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Anna-Sara Malmgren
Stanford University
  1. Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.
    It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. (...)
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  2. Is There a Priori Knowledge by Testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.
  3. Review of "Philosophy Without Intuitions" by Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW]Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  4. A Priori Testimony Revisited.Anna-Sara Malmgren - forthcoming - In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  5. Review of "Relying on Others" by Sanford Goldberg. [REVIEW]Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2012 - Mind.