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Anna-Maria A. Eder
University of Cologne
  1.  23
    Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...)
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  2. Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality.Peter Broessel, Anna-Maria A. Eder & Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):279-300.
  3. How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement.Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2359-2381.
    How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...)
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  4.  82
    No Match Point for the Permissibility Account.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673.
    In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of (...)
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  5.  69
    Decision Theory and Rationality. [REVIEW]Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):326-329.
  6. Wahrscheinlichkeit und Erkenntnis.Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2013 - In Thomas Bonk (ed.), Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie.
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  7. A Study on the Foundations of Theories of Epistemic Rationality.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2016 - Dissertation,
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