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Anna-Sara Malmgren
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
  1. Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.
    It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. (...)
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  2. Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.
  3. Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.
  4. A Priori Testimony Revisited.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  5. Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):795-803.
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    On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.
    Some psychological states—paradigmatically, beliefs and intentions—are rationally evaluable: they can be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Other states—e.g. sensations and gastrointestinal states—aren't: they're a‐rational. On a familiar but hard‐to‐make‐precise line of thought, at least part of what explains this difference is that we're somehow responsible for (having/being in) states of the former sort, in a way we're not for the others. But this responsibility can't be modeled on the responsibility we have for our (free, intentional) actions. So how should (...)
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  7. Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.
    According to a widely shared generic conception of inferential justification—‘the standard conception’—an agent is inferentially justified in believing that p only if she has antecedently justified beliefs in all the non-redundant premises of a good argument for p. This conception tends to serve as the starting-point in contemporary debates about the nature and scope of inferential justification: as neutral common ground between various competing, more specific, conceptions. But it’s a deeply problematic starting-point. This paper explores three questions that haven’t been (...)
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  8. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sanford C. Goldberg. [REVIEW]Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1251-1258.
  9. Review of "Philosophy Without Intuitions" by Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW]Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.