11 found
See also
Anne Baril
Washington University in St. Louis
  1. Eudaimonia in Contemporary Virtue Ethics.Anne Baril - 2014 - In Stan van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing. pp. 17-27.
  2. The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism.Anne Baril - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):511-535.
    Eudaimonists deny that eudaimonism is objectionably egoistic, but the way in which they do so commits them to eschewing an important insight that has been a central motivation for eudaimonism: the idea that an individual must, in the end, organize her life in such a way that it is good for her. In this paper I argue that the egoism objection prods eudaimonists to make a choice between (what we might roughly call) welfare-prior and excellence-prior eudaimonism, and I make some (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. Pragmatic Encroachment and Practical Reasons.Anne Baril - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  4. Pragmatic Encroachment in Accounts of Epistemic Excellence.Anne Baril - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3929-3952.
    Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. (Fantl and McGrath 2007) In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (2007), Bishop and Trout (2005), (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5.  34
    The Ethical Importance of Roles.Anne Baril - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (4):721-734.
  6. A Eudaimonist Approach to the Problem of Significance.Anne Baril - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):215-241.
    Some beliefs seem more significant than others. This paper suggests an approach to explaining this apparent fact. As there are multiple senses in which one belief may be more significant than another, multiple possible sources of such significance, and, moreover, no prima facie reason to expect a single, unified account under which all these senses and sources can be subsumed, I propose the modest approach of articulating just one feature in virtue of which a belief may fairly be called significant: (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Review of Intelligent Virtue, by Julia Annas. [REVIEW]Anne Baril - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):241-245.
  8.  74
    Review of Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. [REVIEW]Anne Baril - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  9. What Makes the Epistemic Virtues Valuable?Anne Baril - 2019 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. pp. 69-80.
    No categories
    Export citation  
  10.  16
    Aristotle and the Virtues. By Howard Curzer. [REVIEW]Anne Baril - 2014 - Ancient Philosophy 34 (1):216-219.
  11.  11
    Review: Paul Bloomfield, The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life. [REVIEW]Anne Baril - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):489-494.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation