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Angela M. Smith [19]Angela Marie Smith [1]
  1. Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
  2. On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible.Angela M. Smith - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):465-484.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge (...)
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  3. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account.Angela M. Smith - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):575-589.
  4. Responsibility as Answerability.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):99-126.
    ABSTRACTIt has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ , but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some questions and doubts about this distinction and (...)
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  5. Attitudes, Tracing, and Control.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2):115-132.
    There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to (...)
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  6.  41
    The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays.Randolph K. Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. -/- Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such (...)
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  7. Conflicting Attitudes, Moral Agency, and Conceptions of the Self.Angela M. Smith - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):331-352.
  8.  93
    Identification and responsibility.Angela M. Smith - 2000 - In A. Van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 233--246.
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  9. Guilty Thoughts.Angela M. Smith - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
  10.  97
    Character, blameworthiness, and blame: comments on George Sher’s In Praise of Blame.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):31-39.
    In his recent book, In Praise of Blame, George Sher argues (among other things) that a bad act can reflect negatively on a person if that act results in an appropriate way from that person's "character," and defends a novel "two-tiered" account of what it is to blame someone. In these brief comments, I raise some questions and doubts about each of these aspects of his rich and thought-provoking account.
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  11.  92
    Knowledge and Expertise in the Early Platonic Dialogues.Angela M. Smith - 1998 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80 (2):129-161.
  12.  23
    The Trouble with Tolerance.Angela M. Smith - 2011 - In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 179-199.
  13. 10. Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness (pp. 632-637). [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Way, Gregg Strauss, Tim Willenken, Matthew Talbert, Angela M. Smith, James A. Montmarquet, Nicole Hassoun, Virginia Held & Nicholas Wolterstorff - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3).
  14.  59
    Making a difference, making a statement and making conversation.Angela M. Smith - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (3):213-221.
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  15.  74
    Rethinking Responsibility, by K. E. Boxer.Angela M. Smith - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):189-194.
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  16.  66
    Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and “The Morality System”. [REVIEW]Angela M. Smith - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):333-345.
    This paper explores one facet of Paul Russell’s unique “critical compatibilist” position on moral responsibility, which concerns his rejection of R. Jay Wallace’s “narrow construal” of moral responsibility as a concept tied exclusively to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. After explaining Russell’s critique of Wallace’s view, the paper considers a Wallace-inspired challenge based on the idea that questions of moral responsibility raise distinct issues of “fairness” that apply only to a narrow subset of the Strawsonian reactive (...)
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  17. 10. Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (pp. 422-427). [REVIEW]Sarah Buss, Angela M. Smith, Sophia R. Moreau, Maria Merritt, Ruth Chang & Cass R. Sunstein - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2).
  18. Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness. [REVIEW]Angela M. Smith - 2010 - Social Theory and Practice 36 (3):515-524.
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  19.  72
    Review of Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will[REVIEW]Angela M. Smith - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1).
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