In political philosophy, citizenship is a key concept. Citizenship is tied to rights and duties, as well as to concepts of social justice. Recently, the debate on citizenship has developed a new direction in focusing on qualified notions of citizenship. In this contribution, I shall defend three claims. Firstly, consumer citizenship fits into the discussion of qualified notions of citizenship. Secondly, the debate on qualified notions of citizenship cannot be detached from the normative claims in the philosophy of citizenship more (...) generally. In particular, duties and rights receive a distinct shape when debated in terms of “consumer citizenship”. Thirdly, I shall argue that further normative limits can be established by discussing qualified notions of citizenship as items of a list that need to cohere in normative terms. I shall pay particular attention to environmental citizenship. (shrink)
Why Democracy Needs Public Goods provides arguments for a new theoretical perspective in favor of public goods. Kallhoff details the benefits of public goods for any democratic state: they contribute to social inclusion, help generate the public forum, and foster national identity. These arguments are supplemented by reconsidering major counter-arguments against this approach, both from political theory and from theories on public finance. Political philosophers, political theorists, and political economists will benefit most from this perspective.
'Flourishing' is a concept of the good life of plants which comprises an empirical and an evaluative aspect. In this article, I shall discuss this concept as a starting point for addressing the moral status of plants anew; I shall therefore first outline the content of flourishing as explained in botany. The article then explores the evaluative aspect of flourishing in the context of three questions. These questions are: how does the concept of flourishing fit into moral theory? Why do (...) plants deserve a moral standing? And finally, what are the consequences of this approach to plants in ethics? The exploration of these questions contributes to a fine-grained perspective on the moral implications of the capacity of plants to flourish. (shrink)
Rooted in different disciplines such as ethics, ecology, law, social and political sciences, this volume explore the normative approaches, societal practices, and legal mechanisms which have emerged in the nano-field over the last two decades.
This chapter outlines different ethical approaches of relevance for a normative assessment of nano-release. We elaborate on traditional risk assessment and the well-known notion of a Precautionary Principle in order to demonstrate that these accounts need to be complemented to provide ethical guidance with regard to environmental influence of emerging technologies. We conclude that it is obligatory to engage in what they call an “eco-centric evaluation” of nano-release.
In der Moraltheorie ist der ethische Naturalismus umstritten. Seit der Zurückweisung eines metaethischen Naturalismus durch G.E. Moore galt es als ausgemacht, dass die Bedeutung von „gut“ nicht mit einem natürlichen Prädikat bestimmt werden kann. Trotz dieses Vorbehalts versuchen Aristotelikerinnen und Aristoteliker neuerlich wieder, Argumente des ethischen Naturalismus in die Erörterung der Moraltheorie einzuführen. In diesem Beitrag möchte ich dafür argumentieren, dass ein in der Aristotelischen Ethik angelegtes naturalistisches Argument zur Rechtfertigung einer Konzeption guten Lebens Berücksichtigung verdient. Dazu soll zunächst der (...) Nachweis geführt werden, dass mit Aristoteles eine Konzeption der Gattungsidentität des Menschen entwickelt werden kann, die in der Aristotelischen Naturphilosophie ihre Grundlage hat. Dann wird erläutert, inwiefern die Deutung guten menschlichen Lebens als eines moralisch richtig orientierten Lebens auf die Vorstellungen der Gattungsidentität bezogen bleibt. Entgegen der Deutungen des Naturalismus als einer biologisch-wertenden Konzeption und entgegen den Ansätzen zu einem Verzicht auf eine ethische Ausdeutung des menschlichen Gedeihens wird eine perfektionistische Deutung des naturalistischen Arguments entwickelt. In moral philosophy, ethical naturalism is no longer accepted. Since G.E. Moore succeeded in rejecting metaethical naturalism, no one tries any more to define “good” with “natural terms”. Yet, recently, Aristotelians have tried to reintroduce ethical naturalism in moral theory. In this contribution I shall argue that ethical naturalism can be defended as an approach that helps identify the “good human life”. I shall first explore the notion of “species” in Aristotle’s natural philosophy as a theoretical background for explaining the notion of the human species. I shall then identify an argument that connects the idea of the human species with ideas about the good human life in a moral sense. Different from interpretations of naturalistic arguments in terms of an evaluative notion of a biological entity and different from an interpretation that reduces the notion of “human flourishing” to a political notion, I shall defend a version of ethical naturalism that deserves the name “ethical perfectionism”. (shrink)
The debate on “safer by design” has primarily been focused on strategies to render products safer during the design process. This article focuses on correlated basic legal rights of citizens. The reference to “trump rights” is helpful in highlighting two normative claims: Firstly, products that are “safer by design” are suitable instruments to protect the bodily integrity and health of potential users. Both figure as trump rights in Ronald Dworkin’s sense. In this perspective, “safer by design” strategies can guarantee some (...) most basic rights of citizens. Secondly, the debate on trump rights also suggests that safety needs to be regarded as part of a more comprehensive normative framework. Even trump rights are competitive in that a plurality of rights needs to be respected. A final section gives evidence that both claims resonate with recent insights in debate on the precautionary principle. This section also highlights the recent emphasis on environmental concerns. (shrink)