In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..

This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...) attractive and feasible empiricism. (shrink)

This book aims to offer an account of conscious experience and of concepts that help us understand empirical reasoning and empirical dialectic. The account offered possesses, it is claimed, two virtues. First, it provides great theoretical freedom. It allows the theoretician freedom to radically reconceive the world. The theoretician may, for example, begin with the conception that colors are genuine qualities of physical bodies and may, in light of empirical findings, shift to the conception that colors are not genuine qualities (...) at all. Second, the account grants empirical reason a great power to constrain: empirical reason can force a particular conception of the self and the world on the rational inquirer. These seemingly contrary virtues are reconciled through a novel treatment of presentation and appearances in the account offered of conscious experience and a novel treatment of ostensive definitions in the account offered of concepts. The argument of the book is buttressed by a critical study of the principal approaches to experience and reason found in the philosophical literature.--. (shrink)

We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.

This chapter addresses the problem: what is the contribution of experience to knowledge? It argues that the problem is best appreciated by reflection on two commonplace ideas about experience and knowledge—ideas that appear to be in some tension with one another. These ideas are labelled as “Insight of Empiricism” and the “Multiple-Factorizability of Experience”.

Anil Gupta; XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 227–246, https.

I discuss in this paper a criticism of modal logic due to Donald Davidson and John Wallace. They have claimed that, to quote Wallace, “modal predicate calculus does not provide a reasonable standpoint from which to interpret a language” (1970, p. 147). The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate their argument for this claim.

This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.

We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the (...) biconditionals of the form “ ‘A’ is true iff A.”. (shrink)

Some criticisms are offered of Barwise and Etchemendy's theory of truth, the principal one being that it violates a feature of truth called “supervenience”.

I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliability constraint are (...) insufficient; and (6) that convergence is bound to fail since epistemic entitlements are permissions. (shrink)

Adam Marushak raises a dilemma for the proponents of the hypothetical given. On one of its horns, the proponents are said to be committed to rationalism; and on the other horn, to skepticism. I argue, in response, that even if we grant that the arguments of both horns are sound, the commitments incurred are light and unproblematic. I argue also that the dilemma is based on a reading of the hypothetical that, though valuable, needs to be refined in light of (...) certain distinctions. These distinctions concern the different support relations that can obtain between beliefs are various elements of a view. (shrink)

This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an (...) explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning. (shrink)

I want to thank my critics not only for their attention to my book but also for their hospitality in Valencia, where they first presented me with their stimulating and wide‐ranging criticisms. 1 Th...

The concept of truth serves in logic not only as an instrument but also as an object of study. Eubulides of Miletus (fl. fourth century BCE), a Megarian logician, discovered the paradox known as ‘the Liar,’ and, ever since his discovery, logicians down the ages ‐ Aristotle and Chrysippus, John Buridan and William Heytesbury, and Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, to mention just a few ‐ have tried to understand the puzzling behavior of the concept of truth.

A foundationalist account of our empirical thinking divides propositions we accept into two classes, basic and derivative, and sees the warrant of derivative propositions as accruing to them through their derivation from basic propositions. Such an account needs to answer two questions: which propositions are basic, and whence do basic propositions acquire their warrant? A natural and ancient answer to these questions is that basic propositions are observational and that these propositions gain their warrant from perceptions. I critically examine this (...) view and also a variant view offered by Wilfrid Sellars. I put forward an alternative conception, dialectical foundationalism, that sees the distinction between the basic and the derivative as issuing from a distinction between two kinds of reasoning, derivational and dialectical. This type of foundationalism provides a more accurate account of our empirical thinking, I argue, than its traditional and Sellarsian counterparts. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 232-235, January 2022.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 256-270, January 2022.

I argue that a general logic of definitions must tolerate ω‐inconsistency. I present a semantical scheme, S, under which some definitions imply ω‐inconsistent sets of sentences. I draw attention to attractive features of this scheme, and I argue that S yields the minimal general logic of definitions. I conclude that any acceptable general logic should permit definitions that generate ω‐inconsistency. This conclusion gains support from the application of S to the theory of truth.