery of patients. (shrink)

The performance and the success of a group working as a team on a common goal depends on the individuals’ skills and the collective coordination of their abilities. On a perceptual level, individual gaze behavior is reasonably well investigated. However, the coordination of visual skills in a team has been investigated only in laboratory studies and the practical examination and knowledge transfer to field studies or the applicability in real-life situations have so far been neglected. This is mainly due (...) to the fact that a methodological approach along with a suitable evaluation procedure to analyze the gaze coordination within a team in highly dynamic events outside the lab, is still missing. Thus, this study was conducted to develop a tool to investigate the coordinated gaze behavior within a team of three human beings acting with a common goal in a dynamic real-world scenario. This team was a basketball referee team adjudicating a game. Using mobile eye-tracking devices and an indigenously designed software tool for the simultaneous analysis of the gaze data of three participants, allowed, for the first time, the simultaneous investigation of the coordinated gaze behavior of three people in a highly dynamic setting. Overall, the study provides a new and innovative method to investigate the coordinated gaze behavior of a three-person team in specific tasks. This method is also applicable to investigate research questions about teams in dynamic real-world scenarios and get a deeper look at interactions and behavior patterns of human beings in group settings. (shrink)

En economía, la investigación se divide en dos grandes metodologías: los modelos teórico-matemáticos y los estudios empíricos. Estudiando modelos teóricos y métodos empíricos ) se da cuenta de las limitaciones de ambos métodos. Se concluye que ninguno de estos puede generar explicaciones de cómo en realidad suceden las cosas, sino que solo de cómo posiblemente suceden. La razón es que ambos necesitan un enlace interpretativo que permita extrapolar desde su propio sistema hacia un sistema objetivo. Los modelos tienen dominio general (...) y pueden dar cuenta de mecanismos. Los RCTs, al contrario, son válidos internamente y están conectados al mundo real, pero su dominio es muy específico. Aunque ninguno logre responder preguntas amplias de un fenómeno de interés, pueden complementarse para generar extrapolaciones más confiables sobre un sistema objetivo. Sin embargo, esto solo podrá hacerse si se conocen bien los mecanismos y el contexto en que ocurre una evidencia. Palabras clave: Causalidad, Mecanismos, Capacidades, Epistemología de la Economía, Generalización de Evidencia. (shrink)

We prove that there exists a noncomputable c.e. real which is low for weak 2-randomness, a definition of randomness due to Kurtz, and that all reals which are low for weak 2-randomness are low for Martin-Löf randomness.

Las definiciones ocupan un lugar muy importante en la _Ética_ de Spinoza, sin embargo, su naturaleza y su función permanecen aún en gran medida bajo un manto de oscuridad. Tal es así que numerosos comentadores han abordado el tema aunque nunca se ha llegado a un acuerdo definitivo. En el presente trabajo revisitaremos esta vieja cuestión comenzando por una reconstrucción de la doctrina spinoziana de la definición expuesta en diferentes partes del _corpus_. Para ello tomaremos como punto de referencia la (...) oposición entre definición real y definición nominal tal como aparece delineada en la doctrina de la _Lógica_ de Port Royal. Luego ofreceremos un examen de la naturaleza y función de las definiciones de la _Ética_. El recorrido realizado aquí nos permitirá, por un lado, determinar cuál de las interpretaciones en juego tiene mejores fundamentos y, por el otro, arrojar luz sobre la función de las definiciones en la metodología spinoziana. (shrink)

La Hermenéutica, más que una cerrada disciplina filosófica, es una actitud fundamental (fundacional) de la filosofía y las ciencias humanas, que define su quehacer cultural como interpretación comprehensiva de lo real en su(s) sentido(s).

Este artículo es un estudio crítico de dos operaciones fundamentales del Museo de Arte actual: su facultad de taxonomización de lo real y su complicidad con la categoría de Patrimonio. En la formulación contemporánea del Museo de Arte, este trabajo discute los alcances y efectos de la taxonomía como intento de producción de un régimen unitario y continuo de legibilidad e instalación de los objetos, así como la investidura de los objetos como Patrimonio, y en virtud de su posibilidad (...) de experiencia, al modo de “documento-archivo” o “simulacro”. (shrink)

El trabajo pretende continuar con la pregunta en torno al papel de la democracia y su funcionalidad en la economía de mercado. Lo nuevo a desarrollar bajo este interrogante, es trasladar la reflexión al ámbito del socialismo y específicamente a lo que se ha denominado el socialismo de mercado. La aspiración es presentar los desarrollos teóricos en torno al denominado socialismo de mercado, y cómo desde allí se ha estructurado un concepto de democracia que adquiere validez desde el reconocimiento de (...) las llamadas libertades reales y no solo formales. Este debate nos traslada a un escenario teórico particular, el de los denominados marxistas analíticos, el cual se ha sometido a una amplia discusión tanto desde sus defensores como desde sus detractores. Por esta razón retomo a varios autores relevantes en esta corriente teórica como son: John Roemer, Adam Przeworki y Philippe Van Parijs, con el ánimo de hacer una presentación analítica de la idea de mercado, democracia y socialismo. A modo de consideraciones finales, se pretenden dejar algunos delineamientos críticos, en aras del debate académico, que se han hecho a estas acepciones teóricas, en términos de la equiparación analítica que se hace entre individualismo metodológico y colectivismo metodológico. Igualmente sobre el no-reconocimiento de una neutralidad del mercado; y la validación que se hace de la aplicación de modelos socialdemócratas. (shrink)

El autor propone visualizar cómo las asimetrías en las economías de mercado actuales han determinado distintos escenarios de disyuntiva entre lo económico y lo social, quedando cuestionada la real capacidad de creación de espacios de participación democrática, los que se confrontan con una realidad que niega constantemente los derechos fundamentales de los individuos. Se pregunta si la democracia es la antítesis del capitalismo y argumenta que el estado de bienestar representa un escenario de conciliación. Finalmente explora distintas propuestas de (...) terceras vías: neokeynesianismo, poscapitalismo, socialdemocracia. (shrink)

En términos evolutivos, la vida es, simplemente, una manifestación particular de la materia expresada en forma de organismos variantes durante una secuencia temporal inmemorial. El ser vivo la representa y continúa desde aquel pasado remoto hacia un futuro ignorado. El conjunto se denomina naturaleza. Frente a la vida, la muerte constituye una etapa necesaria para que el proceso biológico siga su curso expresando nuevas formas y aconteceres. En este contexto, avanzamos una reflexión que busca dar sentido al concepto de individuo (...) como manifestación real de la vida frente al valor colectivo de una naturaleza abstracta. (shrink)

Moodley and Rennie’s paper arguing against penile transplantation stated out of context arguments and wrongly quoted statements. The cost of penile transplantation is much less than portrayed. The burden of cases is much less than is communicated. The men on our penis transplantation programme represent the poorest of the poor and are one of the most discriminated against groups of humans on earth. The false hope said to be created by Moodley is indeed not false hope at all as there (...) is a real possibility that most patients on our waiting list may be transplanted. Moodley argues that government has, in the context of penile transplantation, no duty to cure those who lost a penis after ritual circumcision, but only an obligation to prevent this from happening. A ‘yuk’ reaction, similarly described in facial transplantation, may be present in colleagues arguing against penile transplantation. (shrink)

El arquetipo vertebrado delineado por Richard Owen a mediados del Siglo XIX fue un modelo concebido para pautar el análisis morfológico de los seres vivos dentro de los lineamientos definidos por la idea de una unidad de composición cuando ella se aplicaba al caso específico de los vertebrados. Pero aquí, además de analizar la razón de ser originaria de ese arquetipo y su modo de operar dentro del contexto epistémico en el que efectivamente surgió, también aludiremos al modo en que (...) ese modelo pudo pasar a ser considerado, no ya como una idealización, o una abstracción metodológicamente operativa, sino como una aproximación a una entidad real que debía ser individualizada y debidamente descripta. (shrink)