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Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics And Political Science
Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics
  1.  69
    Imprecise Probabilities.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 107-130.
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  2. Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Noûs:69-87.
    Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the ‘two bets’ argument for sharp probabilities.
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  3. Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.
    In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The question of (...)
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  4.  91
    Deference, Respect and Intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on (...)
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  5.  7
    Awareness growth and dispositional attitudes.Anna Mahtani - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Richard Bradley and others endorse Reverse Bayesianism as the way to model awareness growth. I raise a problem for Reverse Bayesianism—at least for the general version that Bradley endorses—and argue that there is no plausible way to restrict the principle that will give us the right results. To get the right results, we need to pay attention to the attitudes that agents have towards propositions of which they are unaware. This raises more general questions about how awareness growth should be (...)
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  6. Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments.Anna Mahtani - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450.
    The Reflection Principle can be defended with a Diachronic Dutch Book Argument (DBA), but it is also defeated by numerous compelling counter-examples. It seems then that Diachronic DBAs can lead us astray. Should we reject them en masse—including Lewis’s Diachronic DBA for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s (...)
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  7. The Ex Ante Pareto Principle.Anna Mahtani - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (6):303-323.
    The concept of ‘pareto superiority’ plays a central role in ethics, economics, and law. Pareto superiority is sometimes taken as a relation between outcomes, and sometimes as a relation between actions—even where the outcomes of the actions are uncertain. Whether one action is classed as pareto superior to another depends on the prospects under the actions for each person concerned. I argue that a person’s prospects can depend on how that person is designated. Without any constraints on acceptable designators, then, (...)
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  8. Imaginative Resistance Without Conflict.Anna Mahtani - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):415-429.
    I examine a range of popular solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. According to each solution in this range, imaginative resistance occurs only when we are asked to imagine something that conflicts with what we believe. I show that imaginative resistance can occur without this sort of conflict, and so that every solution in the range under consideration fails. I end by suggesting a new explanation for imaginative resistance—the Import Solution—which succeeds where the other solutions considered fail.
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  9.  18
    Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that are said to be vague. One classic example of a vague term is the word ‘heap’. A single grain clearly does not make a heap, and a million grains does make a heap, but where exactly does the (...)
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  10. Can Vagueness Cut Out at Any Order?Anna Mahtani - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):499 – 508.
    Could a sentence be, say, 3rd order vague, but 4th order precise? In Williamson 1999 we find an argument that seems to show that this is impossible: every sentence is either 1st order precise, 2nd order precise, or infinitely vague. The argument for this claim is unpersuasive, however, and this paper explains why.
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  11.  45
    Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that are said to be vague. One classic example of a vague term is the word ‘heap’. A single grain clearly does not make a heap, and a million grains does make a heap, but where exactly does the (...)
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  12. Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
    We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (...)
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  13.  47
    The Dispositional Account of Credence.Anna Mahtani - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):727-745.
    In this paper I offer an alternative - the ‘dispositional account’ - to the standard account of imprecise probabilism. Whereas for the imprecise probabilist, an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of credence functions, on the dispositional account an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of sets of credence functions. On the face of it, the dispositional account looks less elegant than the standard account – so why should we be interested? I argue that the dispositional (...)
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  14.  24
    Thinking Precisely About Vagueness: An Interview with Anna Mahtani.Anna Mahtani - unknown
    How many hairs must a person lose before they become bald? There doesn’t seem to be an easy way of answering this. This is because “bald”, along with a large number of other words, is vague. This vagueness causes problems and Anna Mahtani specialises in thinking very precisely about these problems….
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  15.  13
    Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that are said to be vague. One classic example of a vague term is the word ‘heap’. A single grain clearly does not make a heap, and a million grains does make a heap, but where exactly does the (...)
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  16.  3
    Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that are said to be vague. One classic example of a vague term is the word ‘heap’. A single grain clearly does not make a heap, and a million grains does make a heap, but where exactly does the (...)
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  17. Williamson on Inexact Knowledge.Anna Mahtani - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
    Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
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  18.  36
    Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.
    Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: he doesn't know it, but he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: (...)
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  19.  1
    Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2018 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that are said to be vague. One classic example of a vague term is the word ‘heap’. A single grain clearly does not make a heap, and a million grains does make a heap, but where exactly does the (...)
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  20.  12
    Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 1: Credences and Preferences.Anna Mahtani - unknown
    Decision theorists and philosophers of language have a lot to learn from one another. In the first of this two-part series, Anna Mahtani looks at the use and interpretation of credences and preferences.
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  21.  84
    The Instability of Vague Terms.Anna Mahtani - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):570–576.
    Timothy Williamson's response to the question why we cannot know where the sharp boundaries marked by vague terms lie involves the claim that vague terms are unstable. Several theorists would not accept this claim, and it is tempting to think that this gives them a good objection to Williamson. By clarifying the structure of Williamson's response to the title question, I show that this objection is wrong-headed, and reveal a new line of attack.
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  22.  9
    Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 2: Indexicals and Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2017 - LSE Philosophy Blog.
    In her second post in this series, Anna Mahtani explores the parallels between philosophy of language and decision theory’s treatment of indexicals and vagueness.
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